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Anotace 
Diplomová práce „Reforma zpravodajských složek Spojených států amerických 
po 11. září 2001: Posílení schopností Spojených států v boji proti terorismu?” zkoumá 
reformu zpravodajských složek USA přijatou po teroristických útocích z 11. září 2001 
s cílem zlepšení protiteroristických schopností Spojených států. Jednoduchý model 
vstupu-výstupu vycházející ze systémové teorie byl vytvořen k evaluaci výstupů 
reformy zpravodajských služeb USA po 11. září na základě efektivity (effectiveness) a  
výkonnosti (efficiency). Kritérium efektivity (effectiveness) je chápáno jako schopnost 
zpravodajských složek zabránit teroristickým útokům, zatímco pod výkonností 
(efficiency) jsou rozuměny opatření a procesy podniknuté na organizační úrovni v rámci 
zpravodajských složek za účelem zabránění teroristickým útokům. Z představené 
analýzy vyplývá , že zpravodajské složky Spojených států amerických po 11. září jsou 
převážně efektivní (tj. od 11. září nedošlo k žádnému teroristickému útoku na USA 
v takovém rozsahu jako útoky z 11. září). Avšak nejsou výkonné (efficient) z důvodu 
organizačních problémů, které zahrnují nedostatečný management, neschopnost nebo 
neochotu jednotlivých zpravodajských agentur spolupracovat a sdílet informace, a 
nedostatečnou motivaci zaměstnanců i případných zájemců o práci ve zpravodajských 
službách. Tyto institucionální nedostatky pak vedou k nevýkonnosti (inefficiency) 
zpravodajských složek, která následně ohrožuje efektivní (effective) zpravodajskou 
obranu před teroristickými hrozbami. 
 
Annotation 
Diploma thesis “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Post-9/11: Strengthening 
the U.S.’s Ability to Fight Terrorism?” examines the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 implemented in order to improve ability of 
 the United States to counter terrorist threats. A simple input-output model developed 
within systems theory is used to evaluate the post-9/11 intelligence reform outputs on 
the basis of effectiveness and efficiency. The criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been 
conceptualized as the ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, 
whereas ‘efficiency’ has been operationalized as measures undertaken at the 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist 
attacks. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the U.S. intelligence 
community since 9/11 is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist 
attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack 
of leadership, inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to 
provide the right incentives for current personnel and potential recruits to the 
intelligence community. These institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the 
intelligence community, which consequently endanger the intelligence community’s 
effectiveness in countering terrorist threats.  
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the equilibrium of U.S. 
perceptions of terrorist threats. This form of violence was not new in American 
historical experience, the threat and use of psychological and physical force by 
individuals, sub-national groups, and state actors aimed at attaining political, social and 
economic objectives in violation of domestic and international law have challenged the 
United States many times in the past. However, this unprecedented (in its extent and 
brutality) action against ordinary citizens of the United States carried out on American 
soil, underscored the vulnerability and unpreparedness of the country for such an attack. 
Most importantly, it highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and 
operational capabilities to counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community 
found it difficult to operate in an integrated manner because its structure was a Cold 
War relic with no single actor with ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch 
lacked an effective planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
The first problem is that the U.S. intelligence community during the 1990s was 
still operating on a structure designed to counter one single enemy – the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. Therefore, a number of cold war legacies were disabling the 
intelligence community to adapt and to react to the rapid growth of transnational threats, 
especially international terrorism. These legacies were all based on divisions and 
boundaries. On the organizational side, the collection of intelligence was divided into 
“stovepipes” by source: human intelligence (HUMINT) under the CIA, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) under the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) under the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The analysis part 
was also organized primarily by agency and not by issue or problem. The CIA was 
responsible for “all-source” analysis, but other agencies had their analysis units as well, 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The second division was, thus, on the CIA/DOD line. The CIA was an 
independent entity, while agencies performing signals and imagery intelligence were 
located within the DOD. Focusing on one target supported competition between the 
agencies, which proved generally beneficial during the Cold War. But the competition 
also led to many turf wars between the agencies and had a negative effect on 
cooperation, which became crucial for countering the transnational threats. The last 
divide was on the domestic-foreign intelligence axis. Out of concern for civil liberties, 
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the CIA was prohibited from performing internal security functions. These powers were 
vested in the FBI, which, however, was first and foremost a law enforcement agency, 
and therefore oriented mostly reactively not preventively. Moreover, the barrier between 
domestic and foreign intelligence had negative effects on information sharing and 
cooperation as well.  
The second problem was that of determining priorities. Transnational threats 
were not new for U.S. intelligence community, but they were treated as marginal within 
the Cold War context. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the growing 
importance of transnational threats, led by terrorism, were recognized both by 
intelligence officials as well as the decision makers. However, the transition from 
focusing on one single target, which is essentially bounded by borders and hierarchical 
in structure to targets which are asymmetric and, by definition, transnational, was not 
realized in a swift enough fashion in order to prevent the attacks from happening. 
All of these problems were addressed already before 9/11. Twelve bipartisan 
blue-ribbon commissions, independent think tank task forces and presidential initiatives 
recognized the post-Cold War deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community and 
made hundreds of recommendations to improve it. However, they were largely ignored 
by both the decision makers, as well as intelligence officials. The changed post-Cold 
War environment was not a sufficient impetus for making a substantial reform of how 
intelligence institutions operated. It seemed that only a catastrophe of 9/11 scope would 
provide the right momentum for change.  
 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two interconnected questions. The first 
question is whether the U.S. intelligence community has become more effective and 
efficient since 9/11? Throughout this research, effectiveness is understood as the ability 
to prevent surprise attacks, whereas efficiency means measures undertaken on 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those attacks. 
Close examination of the governmental actions carried out in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, as well as of the proposed reform embedded in the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act and its subsequent implementation into practice shows 
that the U.S. intelligence community is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any 
successful terrorist attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, 
which in return adversely affect the effectiveness of the intelligence community in 
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countering terrorist threats. These organizational problems include lack of leadership, 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right 
incentives for personnel and potential recruits. These organizational deficiencies reduce 
the intelligence community’s efficiency, which thereafter endanger its effectiveness. 
The second question explores why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by 
the 9/11 intelligence failure, a comprehensive reform of the intelligence community has 
not materialized. In this thesis it is hypothesized that the adoption of substantial 
intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) was obstructed by 
three main factors. First, reform was obstructed by the nature of the intelligence 
organizations themselves. Second, reform was hindered by the rational choices of the 
U.S. leadership (both the president and the legislators). Third, the reform agenda was 
strongly shaped by American citizens’ democratic principles and their core beliefs 
regarding civil liberties. However, among these three obstacles to intelligence reform, 
the institutional aspect is perhaps the most important as institutions are the means by 
which public preferences are transformed into concrete policies. In other words, 
organization matters.1 Organizational structure, culture and management all influence 
how effective and efficient the system will be. Furthermore, in order to keep this thesis 
within a reasonable range, most attention will be paid to the organizational obstacles to 
intelligence reform. 
The two main categories for evaluating the U.S intelligence community before 
and after 9/11 are its effectiveness and efficiency and the relationship between these two 
criteria (independent variables) are summarized in Figure 1. The level of effectiveness 
is defined as ability to prevent the terrorist attacks from happening. Even though it is, as 
many authors conclude, impossible to prevent all surprise attacks the effectiveness of 
intelligence community may be evaluated on the basis of how many attacks were 
successfully prevented.2 The record of successful terrorist attacks on American targets 
before 9/11 is thus zero, whereas given that no terrorist attack of 9/11 scope was 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, terms organization and institution and their derivatives are treated as 
equal. 
2
 See for example: Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable”. World Politics 31 (1): 61-89 or more recently: Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of 
Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Colombia University 
Press. or Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the Wake of 9/11. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. or Pillar, Paul R. 2006. “Good Literature and Bad 
History: The 9/11 Commission’s Tale of Strategic Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 21 
(6): 1022-1044 or most recently Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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committed since 9/11 this fact may be reasonably interpreted as showing the 
effectiveness of U.S. intelligence community.3 
 
Figure 1. Effectiveness and Efficiency of U.S. Intelligence Community before and 
after 9/11 
 
Note: Effectiveness is understood in this study as the ability to prevent surprise attacks. Efficiency means 
measures undertaken on organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those 
attacks. Figure 1. shows that the pre-9/11 intelligence community was neither effective nor efficient. The 
intent of the post-9/11 reform was to create both an effective and efficient intelligence community 
indicated by the dotted arrow. The actual implementation of the intelligence reform legislation and 
executive actions did lead to enhanced effectiveness, but not to increased efficiency (as shown by the 
large clear arrow). 
 
The efficiency criterion is understood here as the number of actions undertaken in order 
to achieve a certain level of effectiveness. These include adapting and prioritizing 
among threats, cooperation and information sharing among agencies, creating a strong 
centralized leadership recognized by everyone, and creating the right incentives for 
personnel working in the intelligence services. Before 9/11 none of these actions was 
accomplished to a degree that was in hindsight considered acceptable (i.e. preventing 
the 9/11 attacks). But what is more surprising is that even after 9/11, the intelligence 
reforms have still not managed to create efficient intelligence community.  
Thus, the original aim of transforming the U.S. intelligence community into a 
single, unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks 
as well as efficient in doing so has not been realized.4 Although, the post-9/11 
                                                 
3
 There are opinions suggesting that there in fact was a number of terrorist attacks on American targets 
since 9/11, such as the Virginia snipers case (see e.g. Gruen, Madeleine, Hyland Frank. 2008. “No Attack 
in the U.S. since 9/11? available at:< 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/no_attack_in_the_us_since_911.php> [accessed 28.4. 2010]), 
however compared to the scope of successful Al Qaeda attacks during the 1990s such as the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing and the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy attacks and the 9/11, the post-9/11 
incidents are not of an equal importance. 
4
 Reform of the U.S. intelligence community as a centralized and unified enterprise was proposed by the 
9/11 Commission and accepted by the subsequent legislative and presidential action. 
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intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain unresolved. 
 
Roadmap of the Research 
The argument presented in this diploma thesis will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 will provide the theoretical and methodological background for this research 
thesis. This work will commence with a definition of intelligence and a brief discussion 
of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical approaches to the 
study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence community reform will be 
introduced. Lastly, the Eastonian input/output methodology employed in this research 
study will be presented. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It will 
examine the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the 
repeated attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of 
transnational threats. This will be followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these 
reform attempts.  
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as 
to why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from 
happening again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and 
recommendations will be examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President 
Bush, undertaken simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, 
and their impact on the intelligence community reform will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 will delve into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions will be 
evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. 
Chapter 5 will provide some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient will be proposed. 
 
The original research proposal for this thesis submitted and accepted in June 2009 
intended to study the change in U.S. homeland security after 9/11 with an aspect of 
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intelligence reform as a part of the research. However, throughout the preparation and 
study period of the thesis, the whole topic of homeland security and intelligence reform 
appeared to be too broad for the range of the diploma thesis. Therefore, the author in 
consultation with her advisor reduced the focus of the research to the U.S. intelligence 
reform only. This approach will enable this thesis to delve in more depth into the 
problem of U.S. intelligence reform. The homeland security aspect is mentioned in part 
3.2.2, but it serves only as additional factor in the intelligence reform analysis. 
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1. Studying Intelligence and its Reform: An Academically Forgotten 
Field 
The subject of intelligence and especially of intelligence reform has been 
generally overlooked by both political scientists and organization theorists. This is 
because the study of intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is difficult 
because much of the evidence and data is secret. More will be said on this point in 
section 1.2. In addition, there is at present no widely accepted definition of intelligence 
and this lack of conceptual clarity also makes the study of intelligence difficult. 
Notwithstanding, the problems associated with secrecy surrounding intelligence work it 
is essential from the outset to develop an explicit working definition of what is meant by 
the term “intelligence”, what can be understood as intelligence, and also its relationship 
to national security and foreign policy making. These issues will be dealt with in the 
first section of this chapter. 
In the second section different academic approaches to the study of intelligence 
will be introduced. These contrasting approaches may be interpreted as different facets 
of the study of intelligence. They include topics such as relationship of intelligence to 
policy making, to democratic principles and the ethics of intelligence or the study of 
intelligence failure in general. However, the question of intelligence community reform 
has not been discussed in great depth so far within the political science or organizational 
literatures.  
For this reason, there is at present no “ready-made” theory, which could be used 
and applied to U.S. intelligence community reform post 9/11. Thus, in order to explain 
the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community to both the pre- and post-9/11 efforts a 
combined approach of organization and bureaucracy theory with aspects from political 
science and decision making must be developed. Lastly, this chapter will present the 
research method used in this thesis. 
 
1.1. What Is Intelligence and Why Is It Important for National Security? 
According to Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading expert in intelligence studies, there 
are several ways to think about intelligence:5 
                                                 
5
 There has been a rich ongoing discussion about what intelligence is, which due to space constraints 
cannot be delved into here, and thus Mark Lowenthal’s approach was chosen. For more information on 
definitions of intelligence, see e.g. Davis, Jack. 1992. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949”. Studies in 
Intelligence 36 (5): 91-104. 
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• Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which 
certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, 
and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are 
conceived and conducted. 
• Intelligence as a product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of 
these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operation 
themselves. 
• Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that 
carry out its various functions.6 
 
Throughout this thesis, the third type of intelligence perception will be mostly used 
because it addresses the key aspect of intelligence analyzed in this thesis – intelligence 
community as an institutional body and its parts. 
Another way of thinking about intelligence is to see it in terms of the craft of 
intelligence, which has two basic components. The first is collection – that is gathering 
of particular information about intelligence targets. Collection is done through different 
methods, such as human intelligence – spies and informants; signals intelligence – 
intercepted communications; imagery intelligence – maps, pictures, etc.; and open 
source intelligence – information derived from publicly available sources. The second 
component is analysis – that is studying collected information and deriving conclusions, 
judgments, or predictions.  
According to one intelligence scholar, “in general, analysis should drive 
collection so that collection focuses on obtaining the information that analysts need in 
order to render their conclusions, judgments, or predictions. ‘All-source analysis’ refers 
to analysis of an intelligence topic using information collected by all relevant 
methods.”7 This process of tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating 
intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. Special functions outside of the intelligence 
cycle are covert actions and counterintelligence, which is focused on protecting the 
country, as well as intelligence agencies, from the activities of other foreign intelligence 
services8. 
                                                 
6
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 8. 
7
 Lederman, Gordon N. 2005. “Restructuring the Intelligence Community”. p. 89 in Peter Berkowitz 
(ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution. 
8
 Turner, Michael A. 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield., p. 41. 
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Intelligence, in the meaning of a finalized product, is an essential part of national 
security policy making. It can provide crucial information about the potential enemy or 
support (or provide evidence against) a certain national security policy action. As 
Robert Jervis contends, “the purpose of intelligence is to provide an understanding of 
the world on which foreign policy can be based and to support instruments to influence 
and possibly deceive others.”9 Policymakers generally accept the intelligence as an 
important part of their decision and policymaking. However, the role and importance of 
intelligence varies in each administration. Again using in words of Robert Jervis, 
“policy makers say they need and want very good intelligence. They do indeed need it, 
but often do not want it.”10 This means that sometimes the view of intelligence analysts 
is not the same as that of the decision makers. This is because it is not always the case 
that intelligence submitted to decision makers is supportive of a government’s preferred 
policy goals. Thus, the relationship between decision makers and intelligence is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
1.2. Academic Approaches to the Study of Intelligence 
The essence of intelligence, both in the meaning of the information provided as 
well as the process, is secrecy. According to Michael Warner, “even the accidental 
disclosure of some analytical, informational, or operational advantage over a rival or an 
enemy is presumed to be tantamount to the loss of that advantage while it is still 
potentially useful.”11 The fact that intelligence is conducted with some level of secrecy 
makes it very hard for the scholars of intelligence to undertake comprehensive analyses. 
As Warner concludes, “intelligence studies have been conducted one way on the 
‘outside’ with no official access to original records, and another way on the ‘inside’, 
where a few scholars have intermittently enjoy sanctioned (if not always complete) 
access to the extant documentation.”12 Thus, an imbalance is created where studying 
intelligence from the outside is extremely difficult and in a sense incomplete, and on the 
other hand the internal sources and studies are difficult to verify. 
                                                 
9
 Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception, and Deception”. p. 70 in Jennifer E. 
Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
10
 Jervis, Robert. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform”. The 
Forum 4 (1): 1. 
11
 Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence”. p. 17 in Loch K. Johnson 
(ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Due to the element of secrecy and also due to the various meanings of 
intelligence, there is little published material on how to study intelligence. Thomas 
Bruneau and Steven Boraz point to the striking fact that “whereas intelligence officers 
and the organizations within which they function in the intelligence community are 
extremely rigorous methodologically in concluding their work, when we turn to the 
study of intelligence structures and processes by outsiders and retired intelligence 
professionals, there is little rigor and virtually no consensus on how to research and 
analyze the intelligence community.”13  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the failure of intelligence community to 
prevent them, attention of scholars as well as former intelligence officials to study 
intelligence heightened, however there is only little available analysis on the 
organization of intelligence and its reform. Even the aforementioned Bruneau and Boraz 
focus in their volume Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness, on the question of relationship between democracy and intelligence. Thus 
they analyze topics such as democratic control of intelligence, the legislative and 
judicial oversight, the problem of civil rights protection with connection to intelligence, 
and the transformation of intelligence from a tool of state oppression in transitional 
countries.14 Many other authors have also focused on the question of ethics and 
intelligence, such as Michael Herman15, or on intelligence oversight in the United 
States, for example L. Britt Snider16 or Jennifer Kibbe.17 
Other authors envisage the U.S. intelligence community reform after 9/11 
through the lenses of changes in intelligence analysis, technology, and intelligence 
collection methods and practices. Here the volume Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, 
Obstacles, and Innovations edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce18 stands out 
                                                 
13
 Bruneau, Thomas C., Boraz, Steven C. 2007. “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness”. P.1 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to 
Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”. Intelligence and National 
Security 19 (2): 342-358. 
16
 Snider, L Britt. 2005. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 11”. Pp. 239-258 in 
Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
17
 Kibbe, Jennifer. 2010. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: In the Solution Part of the Problem?” 
Intelligence and National Security 25(1): 24-49. 
18
 George, Roger Z., Bruce James B. (eds.). 2008. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and 
Innovations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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for its comprehensive treatment of this subject matter. Among other scholars focusing 
on these topics are Stephen Marrin19 and Deborah G. Barger20. 
Third group of authors, who touch upon the problem of intelligence reform, 
focuses on the question of intelligence failure and its prevention. Their approach 
explains that intelligence failures are inevitable and impossible to prevent. Therefore, 
there is no need for substantial reform intelligence community because it in general 
works well. Moreover, reforms of the whole intelligence community would negatively 
affect those parts of the system that produce good results. Main proponents of this 
approach are mostly former intelligence professionals, for example Richard K. Betts21, 
Richard Posner22, and Paul R. Pillar.23 
All of these approaches to the study of intelligence address a certain type of 
change or reform of intelligence, in all three of its meanings. However, none of them 
analyze the organization of intelligence and its importance. Neither do they present a 
suitable theoretical framework for evaluating the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after 9/11 in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. Only three authors 
tackle the question of intelligence community reform from an organizational point of 
view. The first is Amy Zegart, who in her book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11,24 creates a combined theoretical approach to study adaptation failure of 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on both organization theory and political 
science theory of rational choice decision making. Even though this scholar applies her 
framework to an explanation of U.S. intelligence community failure before 9/11, her 
combined framework proves useful even for evaluating the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community reform. The second is a couple of authors, Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas 
Skelley, who in their chapter Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory25 provide an insight of organization theory on the organizational 
structure, culture and management of the intelligence community. The next part of this 
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chapter will present the main arguments for an organizational approach to the topic of 
U.S. intelligence community reform.  
 
1.3. Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform 
In order to build a model of the U.S. intelligence community reform, which 
would allow its proper evaluation and explanation, both organization theory as well as 
the theory of new institutionalism and rational choice decision making will be used. 
Even though, the main focus is on the organizational side of the intelligence 
community, its internal structures, cultures and management, attention also has to be 
paid to processes outside of the U.S. intelligence community. These explain the 
influence of leadership decision-making as well as the institutional design of the 
American democratic principles on the final outcome of the intelligence reform. 
Organization theory consists of a system of competing ideas some of which are 
useful for explaining the failure of the intelligence reform to create a more efficient 
intelligence community. Classical organization theory is focused mostly on private 
corporations and businesses, thus it is necessary to adopt a bureaucratic perspective 
from organization theory. Here the logic may be summarized as follows. First, internal 
change is difficult for private companies26 and even more for governmental 
organizations.27 Second, internal resistance to change is powerful because it is based on 
both the organizational structure and also on an entrenched culture of values, norms, 
ideas and identities.28 Three reasons why organizations resist change can be 
characterized in the following manner.  
First, there is the bounded rationality of organizational leaders, who settle for 
options to internal change that seem to them to be good, but which in fact might not be. 
However, because the leaders have usually incomplete information, cannot predict the 
future and are bound by cognitive constraints, it can lead them to adopt changes which 
might be poorly identified, while the real problems are not addressed and deficiencies 
prevail.29 
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The second reason is structural secrecy. In order to be efficient, organizations 
specialize and divide to proficient subunits focusing on specific tasks. However, this 
kind of specialization prevents the efficient movement of knowledge and information 
within an organization. The resulting outcome is that “people in one part of the 
organization often lack the expertise to understand the work of people in other parts of 
the organization.”30 Structural secrecy makes it hard for managers to understand what 
exactly are the subunits doing and what needs to be changed. “The very structures, 
rules, and technologies designed to improve efficiency sabotage the organizations 
ability to learn and change.”31 
Finally, the liability of time or institutional inertia is the third factor limiting the 
organizational change. All organizations become more resistant to change as routines, 
norms, and relationships get established over time. Here, the problem is multifaceted. 
Organizational management supports standardization in operating procedures, 
motivation of employees, etc. But the very measures that create stability and reliability 
reduce the probability of change.32 In addition, the growing homogeneity of 
organizational culture – i.e. norms, relationships, and behaviors – leads employees to be 
naturally resistant to change of the way things have been done because they have 
become comfortable and used to the old procedures.33 
These three obstacles to change apply to all organizations. However, change is 
even harder for government agencies. This is because governmental institutions are 
generally designed to be both stable and durable and hence resistant to change. 
Government institutions place a high value on reliability, predictability and consistency 
in performing their tasks.34 Moreover, it is much easier for government agencies to 
resist change because they are not operating in a competitive market environment, 
which motivates private companies to adapt in order to survive.  
Also, the political environment in which government institutions work makes it 
difficult for them to change. The political backing for the creation or reform of a 
governmental agency relies on compromising political coalitions. Political opposition in 
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the American democratic political system has various means to limit or hamper the 
reform or creation of a new agency.35  
Another obstacle to governmental agency change in comparison with the private 
sector is that managers of governmental organizations are restricted by many more 
rules, conflicting goals and bureaucratic red tape. The process of managerial decisions 
such as hiring and firing employees, or acquiring more funds is required to move 
through a complicated system of bureaucratic layers, which ultimately makes it difficult 
for the governmental agencies to change. 
Another way of changing agencies that do not manage internally is an imposed 
change from the outside, through executive or legislative action. These processes are not 
at the core of the argument of this thesis, but have a certain effect on the final outcome 
of the U.S. intelligence community reform and therefore need to be mentioned. 
Especially important is the fact that even here obstacles to organizational change 
emerge. These consist of the rational self-interest decision making of both the president 
as well as the legislators.  
For presidents the incentives to improve organizational effectiveness exist and 
presidents are expected to promote it. However, presidents must prioritize among issues 
on their packed agendas. With limited election terms, presidents focus mostly on issues 
that directly concern voters, rather then on changing the complicated organizational 
design of governmental agencies. As Zegart concludes, “presidents are especially 
reluctant to push for agency reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of 
anticipated resistance.”36 Also for legislators the topic of agency reform is mostly not 
attractive enough to delve into. Especially the intelligence reform has weak connection 
to voters in their electoral districts.  
A second external barrier to intelligence reform stems from some key principles 
of American democracy, its decentralized system of federal government and stress on 
civil liberties. The federal system of government, as was already mentioned, enables 
political opposition to mitigate the final outcomes of proposed reforms. Also, the 
emphasis on civil liberties usually complicates any attempts to reform and centralize the 
intelligence community out of the fear of civil rights violations if more power was 
vested in the intelligence community. 
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This overview of the intelligence and organizational literatures highlights a 
number of key themes relevant to reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
All organizations by their very nature are resistant to substantial change and are 
constrained by rational self-interest of key decision makers. In addition, public 
institutions must take into account their political environment. In the case, of 
intelligence organizations strong popular support for liberal democratic principles is a 
central consideration. Each of these three themes provides the building blocks for the 
research methodology used in this thesis. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
Given the complex theoretical framework applied to the study of the U.S. 
intelligence community reform, the research methodology requires a comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the actual research method used in this thesis may be summarized as an 
analytical and evaluative organizational narrative. The research methodology used in 
this thesis is based on an Eastonian37 input/output perspective on intelligence reform. 
The basic features of this methodological approach are presented schematically in 
Figure 1.1. 
Within this Figure 1.1 the development of the U.S. intelligence community 
before 9/11 as well as actions undertaken in order to promote intelligence reform post 
9/11 are considered to be inputs into the original institutional design of the intelligence 
community. Thereafter, the impact of the pre-9/11 situation and post-9/11 reform 
proposals will be evaluated using an organizational and rational-decision making 
framework. Lastly, the output or actual implementation of the legislation reforming the 
U.S. intelligence community will be evaluated based on the criteria of effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
The intelligence institutions depicted by the box in the centre of Figure 1.1 
consists of the internal organizational processes present within the U.S. intelligence 
community. These internal processes include the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within the intelligence agencies culture. 
The internal organizational processes are influenced by external processes entrenched in 
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the political and societal environment. The external environment processes consist of 
executive and legislative decisions made by the self-interest rationale of political 
leaders, as well as of the democratic societal values of citizens on the basis of deeply 
held beliefs regarding civil liberties. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the research methodology 
 
Note: This systems theory approach to intelligence provision, based on the work of Easton,38 views the 
work of intelligence institutions as being a product of the inputs into these institutions and the 
environment within which intelligence institutions operate. This model does not deal directly with the 
internal operations of intelligence institutions but suggests that institutional factors play an important 
role in mediating policy inputs and outputs. 
 
The pre-9/11 socio-political context will be discussed in chapter 2. This context is 
viewed in Figure 1.1 as providing a key input to the development of the U.S. 
intelligence community before 9/11. Within the approaches to the study of intelligence 
presented in section 2.2 of chapter 2, all of the previously mentioned themes such as 
limits of intelligence oversight, methods and practice of intelligence agencies 
influencing institutions decisions and actions, and the advocacy of the status quo by 
former intelligence professionals add to the pre-9/11 input will be discussed. Each of 
these themes has influenced the internal organizational design and culture of the U.S. 
intelligence community. 
Later in chapter 3 the focus will shift to an examination of the input provided by 
reactions to the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on governmental and legislative initiatives to 
reform the U.S. intelligence community. These actions have also had an impact on the 
internal institutional processes within the intelligence community. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
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thereafter evaluate all the interconnected input processes influencing the final output of 
the post-reform intelligence community in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. 
The evidence for the analysis and evaluation of the U.S. intelligence community 
reform presented in following chapters is drawn from a wide range of unclassified and 
declassified policy documents. This type of evidence is composed of various 
commission recommendations, official reports and working papers analyzing the pre-
9/11 and post-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence community, internal agency evaluation 
documents of the progress of implementing the intelligence reform propositions, various 
official strategies, and miscellaneous pieces of legislation related to the intelligence 
community reform. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical and methodological framework for this research 
thesis has been presented. The theoretical approach adopted draws inspiration from 
insights derived from the literatures on intelligence and organizations. These insights 
have been used in conjunction with an Eastonian systems model to construct a 
methodological approach exploring the two main influences, or inputs, on intelligence 
institutional reform and the enhanced security provision provided by intelligence 
organizations collectively. This policy output will be evaluated in terms of two central 
criteria: effectiveness and efficiency. Given the relative underdevelopment of the 
scholarly study of intelligence community reform such a methodological approach 
seems a reasonable approach to adopt when dealing a large volume of detailed evidence. 
In the next chapter, the process of applying the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives developed in the foregoing pages will be “put to the test” and used to 
marshal the evidence to address the two key questions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. 
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2. U.S. Intelligence Community before 9/11: Searching for Direction 
For about forty years the United States intelligence community focused on one 
overriding target: the Soviet Union, and its satellites. Attention and resources were 
mostly directed against Soviet nuclear forces and its conventional forces threatening 
Western Europe.39 However, with the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community, 
as well as the whole direction of the U.S. foreign policy, faced a dilemma of finding its 
purpose in a new unipolar world.40 The old adversary had disappeared and a new one 
was coming in many different forms and shapes. The intelligence community was 
expected to adapt to these new threats and to focus on a changed set of targets. The 
ability (or inability) to adapt to these changes forms part of the pre-9/11 input to the 
intelligence community reform agenda outlined earlier in the systems theory model 
presented in Figure 1.1. 
This chapter will first focus on the change of the intelligence environment after 
the end of the Cold War and the challenges posed by transnational threats. Although 
these threats were not new to the U.S. intelligence community, they were never in the 
forefront of its attention. In the second section, various attempts to reform the 
intelligence community before 9/11, based on the changing threats and targets, will be 
presented. These were set forth in recommendations of a number of bipartisan blue-
ribbon commissions, nonpartisan think tank reports and governmental initiatives 
undertaken during the 1990s. The final part of this chapter will examine the main 
obstacles to implementing these proposals and recommendations for a reform. 
 
2.1. Post-Cold War Environment: Adapting to New Threats 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
communist threat had diminished and there was no apparent threat from any foreign 
military power or any hostile ideology of comparable reach to that of the Soviet 
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Union.41 However, different types of threats to U.S. national security emerged. These 
threats were known to U.S. policy makers and intelligence analysts during the Cold 
War, but they were mostly understood as being peripheral to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its communist counterparts.  
The main characteristic of these threats is their asymmetric and transnational 
nature. The asymmetry is postulated by the non-state character of their actors, which 
can be mostly described as armed groups. According to Richard H. Schultz, a leading 
expert on the topic of asymmetric threats and armed groups, there are four categories of 
armed groups: terrorists, insurgents, militias, and organized crime. “All armed groups, 
to varying degrees, challenge the state’s authority, power, and legitimacy. Some do so 
by seeking to overthrow the government and replace it, while others attempt to weaken, 
manipulate, or co-opt the state.”42 This is achieved through the use violence and force in 
unconventional and asymmetric ways. The transnational aspect of these threats can be 
characterized by their disrespect for national boundaries and cross border operational 
mode. These threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.43 
Transnational threats and the actors responsible for them were not new for U.S. 
intelligence; the intelligence community had been active against organized crime and 
drug traffickers even during the Cold War. Similarly, terrorism was a re-occurring issue 
with recognized threats of Middle East terrorism since the 1970s and state-sponsored 
terrorism of the 1980s. But as Gregory Treverton points out, the novelty was: (1) in the 
growing importance of transnational threats, especially of terrorism, and (2) in the range 
of concern for transnational threats, which (again most notably terrorism) became the 
primary activity for intelligence.44 
Also, the spectrum of present and potential transnational threats has been 
broadening, thus creating the need for the intelligence community to adapt in order to be 
able to follow this growing number of targets. Whereas during the Cold War the 
problem was a general lack of information, the post-Cold War environment presented 
the opposite challenge for the intelligence community – too much information 
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stemming from the vast range of transnational threats. Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading 
scholar of intelligence studies, contends that “deciding what to focus on in the absence 
of the overwhelming Soviet threat and in the midst of nearly a decade of severe budget 
cuts was a daunting managerial challenge”.45 
The terrorist threats did, indeed, stand out among the many other transnational 
threats identified after the end of the Cold War. Some intelligence officials argued that 
intelligence agencies did recognize the importance of the terrorist threats and allocated 
its resources and launched new programs to combat terrorism well before 9/11. As 
former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates stated in 1994, the U.S. 
intelligence community started to readjust its priorities and shifted its resources away 
from the Soviet and other communist-related targets and missions soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, 58 percent of the whole intelligence 
community’s budget were devoted to following the Soviet-related threats, while by 
1993 this figure had dropped to just 13 percent.46 Even though specific budget figures 
for the intelligence community are classified, it appears resources were reallocated to 
fight terrorism. As the conclusions of the Joint Inquiry suggest, despite the time of tight 
budgets during the 1990s, direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.47 
Moreover, both within the CIA and the FBI incentives to transform and to 
address the terrorist threats evolved. According to the testimony of former Director of 
the FBI (1993-2001) Louis J. Freeh before the 9/11 Commission, the FBI had more than 
tripled its counterterrorism budget by 1999; it had also doubled the number of agents 
working on counterterrorism cases and expanded the number of its Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF) to improve coordination with local law enforcement.48 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2003, stated in 
his testimony before the Joint Inquiry that both the CIA as well as the intelligence 
                                                 
45
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2008. “Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq”. p. 227 in 
Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.). Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
46
 Robert Gates quoted in Hedley, John. 1996. “The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix 
it?” Studies in Intelligence 39 (5): 14. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol39no5/pdf/v39i5a02p.pdf> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
47
 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. 2002. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001. Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Joint Inquiry Final Report), p. 257. Available at: 
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
48
 Freeh, Louis J. 2004. “On War and Terrorism”. Testimony before the National Commission on 
Terrorist attack upon the United States. April 13, 2004. Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/freeh_statement.pdf> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
- 28 - 
 
community as a whole had focused on the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other 
Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or Egyptian Islamist Jihad. An 
interagency approach was adopted through the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), under 
the auspices of the DCI. Among other CIA initiatives were: a new comprehensive 
strategy against al Qaeda called “The Plan”, a nationwide program for hiring qualified 
personnel for counterterrorism tasks, a counterterrorism educational programs, and 
measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI such as exchange of senior 
officials.49 
However, as Gregory Treverton, a renowned intelligence expert, points out, the 
U.S. intelligence community faced a number of Cold War legacies, which were 
mismatched to the changed threats. First, it was the boundaries between intelligence and 
law enforcement, foreign and domestic, and between public and private, which were 
created out of concern for civil liberties. These boundaries were then reinforced by the 
institutional legacy, which organized intelligence by source based on “stovepipes”50 on 
the collection side, and by agency not by issue or problem on the analysis side. During 
the Cold War, this division enhanced competition between analysts and provided 
different perspectives on the same issue, while the agencies could tailor their analysis to 
the needs of their consumers. The final Cold War legacy was a product of the 
boundaries. Domestic intelligence performed by the FBI was twice circumscribed. The 
FBI was first and foremost law enforcement organization, thus focused on reaction and 
prosecution, rather than on prevention. Moreover, “the domestic-intelligence function 
was limited by the boundary between intelligence and law enforcement, a ‘wall’ that 
extended inside the FBI and inhibited cooperation among intelligence and law 
enforcement officials working on similar issues.”51 
The intelligence community pre-9/11 attempted to transform itself amid the new 
terrorist threats by reallocating resources and creating new initiatives. However, the 
pace of the transformation was not efficient enough given the limited resources as well 
as the obstacles within the organizations stemming from the Cold War legacy of the 
institutional design of the intelligence community. As a result, the events of 9/11 
highlighted the unpreparedness and ineffectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community 
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to prevent a terrorist attack. Most of the deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community 
and the importance of adaptation of the intelligence community organization to the 
transnational threats were identified by various commissions and initiatives throughout 
the 1990’s. Their main ideas and recommendations will be examined in the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
2.2. Pre-9/11 Attempts to Reform the U.S. Intelligence Community52 
The end of the Cold War brought on a debate not only about the role of the 
United States in the international system, it has also stirred up a discussion about the 
importance of intelligence for the U.S. national security and foreign policies53 as well as 
about the best way the intelligence community should be organized in order to face the 
changed threats. Amy Zegart, a leading expert on U.S. intelligence reform and national 
security, created an intelligence reform catalogue consisting of twelve major bipartisan 
commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces. This catalogue 
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts between 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
this respect, Zegart contends that “All of their reports urged reform within intelligence 
agencies, across the Intelligence Community and other parts of the U.S. government.”54 
Using Zegart’s approach to analyzing the pre-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence 
community has the advantage of eliminating the problem of hindsight, instead it allows 
us to focus on what the intelligence officials and policymakers really knew before 9/11. 
Table 2.1 presents the twelve initiatives, out of which six were high profile 
bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions chaired by Congressional leaders and top 
governmental officials such as former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, former 
Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and Harold Brown, William Webster former director of 
both the CIA and FBI and Ambassador Paul Bremer. Three studies were developed by 
leading nonpartisan think tanks: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Institute 
for Public Policy, and the 20th Century Fund. The remaining three reports stemmed from 
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governmental initiatives: President Clinton’s interagency National Performance Review, 
the FBI’s 1998 Strategic Plan, and a House Intelligence Committee staff study.55  
 
Table 2.1. Intelligence Reform Catalogue of Unclassified U.S. Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism Studies, 1991-2001 
 
Year 
Issued 
Study Name Number of 
Recommendations 
1993, 
1995 
National Performance Review (Phases I and II) 35 
1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) 
39 
1996 Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force 29 
1996 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study 
(IC21) 
75 
1996 20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence 18 
1997 National Institute on Public Policy Report on Modernizing 
Intelligence (Odom Report) 
34 
1998 FBI Strategic Plan 1998–2003  60 
1999 Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Deutch Commission) 
57 
1999, 
2000 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore 
Commission), Reports 1 and 2 
60 
 
2000 Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement 
(Webster Commission) 
21 
 
2000 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) 36 
2001 U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-
Rudman Commission), Phase III Report 
50 
 Total 514 
Source: Adapted from Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 29. 
 
Together the studies proposed 514 recommendations on wide range of issues. Only six 
of the studies focused specifically on intelligence issues; the other six dealt with topics 
ranging from counterterrorism (The Gilmore and Bremer Commissions), proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (The Deutch Commission), federal law enforcement (The 
Webster Commission), to emerging 21st century threats to the U.S. national security in 
general (The Hart-Rudman Commission). Out of the 514 recommendations, 
approximately two-thirds of them, or 340, focused exclusively on improving and fixing 
the U.S. intelligence community. It should be noted that even the law enforcement and 
counterterrorism studies paid a great amount of attention to the problems of the 
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Intelligence Community. “Tellingly, every study during the period included discussion 
of major intelligence deficiencies and every study issued recommendations to fix them. 
Together, the counterterrorism and law enforcement studies contributed one-third of all 
intelligence reform recommendations.”56 
Zegart has identified four categories of major organizational problems on which 
the studies mostly agreed: (1) the intelligence community’s lack of coherence or 
“corporateness”; (2) insufficient human intelligence; (3) personnel systems that failed to 
align intelligence needs with personnel skills or encourage information sharing; and (4) 
weaknesses in setting intelligence priorities.57 It is important to note that each of these 
four categories were later identified by both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 
9/11 Commission as the ultimate blunders leading to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. 
The lack of “corporateness” can be best understood through the structural 
shortages in organization and lack of leadership in the U.S. intelligence community. As 
the Council on Foreign Relations report pointed out, “the intelligence community was 
less a community than a collection of more than a dozen largely autonomous 
components spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the world” with no one in 
charge of them.58 Despite the official role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
as the main leader of the intelligence community being responsible for proposing 
strategies and coordinating efforts across the intelligence agencies, the DCI was in 
reality overpowered by the Secretary of Defense which controlled over 80 percent of the 
intelligence budget. In this sense, the 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study 
criticized what it saw as “the glaring gap” between the DCI’s responsibilities and its 
authorities.59 
Inadequate human intelligence capabilities were criticized by a majority of the 
reports. In this respect, it was recommended that the recruitment process requiring prior 
approval from the CIA before individuals suspected of civil rights violations could be 
recruited60 be re-evaluated or abolished. The Bremer Commission recommended the 
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DCI to issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines would no longer apply to recruiting 
terrorist informants and identified aggressive recruitment of human intelligence sources 
on terrorism as one of the intelligence community’s highest priorities.61 A similar 
suggestion was made by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which also warned against the 
steep decline of intelligence budgets and its impact on human intelligence.62 
The problems of personnel systems and information sharing were addressed by 
nearly one-third of the recommendations. The House Intelligence Committee staff study 
concluded that the intelligence community “continues to face major personnel crises 
that it has, thus far not addressed in any coherent way”.63 Hand in hand with the 
personnel issues, the importance of information sharing was stressed. The Aspin-Brown 
Commission as well as the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Council on Foreign 
Relations Task Force recommended improvements in information sharing between the 
intelligence agencies and better cooperation with law enforcement agencies on domestic 
intelligence issues.64 
Many of the recommendations proposed during the 1990s also focused on the 
lack of attention of both the intelligence officials as well as policymakers to setting 
intelligence priorities. The emergence of transnational threats at the end of the Cold War 
resulted with more issues to be covered by the intelligence agencies with less sources 
and little guidance about how to prioritize among them. The 1996 House Intelligence 
Committee called the requirements process “one of the most vexing aspects of 
intelligence management” and called for creation of “an overarching concept for 
coordinating intelligence requirements, especially when faced with declining resources, 
a growing customer base, and increasingly diverse requirements”.65 The lack of 
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effective prioritizing process was criticized even five years later by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission, which was concerned with the “dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of 
important countries, regions, and functional challenges”.66 
As Zegart contends, of the 340 recommendations for changes of the U.S. 
intelligence community, only 35 were successfully implemented, and 268 – or 79 
percent of the total – resulted in no action at all.67 There was only one legislative 
initiative that attempted to implement the various commissions’ recommendations and 
one initiative that served as a starting point for all of the studies included in the 
Intelligence Reform Catalogue. This first attempt to reflect the changed situation of the 
post-Cold War world was made by Senator David Boren and Representative Dave 
McCurdy in 1992.68 Both of these legislators introduced two nearly identical proposals 
to reshape the structure of U.S. intelligence community including the replacement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence with a Director of National Intelligence, who was 
supposed to preside over four separate agencies – one for each category of intelligence 
collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) and the fourth for newly created agency 
responsible for analysis.69 Moreover, the DNI was supposed to have budget authority 
over all kinds of intelligence, including military. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was 
not adopted, and as Richard A. Best notes, “observers credited strong opposition from 
the Defense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with 
inhibiting passage of the legislation”.70 
The other main legislative initiative was the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
the 1997 Fiscal Year (FY1997), which attempted to act upon the recommendations of 
the Aspin-Brown Commission and the IC21 Study. Two deputy DCI positions were 
established, one for Deputy DCI and the other for a Deputy DCI for Community 
Management, both Senate-confirmed positions. Moreover, the act gave the DCI 
authority to develop and present to the President an annual budget for the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program and to participate in the development of a military 
intelligence budget. Despite the effort that went into the FY1997 legislation, attempts 
intended to enhance the DCI’s community-wide role were not fully implemented. The 
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FY1997 Act established four new Senate-confirmed positions having responsibilities 
that extended across all intelligence agencies. From its enactment until it was 
superseded by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Senate 
confirmed only two individuals to these positions, who both left office in 2003 and were 
never replaced. In addition, the DCI’s authorities in the preparation of budgets for all 
intelligence agencies had not been fully exercised.71 
Analysis of the intelligence reform catalogue data on various attempts to reform 
the U.S. intelligence community amid the growing threats of transnational terrorism 
indicates that intelligence officials as well as policymakers recognized the importance 
of these threats and the necessity to adapt to them. However, both legislators and 
intelligence specialists failed to achieve the necessary reforms to eliminate the 
deficiencies identified. Even after legislation implementing the recommendations was 
adopted, proponents of reform failed to oversee its full realization. The FY1997 Act is 
one example of such failures. There are a number of reasons why these attempts were 
thwarted. These reasons will be examined in the final section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Obstacles to Reform pre-9/11 
Answering the question why were the pre-9/11 recommendations largely 
ignored by intelligence officials as well as the policymakers requires a multifaceted 
perspective. The first and largest obstacle was the general aversion of organizations 
toward reform. Such resistance opposed both internal initiatives espousing change and 
external attempts imposed through legislation or executive action. The second obstacle 
is embedded in the very principles of American democracy, which are based on 
protection of civil liberties, as well as on the fragmentation and decentralization of the 
U.S. system of government. The third obstacle is based on the rational interests of the 
U.S. leaders, i.e. the tradeoffs between incentives for change and the actual capabilities 
to make the change, which largely effect the decision making of the U.S. leaders. This 
three level approach facilitates creating an explanatory model of resistance to reform of 
the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 despite the widespread recognition of the 
threat posed by terrorism during the 1990s. 
 
2.3.1. Organizational Obstacles 
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As noted in chapter 2, organizations in general do not change easily72, for 
government agencies change is even harder73, and for the intelligence community it is 
particularly so.74 All organizations have to overcome three types of problems when 
attempting to change: (1) bounded rationality75 – cognitive limits of individuals 
affecting the decision-making and management of organizations; (2) structural secrecy 
or information asymmetry76 – specialization of subunits preventing knowledge sharing; 
and (3) liability of time or institutional inertia77– growing resistance to change as 
routines, norms and relationships become established. As Amy Zegart contends, for 
government agencies these problems are heightened, because they lack three key 
advantages that the business organizations enjoy.78 
The first is the lack of market competition, which in private sector creates the 
incentives for reform to promote better efficiency and effectiveness if they want to 
survive. Government agencies do not face this immediate threat of diminishing or 
replacement due to poor performance. The Congress does have oversight capabilities. 
However, its powers to dissolve an intelligence agency are limited. 
The second advantage that government agencies lack is that the owners and 
employees of private companies generally want them to succeed and therefore create 
and support the incentives for change. On the contrary, government agencies’ reform is 
often thwarted by political opponents who obstruct the legislative process and thus limit 
the likelihood for success of reform. In the case of the U.S. intelligence community, the 
role of the Department of Defense lobby proved crucial as it effectively blocked many 
of the initiatives attempting to reorganize the community that would reduced its 
authority in any way.79 
The third disadvantage when comparing the government agencies to the private 
sector are the limits imposed on the actual managerial work of public sector officials, 
who are bound with bureaucratic red tape and have much less freedom in their decision-
making as opposed to managers of private companies. Intelligence officials serve many 
different consumers from the president, his advisors and members of the Congress, who 
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all have different and often conflicting preferences. This makes it very difficult to make 
internal adjustments.80 
 
2.3.2. Democratic Principles 
American democratic principles limited external intelligence reform in two 
ways. First, as was already mentioned above, there is the fragmented and decentralized 
political system based on separation of powers, congressional committee system, and 
majority rule. Within this system it is possible for political opponents to hinder the 
enactment of new legislation and thus curb or thwart any reform process altogether.81 
Another way in which the democratic process negatively influenced the 
intelligence reform attempts was its emphasis on civil liberties. Any change of the U.S. 
intelligence community, which would led to heightened domestic intelligence or 
cooperation of CIA on domestic affairs was immediately criticized. Such opposition 
was based on fears of limiting civil liberties and creating a “big brother” kind of 
institution – something highly unpopular with the American public.82 
 
2.3.3. Rational Decision-making 
The last obstacle is a result of the differing capabilities and incentives of 
decision-makers. Both the president and legislators are well-aware of the difficulty of 
enforcing a major intelligence reform. The general unpopularity of the topic among 
voters as well as the community itself lowers the decision-makers incentives even more. 
Moreover, national security bureaucrats promote their own interests. These are mostly 
adhering to the status quo as no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to any 
other ‘rival’ organization.83 
 
                                                 
80
 Zegart, Amy. 2005, p. 95. 
81
 Lahneman, William J. 2007, p. 89. 
82
 Davis, Darren W., Silver, Brian D. 2004. “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of 
the Terrorist Attacks on America”. American Journal of Political Science 48 (1): 28-46.   
83
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 58. 
- 37 - 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. More 
specifically, this chapter has explored the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community 
to various reform initiatives during the 1990s. A variety of explanations have been used 
to account for such institutional resistance to comprehensive reform. One influential 
approach based on historical experience, suggests that real reform or change is only 
possible amid a catastrophe or crisis. Pearl Harbor and entrance into WWII were the 
impetus leading to the creation of the CIA and a subsequent restructuring of the whole 
system of the U.S. national security.  
Since the immediate post-war era, no major attempt to reorganize and reform the 
U.S. intelligence community had been successful until the enactment of the Intelligence 
and Prevention Terrorism Act. It seems that the post-Cold War change of threat 
environment did not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s 
intelligence services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence 
community was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was 
unprepared to prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Only after the events of 9/11 and from the perspective of hindsight did the 
deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community become widely visible and hence 
impossible to ignore. The question of whether the worst terrorist attack in the history of 
the United States was a catalyst strong enough to promote effective and efficient 
intelligence reform will be examined in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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3. 9/11 and its Aftermath: Searching for Answers and Solutions 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in American 
history. Their extent and brutality combined with the fact that they were carried out on 
the American soil provided unique opportunity not only for the reform of the U.S. 
intelligence community, but also for the biggest transformation of the U.S. government 
since 1947. Suddenly, the shocked American public was willing to sacrifice some of its 
civil liberties in exchange for protection. Also, the rational self-interests of the President 
as well as the legislators shifted towards support for the intelligence reform.  
After the first shock from 9/11 passed over, a wide-ranging debate was 
prompted over the role of intelligence in failing to recognize the threat and prevent the 
terrorist attacks. Two commissions were established to investigate the failure. First was 
the Joint Inquiry conducted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees and second was the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). The conclusions and 
recommendations of these committees pointed out some of the essential weaknesses 
within the intelligence community and became an important starting point for 
subsequent intelligence community reform.  
Moreover, in the immediate reaction to 9/11, President Bush and the U.S. 
Congress promoted other initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. These initiatives affected also the U.S. intelligence 
community. The first one, enactment of the USA Patriot Act had a positive impact as it 
removed the barriers of information sharing between the law enforcement and 
intelligence. The second initiative, the homeland security agenda, turned out to have a 
more ambiguous impact. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
responsible among other functions for domestic intelligence gathering and analysis 
created another level in the already fragmented intelligence community. Also, the 
creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) produced more confusion 
about the roles of intelligence community and the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. 
This chapter will present the main findings and recommendations of the Joint 
Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission. Thereafter, there will be an examination of the 
initiatives that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, such as the USA 
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Patriot Act, the development of homeland security agenda, and the creation of the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center and their implications for intelligence reform.   
As was the case with the pre-9/11 context of the U.S. intelligence community, 
these initiatives also serve as an input factor to the evaluation of the final outcome of the 
U.S. intelligence community reform, its efficiency and effectiveness (see Figure 1.1). 
 
3.1. Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations 
Shortly after 9/11, questions concerning the failure of intelligence to avert the 
terrorist attacks were raised. There was pressure to find out what had led to the attacks 
and who was responsible. Was the U.S. intelligence community properly organized for 
the transnational, non-state actor threats? Had policymakers known about the threat and 
failed to act? These were the types of questions that were asked both by the U.S. public 
as well as by the legislators themselves. It is apparent from the previous chapter that the 
threats were known and that there were many hints pointing to the insufficient 
organization of the intelligence community, however, only after 9/11, for the first time 
since the end of the Cold War, people actually seemed to pay attention. 
First, the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Intelligence Committees established a Joint Inquiry with three principal goals: (1) to 
conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have 
known prior to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the 
United States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist 
attacks against the United States and its interests; (2) identify and examine any systemic 
problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or 
preventing these attacks in advance; and (3) to make recommendations to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist 
attacks.84 
Among the main findings of the Joint Inquiry was that “prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was neither well-organized, nor well-equipped, and did not 
adequately adapt to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets 
within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage 
provided by U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities.”85 Put simply, as the 
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Joint Inquiry recognized, the intelligence community was not properly organized for a 
transnational threat such as al Qaeda. 
Other findings included: (1) the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy both on governmental as well as intelligence level; (2) inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources and problematic intelligence community budgeting practices and 
procedures; (3) inefficient use of new technology and reliance on outdated technologies, 
thus having a negative impact on collaboration between the intelligence community 
agencies as well as their adaption to the nature of the terrorist threats; (4)  lack of 
incentives for analytical positions, which were seen as dead-end jobs in the community 
and which led to analytic deficiencies, thus seriously undercutting the ability of U.S. 
policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat; (5) lack of information sharing 
not only between intelligence community agencies, but also within individual agencies, 
and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, and also between 
intelligence community and relevant non-intelligence community agencies, such as law 
enforcement and border protection; (6) lack of reliable and knowledgeable human 
sources; (7) lengthy and perilous application process for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance leading to a diminished level of FBI coverage of 
suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States; (8) lack of strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.86 
 In its final report, the Joint Inquiry proposed nineteen recommendations, which 
included establishing a powerful new director of national intelligence, revamping the 
intelligence priority process, and considering whether new domestic intelligence agency 
should replace the FBI. However, as M. Kent Bolton contends, the Joint Inquiry’s 
thorough work – it studied some one million documents and interviewed some 500 
persons – “raised more questions than it answered; it thereby provided an impetus for 
subsequent postmortems.”87 This succeeding task was undergone by the 9/11 
Commission, the mother of all postmortems. 
 The 9/11 Commission built on the findings of the Joint Inquiry and added some 
more insights stemming from 1200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of various 
documents. The 9/11 Commission took the reshaping of the U.S. intelligence into a new 
level. Gregory Treverton points out that “its report was dramatic and made several 
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recommendations – primarily to reshape the organization of U.S. intelligence but also to 
begin to change the way it does business.”88 
 Regarding intelligence, the 9/11 Commission identified six problems, which 
created the need to restructure intelligence: (1) structural barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work – the problem of organizing national intelligence around collection 
disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission; (2) lack of common standards 
and practices across the foreign-domestic divide that created the inability to pool 
information gathered abroad with information gathered in the United States; (3) divided 
management of national intelligence capabilities, which limited influence of the DCI 
over the three intelligence agencies housed within the Department of Defense (the NSA, 
the NGA, and the NRO); (4) weak capacity of the DCI to set priorities and move 
resources; (5) too many tasks carried out by the DCI – the fact that DCI had three jobs 
as head of the community, principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters, and 
head of the CIA combined with his weak authorities even limited his managerial 
abilities; (6) too complex and secret nature of intelligence community, which made 
public comprehension of the intelligence agencies and the rules surrounding them 
impossible.89 
 Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission recognized the fact that even though the 
DCI was responsible for community performance, it lacked three authorities critical for 
any agency head or chief executive officer: control over purse strings, the ability to hire 
or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure 
and personnel.90 In order to address these problems the 9/11 Commission made six 
broad proposals, which underscored the need not only to create the technical 
infrastructure to better share intelligence but also to rethink the perspective of “need-to-
know” and other security requirements that frustrated sharing. The 9/11 principal 
recommendations were to91: 
 
• Create the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), located in 
the White House and possessing real authority over the budgets of the fifteen 
U.S. intelligence agencies 
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• Institute a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reporting to the DNI, 
responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence 
• Establish national intelligence centers, organized around discrete issues on 
the model of the NCTC, under the authority of the DNI 
• Make the CIA director a position separate from the DNI and charge him 
primarily with building better espionage capacity for the nation 
• Rethink the web of “need-to know” and other security procedures that 
frustrate not just sharing but also intelligence work as whole 
• Not to create a separate domestic-intelligence service, instead to encourage 
the FBI to move forward with changing its mission from pure law 
enforcement to terrorism prevention  
 
The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations fit to each of the 
four categories (lack of “corporateness”, personnel/information sharing, strategic 
mission and priorities, and human intelligence) of the twelve pre-9/11 commissions and 
task forces’ proposals for reform. Therefore, it is possible to see some consistency in the 
pre- and post-9/11 attempts to reform the U.S. intelligence community. As chapter 2 
showed, the pre-9/11 attempts were generally ignored by the decision-makers and 
resisted by the intelligence agencies themselves. The general idea behind the 9/11 
Commission reform proposal was that after 9/11 the incentives for adoption of the 
reform have changed and it was therefore possible to usher in a sweeping reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community. The next chapter will address this assumption.  
But before we move to an interpretation of the implementation of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, it is important to pay attention to other developments, 
which happened simultaneously with the work of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 
Commission.  
 
3.2. Immediate Reaction and its Implications for Intelligence Reform 
The surprise of the 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in sweeping response of the 
Bush administration and the U.S. Congress in order to boost domestic counterterrorist 
policies. This immediate reaction included enactment of the USA Patriot Act, 
development of a homeland security agenda and subsequently the establishment of the 
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Department of Homeland Security. Both of the initiatives had implications for the 
intelligence community reform. 
 
3.2.1. USA Patriot Act 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration presented Congress 
with proposals to expand police and prosecutorial powers to enhance the fight against 
terrorism”.92 Six weeks later, these proposals culminated in the adoption of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA Patriot Act93. It passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by wide margins – 375 to 66 and 98 to 1 respectively.94 
As a result of the speedy manner in which Congress presented (Oct. 23), debated, and 
implemented this policy (voting in the House was held on Oct. 24 and in the Senate on 
Oct. 25) there was little controversy surrounding its inception.95 
The main aim of the USA Patriot Act was to strengthen the abilities of the U.S. 
government agencies to collect and share information regarding ongoing investigations 
of terror plots. And also to enable the U.S. government to be better equipped to identify, 
investigate, follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists. Among the most 
important provisions included in the act were:96 
 
• It allowed for federal warrants to be effective nationwide and no longer 
limited to special districts; 
• It enabled law enforcement to obtain subpoena power for alleged terrorists’ 
communications, including fixed and wireless telephones, e-mail, web 
surfing, as well as unopened voice mail and e-mail; 
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• It attached roving wiretaps to alleged terrorists and thereby eliminated the 
need for the government to request wiretaps for specific telephone numbers 
as previously required; 
• It improved coordination and cooperation, such as information gathering 
between US intelligence and law enforcement investigators, with respect to 
terrorist organizations; 
• It allowed law enforcement to use new subpoena power to obtain payment 
information such as credit card or bank account numbers, of suspected 
terrorists who are utilizing the Internet; 
• It created rules to counter terrorists’ access to, and use of illicit funds as well 
as to prevent or impede other improper terrorist activities; 
• To punish those who aid or harbor terrorists. 
 
The importance of the USA Patriot Act with regards to the U.S. intelligence was 
embedded in the provisions which enhanced domestic surveillance as an amendment of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Also, the Act provided for possible 
sharing of information on criminal probes between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government. Thus, eliminating one of the main 
deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence criticized even before 9/11. 
However, from the point of promoting substantial intelligence reform, the USA 
Patriot Act was only a quick fix, which did not (and was not intended to) address the 
structural deficiencies of the intelligence community. 
 
3.2.2. Homeland Security 
The U.S. government also moved in another direction, as President Bush started 
to focus more on creating a broad concept of a unified approach to protecting the 
homeland against future terrorist threats. This strategy also had an intelligence element, 
however there were many problems connected with the homeland security agenda. 
The first steps taken in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken already less than one month after the attacks. On October 8, 
2001 Tom Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and the Director of the newly established Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS). The Office’s mission was to “develop and coordinate the 
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implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks. The Office’s objective was to coordinate the executive branch’s 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”97 
At the end of October 2002, the Homeland Security Council was created by the 
President. Again, Tom Ridge was put in charge of this council. Among the members of 
the HSC were: the President and the Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
and Health Care, the Attorney General, the Director of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Director of FBI, and the Director of CIA. The HSC’s role was to 
ensure the coordination of all homeland security related activities across the whole 
spectrum of federal, state and local offices and agencies. 
However, this model of so called “presidential advisor” proved insufficient. “In 
particular, critical voices in Congress pointed to inherent weaknesses in Ridge’s post. 
Without any budget authority, they argued, the Homeland Security czar lacked 
sufficient human and financial resources, had no way to enforce decisions, and relied 
primarily on the power of persuasion, albeit as a trusted advisor with unfettered access 
to President Bush.”98 On the other hand, there also existed fears of Ridge’s excessive 
influence that went beyond congressional accountability. These fears led Democratic 
senator Joe Lieberman to propose in May 2002 a full-scale reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy and a creation of a new department dealing with the questions of homeland 
security. Even though President Bush had previously rejected proposals for such full-
scale government reorganization, the need for this change became imminent. Therefore, 
in June 2002, President Bush introduced his own proposal that “sought to maximize 
presidential influence over any new cabinet-level department”.99  
In his speech to the nation on June 6, 2002,100 President Bush emphasized the 
need for essential reorganization of government by creating the Department of 
Homeland Security that would help the government to deal more effectively with the 
new threats of the 21st century. The new National Strategy for Homeland Security 
prepared by Ridge’s OHS team was also introduced by the President in this speech. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued on July 16 2002, 
introduced three main strategic objectives of combating terrorism on the domestic level: 
“(1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur.”101 The homeland security strategy was divided into six key mission areas 
within which the strategy was supposed to operate. The first three areas were focused on 
the first objective of prevention, other two focused on the second aim of reducing 
vulnerability and the last focused on damage minimization and recovery. The 
framework of six critical mission areas was established as follows: 
 
• Intelligence and Warning area, which included creation of an integrated 
federal approach to gathering, analysis, production, and sharing of 
information from both classified and open sources; 
• Border and Transportation Security area, which was aimed at preventing 
terrorists and terrorist materiel in entering the country by creating an 
interconnected system of border and transport infrastructure control that 
simultaneously secures the legitimate flow of people and goods; 
• Domestic Counterterrorism area, which was focused on support for old and 
evolution of new intelligence and law enforcement efforts to identify 
terrorists and their supporters, prevents them from carrying attacks, and to 
arrest and prosecute them; 
• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets area, which involved 
precise and complete identification and prioritization of the U.S. 
infrastructure, including virtual networks, and assessment of consequences 
and connections among the infrastructures; 
• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats area, which was primarily focused 
on detection, deterrence, prevention, and management of the consequences 
of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response area, which was aimed at 
minimizing the damage and rapid recovering from terrorist attacks which 
may occur. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security also identified the Department’s key role 
“as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions involved in homeland 
security”102 and its main challenge in developing “complementary systems that avoid 
duplication and ensure essential requirements are met”103. Moreover, it stressed that in 
order to meet the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination must be increased 
“in law enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy 
development and implementation so that public and private resources are better aligned 
to secure the homeland”.104  
According to Chris Hornbarger, “prior to 9/11, eleven of fourteen cabinet 
departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Veterans Affairs), plus a host of 
independent and subordinate agencies (for example, the CIA, and FEMA) bore 
substantial responsibility for key aspects of homeland security”.105 This situation has 
changed with the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the 
Homeland Security Act enactment on November 25, 2002.106 The new department 
combined twenty two agencies with approximately 180,000 employees including “such 
disparate organizations as: the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
(Transportation), the Secret Service (Treasury), FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FBI), and the Critical Infrastructures Assurance Office 
(Commerce)”.107 It became the fifteenth department in the history of U.S. government 
and a third biggest department of the Bush administration. 
One of the DHS’s four directorates, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate (IAIP) was intended to fulfill one of the most critical homeland 
security functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of 
information. It was tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information 
about terrorist threats to the United States, assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. 
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infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant 
federal, state, and local officials. It was to “fuse and analyze intelligence and other 
information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources – including the 
CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT and data gleaned from other 
organizations.”108 However, it had neither the power to collect intelligence nor any 
tasking authority over other agencies. Rather than integrating the CIA, FBI and other 
agencies, the IAIP had to beg to obtain information from them.109 Both the CIA and the 
FBI strongly resisted handing over significant power to the DHS. And both agencies 
increased, rather than decreased their homeland security functions. According to Seth 
Jones, “White House and congressional support for DHS faded quickly. Most 
policymakers believed either that DHS was unable to perform terrorist threat analysis 
adequately, or that other departments within the federal government could do it 
better.”110 
 
3.2.3. Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
In a rather surprising move, President Bush circumvented the newly established 
DHS’s intelligence directorate and proposed an establishment of a new Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in January 2003.111 The TTIC was created under the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the 
president and federal agencies on terrorist threats – the very task originally envisioned 
for the DHS. 
The TTIC was designed to integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information 
collected domestically and abroad and to design a database of known and suspected 
terrorists that could be accessed by federal, state, and local officials across the United 
States. It was also focused on examining regional threats, such as Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It 
was staffed by representatives from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the 
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Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, NGA, and Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Even though, it was legally not part of the CIA (officially it reported to the 
DCI), in practice the distinction was much less clear as the CIA effectively controlled 
its functions – it was placed under the CIA’s budget and was located at CIA 
headquarters.112 As with the case of the IAIP, its mandate was very vague, concentrating 
on analysis not on driving collection with no attempt to shift the intelligence community 
organizational paradigm. Thus, it had only added another fragment to the already 
disjointed intelligence community structure. 
Although created to improve coordination and sharing, the TTIC has caused 
confusion within the federal government about the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. Its creation duplicated functions of the IAIP and greatly undermined its mandate. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
President Bush and the U.S. Congress reacted to the shock of 9/11 events in a 
number of distinct ways that have had far reaching consequences for the intelligence 
community. First, Congress decided to study the intelligence failure through its Joint 
Inquiry, while simultaneously adopting legislation on improving enhancing domestic 
surveillance and removing limits on domestic and foreign information sharing 
embedded in the USA Patriot Act. In contrast, President Bush focused on promoting a 
new homeland security agenda, which originally contained an intelligence aspect but 
was weakened by the creation of the TTIC.  
One fundamental implication of all of these new security policies was that none 
of these initiatives presented a comprehensive plan of how to integrate the wide ranging 
activities of the intelligence community, change agencies’ incentives and cultures to 
enhance information sharing, match intelligence resources against priorities, reform the 
FBI or improve human intelligence. By the time the Joint Inquiry’s findings and 
recommendations which were published in 2002, the immediate momentum for 
substantial reform of the U.S. intelligence community was already gone. The 9/11 
Commission, backed by enormous media coverage and pressure from the 9/11 victims 
families, was more successful in pushing for implementation of its recommendations. 
However, as will be argued in the next chapter, its proposals for “sweeping” reforms 
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were mitigated during the congressional debate over the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act. 
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4. Implementation of the post-9/11 Recommendations: Bringing about 
the Reform? 
The debate over intelligence reform following the release of the 9/11 
Commission report presented an opportunity to make far-reaching changes to create a 
more effective and efficient U.S. intelligence community. However, due to pertaining 
rational self-interest decision making processes and inability to overrule heightened 
opposition in Congress, the potential for substantial reform was not materialized. 
Moreover, because the newly created position of the Director of National Intelligence 
was not given such authorities as was suggested in the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, it became difficult for him to promote policies, which would have 
effectively enabled him to overcome the internal resistance to reform within the 
intelligence organizations. 
This chapter will first focus on the process of adopting the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The legislative debate that 
accompanied its enactment and its major provisions will be introduced. Then, the actual 
impact of the IRTPA on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community 
will be evaluated, both in terms of the newly created institutions – the DNI and the 
NCTC, as well as from the point of view of the old institutions – the FBI and the CIA. 
The analysis and evaluation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations’ 
implementation and the consequent character of the intelligence community after the 
enactment of the IRTPA presented in this chapter can be interpreted as the output 
perspective of the input-output methodological model (see Figure 1.1) examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
 
4.1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
The 9/11 Commission final report was issued in July 2004 and was followed by 
an immediate congressional response. Throughout the course of its work, the 9/11 
Commission received extensive media coverage, which gave rise to public pressure on 
the Congress to act on the recommendations. Also, a significant lobby was set up 
around the 9/11 victim families pushing for the implementations of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. These forces speeded up the legislative process and 
both the Senate and the House began to draft implementing legislation. 
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4.1.1. Intelligence Reform Legislative Process Background 
Both versions of bill focused mainly on the two central recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission: the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The original DNI proposal 
suggested authorities for the individual to oversee all-source national intelligence 
centers, serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, manage the national 
intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence 
community. Included in his powers were supposed to be the responsibility for 
submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating fund to the intelligence agencies, 
and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community.113  
The NCTC recommendation was designed to address the intelligence 
community’s structural problems, particularly the lack of an appropriate entity for 
performing executive branch–wide counterterrorism operational planning. It was 
supposed to be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies. Its focus was envisaged to be on counterterrorism 
and it was supposed to have responsibility for integrating the intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities against terrorism. Its aim was to be the preeminent body for analyzing 
terrorism and assessing the terrorist threat.114 
The Senate bill followed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations more closely, 
while the House bill provided for a far less powerful director. The House bill covered a 
wide range of counterterrorism issues, including immigration and criminal penalties. 
Glenn Hastedt summed up the differences between the bills: “Under the Senate bill, the 
CIA director ‘shall’ be under the authority, direction, and control’ of the national 
intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only ‘report’ to the 
National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence 
Director the power to develop budgets and give ‘guidance’ to intelligence community 
members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would ‘determine’ the budget. The 
Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the 
Director’s high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil 
liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.”115 
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The main opposition against the bill came from the House Republicans led by 
the chair of House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Essentially, Hunter was 
a protégé of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in Congress. Similar to 
previous attempts to reform the intelligence community, Department of Defense 
officials, now led by Rumsfeld, strongly opposed any proposals changing the structure 
and streamlining the intelligence community. These changes were traditionally 
perceived by Pentagon as a threat to its control over defense intelligence agencies and 
over the vast share of the intelligence budget. Thus, the Defense Department leadership 
tried to discredit the reform by all means, both privately during classified hearings, and 
publicly when General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered 
a bombshell letter to the House Armed Services Committee. “In the letter, Meyers 
opposed giving the proposed director of national intelligence strong budgetary 
authorities over intelligence agencies housed in the Pentagon arguing that only a 
Pentagon-controlled budget would ensure sufficient ‘support to the warfighters’.”116 
Moreover, the presidential support to the Senate version of the bill remained 
lukewarm.117 At a time of ongoing War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the President did nothing to stop the Defense Department lobby. He simply avoided 
fighting his own Department of Defense over intelligence reform at war time. 
According to Michael Turner, “President Bush had to look like he was pushing the bill 
but would in fact prefer to see the proposal die”.118 And that is why he, at the end, 
recommended the passage of a bill that conformed to the House version, establishing a 
weak DNI and keeping the Defense Department in charge of its intelligence agencies. 
The final bill was adopted 89-2 in the Senate and 336-75 in the House.119 The president 
then signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 on 
December 17, 2004. 
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4.1.2. Major Provisions of the IRTPA 
The IRTPA was divided into eight titles:120 (I) Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; (II) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (III) Security Clearances; (IV) 
Transportation Security (V) Border Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters; (VI) 
Terrorism Prevention; (VII) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations; (VIII) Other Matters.  
Under Article I, the IRTPA created a Senate confirmed DNI separate from the 
CIA director, responsible for leading the intelligence community and for serving as 
principal adviser to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland 
Security Council. The DNI was given several important authorities and 
responsibilities.121 
Determining the Intelligence Budget122. The DNI has been tasked to determine 
the intelligence budget proposal submitted to the President for consideration and 
submission to Congress. With regards to the military portions of the budget, the 
legislation has stated that the DNI shall participate in the development by the Secretary 
of Defense of the annual budgets of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. However, the scope of the participation was 
not specified by the legislation. 
Managing the Execution of the Intelligence Appropriation. Contrary to the 9/11 
Commission recommendation, the IRTPA has kept the intelligence appropriation 
classified, thus keeping the intelligence funding hidden in other departments’ 
appropriations and being received straight through the departments’ budgets. However, 
the legislation has given the DNI control over the funds flowing through the 
departments to the intelligence agencies through exclusive direction to the Office of 
Management and Budget with respect to the apportionment of funds drawn on the U.S. 
Treasury. The legislation has also permitted the DNI to audit and monitor how 
departments are expending the funds.  
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Transferring Funds and Personnel. The DNI has not been given a full authority 
over the agencies funds and personnel. The DNI has only been allowed to move up to 
$150 million from agencies per fiscal year to meet emerging threats, provided that the 
funds moved are less than 5 percent of an agency’s intelligence funding and that the 
fund movement does not terminate an acquisition program. The DNI has been given 
authority to move personnel during the DNI’s start-up phase. The DNI might make 
additional personnel transfers pursuant to joint procedures agreed upon with department 
secretaries. The legislation thus deleted the provisions of prior law that a department 
secretary may veto the DCI’s transfer of intelligence funds and personnel and that FBI 
funds and personnel are exempt from any transfer.  
Hiring Senior Officials. The DNI has received strengthened authority to select 
senior officials. As under prior law, the Secretary of Defense must seek the DNI’s 
concurrence before submitting a recommendation to the president for the Directors of 
the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National 
Reconnaissance Office. However, the Secretary of Defense may not forward a 
recommendation to the president if the DNI objects. The same arrangement has been 
maintained for the selection of the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and 
research, the assistant secretary of homeland security for information analysis, and other 
senior officials across the intelligence community with the respective department heads. 
But importantly, the DNI has not received the authority to remove anyone from their 
position. 
Another important provision, which aimed to change the intelligence 
community’s strategic operational planning, was establishment of the statute of National 
Intelligence Centers (created based on geographic and transnational topics according to 
the DNI’s and NSC’s priorities). Under the IRTPA, the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) and the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) were formed.123  
The centers and other entities that the DNI might have wanted to create were to 
be housed in an administrative body called the Office of the DNI (ODNI). The ODNI is 
technically an independent agency because it is not located within any other executive 
branch department or entity. The DNI’s staff has also been located in the Office of the 
DNI.  
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The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been made responsible for 
integrating the intelligence agencies’ capabilities, designing preeminent 
counterterrorism analysis and proposing collection requirements to the DNI to guide the 
agencies’ collection activities. The NCTC’s other function established under the IRTPA 
was to engage in planning for counterterrorism operations across the executive branch. 
However, the actual description of the planning work has remained fairly vague in the 
IRTPA, because “it existed in a gray area between high-level strategy and detailed, 
tactical planning”.124 
Other provisions of the IRTPA focused on the problem of improving the 
domestic intelligence capabilities of the FBI (Title II). The IRTPA directed specific 
instructions for the FBI to change fundamentally the FBI’s orientation and culture. The 
Director of the FBI was ordered “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated 
national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance 
specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the 
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with 
substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.”125 
Moreover, the IRTPA paid vast attention to provisions concerning homeland 
security and improving the counterterrorism prevention as well as response. The 
provisions under Title VI (Terrorism Prevention) were aimed at enhancing the ability of 
the DHS to stop terrorists before they reach the U. S. borders, and to stop money-
laundering practices that support terrorism. Other sections and titles were also devoted 
to transportation security and border protection, thus stretching the overall reach of the 
IRTPA. 
 
In summary, the 9/11 Commission was one of the very few commissions to ever 
see its recommendations successfully codified into law. However, the IRTPA’s actual 
impact was mitigated by the ambiguity of its language. The vagueness of the legislation 
was a product of the congressional compromise and strong Defense Department lobby 
protecting its “turf”. Even thought the adoption of the IRTPA improved the situation of 
central management of the U.S. intelligence community, it did not vest enough 
authorities to the DNI to be able to overcome the obstructions to the intelligence 
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community reform from both the agencies themselves, as well as from the DOD 
leadership. Moreover, the fact that the IRTPA focused in most part on other fixes in 
homeland security also contributed to its ambiguous impact on the intelligence 
community reform. The actual development of the establishment and functions of the 
new agencies with the intelligence community, the DNI and the NCTC, as well as the 
impact of the IRTPA on the old agencies, the FBI and the CIA, will be examined and 
evaluated in the following subchapters. 
 
4.2. Intelligence Community after the Reform Act126 
This subchapter will focus on evaluation of the newly established institutions in 
the IRTPA, the DNI and the NCTC. The key question is whether their creation 
essentially led to better efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism mission. 
 
4.2.1. Director of National Intelligence 
According to Gordon Lederman, “the Executive Branch’s implementation of the 
2004 act began without the necessary vigor.”127 The first DNI, Ambassador John 
Negroponte, was an accomplished diplomat and policymaker, but he lacked working 
knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and substantial experience in leading and 
transforming large organizations. Negroponte decided to take on his role in the same 
fashion as his DCI predecessors and quickly absorbed two key intelligence functions – 
providing the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and overseeing the production of the 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Thus, 
Negroponte became, as was required by the law, the president’s chief intelligence 
briefer as well as chief analyst. However, giving a good substantive briefing takes time 
– according to some up to 60 percent.128 And as Arthur Hulnick points out, “if the DNI 
had nothing else to do, then serving as the government’s chief intelligence analyst might 
make sense. But he is supposed to be managing the intelligence system, including 
overseeing the budget process, arranging long-range planning, and other matters of 
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interagency concern.”129 It is possible to say that while Ambassador Negroponte 
solidified his position as the chief intelligence officer, he certainly failed to fulfill his 
position as the chief executive officer of the intelligence community. 
One of the major problems of implementing the IRTPA is that the legislation 
was giving the DNI considerable responsibility but not enough power and authority 
especially when faced with Defense Department resistance. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld successfully pushed for establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, “which was widely viewed as an attempt to block the DNI’s effort to gain 
effective authority over DOD intelligence functions.”130 All Defense Department 
intelligence agencies were made subordinate to this new Director of Military 
intelligence-like position. Thus, the DNI’s actual power over the DOD agencies has 
remained quite limited. 
Also the creation of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) proved problematic. Patrick 
Neary contends that the problem began with Negroponte’s inability to clearly articulate 
the ODNI’s mission. “Rather than the engine of change, the ODNI became the fulcrum 
of competing notions of reform.”131 On top of its unclear mission, the ODNI expanded 
into aggrandizing 1500 staff positions, even though originally it was supposed to be 
limited to about 500 people.132 Such growth of bureaucratic layering certainly was not 
something envisaged in the attempts for efficient reform. 
In 2006, Ambassador Negroponte resigned from the position of the DNI and was 
replaced by seemingly much better fit for the position, retired Admiral Mike 
McConnell. Former NSA director with decades of experience in U.S. intelligence was 
confirmed in January 2007. DNI McConnell began his tenure by issuing a 100-day plan, 
followed by a 500-day plan for the intelligence community. They were based on a 
number of initiatives such as: (1) Create a Culture of Collaboration; (2) Foster 
Collection and Analytic Transformation; (3) Build Acquisition Excellence and 
Technology Leadership; (4) Modernize Business Practices; (5) Accelerate Information 
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Sharing; (6) Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities.133 Both of the plans focused on better 
management and provided “an intellectual structure for considering intelligence reform 
more methodically.”134 Even though the change on the working level remained 
limited,135 the rhetoric and McConnell’s approach to the DNI’s position certainly led to 
a better sense of corporateness and leadership within the intelligence community. 
 In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was succeeded by Robert 
Gates, a former DCI in December 2006, which subsequently led to easing of tension and 
improved relationship between the DNI and the Defense Department during the final 
months of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, some other serious problems 
remained, especially on the level of coordination and oversight of the old agencies and 
within the newly created NCTC such as deficiencies regarding security clearances and 
personnel management. 
 
4.2.2. National Counterterrorism Center 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to give boost to 
information sharing and analysis. It has taken over and expanded the TTIC’s mission 
and became a hub for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence across the community. 
The NCTC was presented as the most successful improvement of the intelligence 
community – the grand jewel of intelligence reform. Different agency officials were 
supposed to sit in one room and draft collective analysis on terrorist threats. The IRTPA 
“in order to promote and facilitate rotations to the new center, required rotational 
assignments for promotion within the intelligence community, and created specific 
incentives for service in national intelligence centers.”136  
However, even if the rules allow it, organizational barriers still block 
information sharing. According to Amy Zegart, “because NCTC’s analysts have varying 
levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they still see different 
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pieces of information.”137 Arthur Hulnick also points out that “CIA security officials did 
not accept the clearances of officers from other agencies without doing their own 
security checks, and that even a CIA officer had to get a new clearance because he 
would be using a different computer system than the one for which he already had 
access.”138 This kind of bureaucratic pathology is very baffling given the amount of 
criticism and pressure for improvement was imposed on information sharing after 9/11. 
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project issued a report card 
assessing implementation of its recommendations. Information sharing efforts received 
a grade D.139 Two years later, one intelligence officer offered a similarly discouraging 
progress report and underscored that “most of the sharing issues we face are cultural and 
process rather than technology.”140 However, the technological problems should not be 
overlooked as the agencies’ intelligence databases use different software mostly 
incompatible with each other. 
Moreover, according to Zegart, “most U.S. intelligence agencies have no 
experience conducting all-source analysis, so the personnel they assign to the NCTC is 
learning on the job.”141 However, with inexperienced analyst and obstructions to their 
actual work, the quality of analysis is hampered. Also, within the respected agencies, 
rotational assignments are not promoted as they should be. They are still seen more as a 
necessary evil than as a prestigious mission to which the brightest analysts should be 
nominated. And once part of the NCTC the analysts continue their loyalty to their 
parent agencies rather than to the NCTC mission itself.142 
The idea of rotational assignments was one of the key initiatives in transforming 
the intelligence community into – in President Bush’s words – a single, unified 
enterprise.143 In order to accomplish this task creation of a notion of jointness was 
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required.144 However, the process of joint duty has been largely circumvented by 
intelligence professionals. But as Patrick Neary concludes, “joint duty is a means to an 
end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission 
accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur 
without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional 
workforce.”145 
 
To sum up, evaluating performance of the newly created agencies clearly shows 
that deficiencies pertain. The key problem is the inability of the DNI to overcome the 
cultural patterns embedded in the U.S. intelligence community’s institutional 
environment. These obstacles than make it difficult for the DNI, already weakened by 
some of the provisions of the IRTPA not granting him enough authority, to fully 
coordinate the intelligence community into a unified enterprise efficient and effective in 
countering the terrorist threats. While for the new institutions the problem lays in the 
inability to coordinate, for the old institutions, such as the FBI and the CIA, as will be 
shown in the last part of this chapter, the problem is to adapt. Nevertheless, the main 
obstacles to the reform for both are deeply rooted in the organizational structure, culture 
and practices. 
 
4.3. FBI’s and CIA’s Internal  Attempts to Implement Reform 
Due to the severe criticism for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11, the 
FBI has set forth ambitious changes in order to redefine itself from an agency that 
investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence 
before attacks occur. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its 
counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence. It is important to 
note that these actions were motivated in part by FBI’s desire to remain the lead 
counterterrorism agency for homeland threats as voices calling for creation of 
completely new domestic intelligence agency and or creating a domestic intelligence 
element within the DHS sprung during the post-9/11 discussions. 
According to Seth Jones, “FBI Director Robert Mueller tried to change the FBI’s 
traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the 
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hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and 
policymakers at headquarters. He implemented a major reorganization and increased 
resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were 
permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism.”146  
Moreover, an Operations Center was established to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information sharing and collaboration. Also 66 new Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 
the country were created, which included state and local law enforcement officers, and 
FBI agents. The FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive 
Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office was 
responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI 
investigations and overall strategies. It was the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating 
intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the 
U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state 
and local law enforcement, and the private sector. Each FBI field office was also put 
under a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s 
intelligence functions in that field office.147  
Despite these major changes, the law enforcement organizational culture largely 
prevails. Most problematic is the position of analysts within the FBI structure. 
According to Arthur Hulnick, “analysts were recruited or borrowed, primarily from 
other intelligence analytic units, but soon found that they were second-class citizens in a 
system that valued the Special Agents more than the analysts.”148 The FBI’s own 
guidelines divide its employees to only two groups Special Agents and “other support 
professionals”, thus putting analysts into a same group with cleaning people or truck 
drivers.149 Amy Zegart also refers to this problem contending that “the bureau rules still 
mandate that senior positions in the field, including the top spot in every U.S. field 
office, be staffed by FBI special agents.”150 These provisions essentially preclude any 
career moves for the FBI analysts. 
 Efforts to improve the FBI’s obsolete technology systems have also been 
unsuccessful and very costly. After two attempts to acquire a technology modernization 
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program, the FBI still does not have a modern and effective case management record 
system.151 
 Even though that the FBI has attempted the most ambitious changes, the results 
are disappointing and greatly inefficient given the amount of attention and resources 
allocated to consolidate its domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. It seems 
that most of the proposed changes have been unable to break the law enforcement way 
of thinking within the agency, despite the fact that its official mission has been restated 
to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats 
first, and to uphold and enforce the criminal laws second. 
The CIA has not adapted well to the post-9/11 changes either. For most of the 
time, it has been an agency in turmoil. Due to numerous scandals both of its foreign 
operations (the black sites scandal152) as well as its leadership (Porter J. Goss 
scandal153), the morale has been on a low. The IRTPA ordered the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency to rebuild CIA’s analytical capabilities, transform the clandestine 
services by building its human intelligence capabilities, develop a stronger language 
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives, emphasize recruiting 
diversity among operation officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities, and to 
ensure a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection 
at the operational level. It has also “instructed the CIA and the Department of Defense 
to work better together in coordinating their respective intelligence domains.”154  
The CIA has attempted to increase its domestic intelligence powers first through 
its Counterterrorist Center and then through the TTIC, which was placed under the 
CIA’s budget and headquarters. Even when the independent NCTC was created, the 
CIA provided its analysts but focused more on protecting its own turf by not sharing all 
of its information, which was explained by differences in clearances.  
With regards to improving HUMINT capabilities, obstacles also prevail. The 
recruitment process of new HUMINT agents is bounded by the old rules of secrecy and 
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fear of moles. According to Arthur Hulnick, the old “paranoia remains, but is now 
focused on the possibility that a jihadi will get on the inside. Thus, applicants who have 
the right languages and ethnic background are being kept out by the fear of penetration. 
Most damaging is the reluctance on the part of security officials to clear people who 
come from backgrounds abroad that they find questionable.”155 Moreover, completing 
security forms and waiting for the background checks and the polygraph exams that 
many agencies demand still takes months, and this selection process is discouraging 
potential recruits.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 clearly shows that even 
though attempts to substantially reform the U.S. intelligence community into a single 
united enterprise with the aim and strategy of fighting transnational terrorist threats 
were made, real change has not to date reached the standard that was originally 
envisaged. Such an outcome is surprising given the strong public reaction to the events 
of 9/11 and the enthusiasm the legislative and executive branches of government 
exhibited for improving intelligence gathering and coordination. The evidence presented 
in this chapter points to a number of reasons for the failure of reform of the intelligence 
community to match expectations.  
The legislative negotiations surrounding the IRTPA bill were strongly 
influenced by a robust Defense Department lobby and combined with only lukewarm 
attention from President Bush resulted in adoption of a very vague and ambiguous piece 
of legislation. On paper, the newly created DNI has many responsibilities as well as 
authorities. However, the actual powers are much less significant and have not enabled 
the DNI to overpower the Department of Defense or overcome resistance to reform 
within the old intelligence agencies. Thus, the DNI’s ability to coordinate the U.S. 
intelligence community has been impaired. Moreover, the burgeoning size of the Office 
of the DNI has raised questions about unnecessary levels of bureaucratic layering, 
which is not helping attempts to building a more efficient intelligence community.  
Another important factor in explaining the limited success of the reform agenda 
is the organizational culture of the old intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Their 
debilitating sense of agency parochialism, a belief in the overriding importance of 
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security, and the “need-to-know” principle of secrecy makes them extremely resistant to 
change even amid a crisis on the scale of 9/11.  
However, it can be argued that although the intelligence community is not 
working efficiently even after the reform, it is nonetheless effective in preventing 
terrorist attacks from happening. This is largely due to the fact that in the past nine 
years, U.S. intelligence spending has roughly doubled. The DNI publicly released the 
figure of $47.5 billion for the FY2008 National Intelligence program. An earlier release 
by the then DCI Tenet for FY1998 was a $26.7 billion aggregate budget for NFIP,156 
JMIP and TIARA.157 This growth in funds has undoubtedly helped to improve U.S. 
intelligence community functioning, i.e. its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of a 
9/11 type attack. However, it remains an open question as to whether these funds have 
been used as efficiently as they might have been given the aims of the intelligence 
reform agenda. At present, the answer to this ‘efficiency’ question appears to be 
negative. Because of the organizational obstacles, money was not efficiently spent on 
technological improvements, on the HUMINT recruitment, nor on information sharing 
or unifying security clearances.  
The result of the U.S. intelligence reform then is a system that is effective, that is 
able to prevent terrorist attacks, but is not efficient in doing so. The idea behind the 9/11 
Commission recommendations was to create a unified intelligence community, which 
would work both effectively and efficiently on its mission to counter terrorist threats. 
However, only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence 
community is still a work in progress. 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations were a building stone of U.S. 
intelligence reform. But given the relatively poor results of this reform agenda, voices 
criticizing the form and scope of this reform program have come from both academics 
and intelligence professionals. These questions have inquired about the right kind of 
intelligence reform, and what more could have been done to improve the intelligence 
community. The final chapter will initially examine alternative approaches proposed by 
critics of the intelligence reform program to date. Thereafter, possible solutions to the 
current intelligence reform dilemma will be presented. 
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5. The Right Kind of Reform for the Intelligence Community? 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations set forth a path for the U.S. intelligence 
community reform based on its centralization and enhanced information sharing. 
However, soon after the publication of the 9/11 Commission report, criticism from both 
academics as well as intelligence professionals began to scrutinize the report’s 
conclusions and recommendations as overlooking a number of important realities 
connected to both the U.S. intelligence community and its abilities to avoid intelligence 
failure (i.e. prevent surprise attacks). This chapter will analyze these alternative 
approaches to the U.S. intelligence reform. Then, proposals of possible future steps in 
order to improve the current state of U.S. intelligence community will be made. 
Also this chapter provides the evaluation and analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 from the output perspective 
of the methodological model (figure 1.1). 
 
5.1. Preventing Surprise Attacks 
Soon after the 9/11 Commission report was published, a number of scholars and 
former intelligence professionals criticized the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations as 
well as the 9/11 Commission’s overall approach to the U.S. intelligence community. 
The main objection against the report and the subsequent legislation was based on an 
argumentation that it is impossible to prevent surprise attacks. The very nature of 
surprise attacks is uncertainty caused by asymmetry of attacker and victim. As Richard 
Posner, one of the main proponents of this theory points out, “the attacker picks the 
time, place, and means of attack. Since without a great deal of luck his plan cannot be 
discovered in advance by the victim, the attacker has, by virtue of his having the 
initiative and of the victim’s being unable to be strong everywhere all the time, a built-
in advantage that assures a reasonable probability of a local successes.”158 Therefore, 
the character of the attacks makes it extremely difficult to prevent them. As Posner 
continues, “even the best intelligence service is bound to be surprised from time to time 
because the only way to ensure against ever being surprised is to ignore the cost of false 
alarm and as a result bombard action-level officials with dire warnings.”159 
Furthermore, preventing surprise attacks is virtually impossible either due to lack of 
information or an excess of data. Richard K. Betts warns that “in attack warning, there 
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is the problem of ‘noise’ and deception.”160 He points to an overload of high volume of 
analysis, reports, statistics, which are exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb them 
or scrutinize them.  
Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents: Living with the High Risk 
Technologies argues that some type of failure is simply inherent in the system.161 Even 
though Perrow’s work was focused mostly on early warning systems of nuclear attack 
during the Cold War, his conclusions are, according to the critics of post-9/11 
intelligence reform, valid also for the U.S. intelligence community. As Joshua Rovner 
and Austin Long conclude, “both tactical warning intelligence and nuclear power plants 
are best described as complex, tightly coupled systems. The amount of time available 
for analysts or operators to make correct decisions is often quite small, with almost no 
margin for error. Interactions in both a nuclear power plant and an enemy organization 
(be it a nation-state’s military or a terrorist group) are often unobservable. Certainly, 
enemy intentions, as opposed to dispositions, are nearly always unobservable.”162  
The 9/11 Commission was also criticized for its perspective of hindsight and 
assumptions that anything what was uncovered retrospectively should have been 
uncovered in real time by the intelligence community. Paul R. Pillar, a long term 
veteran of the CIA, condemns the 9/11 Commission’s references to the failure of 
‘connecting the dots’. As he puts it, “the dots the counterterrorist analyst faces, unlike 
those in children’s puzzles, have neither numbers nor a white background, and they can 
be connected in many different ways.”163 Richard Posner also disapproves of the 9/11 
Commission’s approach. He contends that “with the aid of hindsight it is easy to 
identify missed opportunities to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from 
that observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result not of 
bad luck, the enemy’s skill and ingenuity, the inevitability that some surprise attacks 
will succeed, the personal failures of individuals, or the difficulty of defending against 
suicide attacks or protecting a well-nigh infinite range of potential targets, but rather of 
systemic failures in the nations intelligence and security apparatus; failures that can be 
rectified, making us safe, by changing the apparatus.”164 
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All of these authors have come to a conclusion that the U.S. intelligence 
community had worked well before 9/11. Despite the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks, 
the overall counterterrorism performance of the U.S. intelligence community during the 
1990s was strong. Therefore, the proposals for major organizational reform of the 
intelligence community were not substantiated.   
Richard K. Betts argues that no intelligence reform could ever be permanent or 
complete for the simple reason that fixing specific problems often creates new ones and 
that no initiative occurs without opportunity costs. Reforms intended to increase flow of 
analysts, for example, can cause overload, leaving analysts without the time or tools 
needed to separate critical signals from noise. Reforms intended to help analysts 
connect the dots might cause them to be too creative, prompting them to issue 
unnecessary alarms. In a sense, intelligence reform is a zero-sum game: removing some 
weaknesses creates new ones, and these new weaknesses are a likely source of 
intelligence failure.165 Elsewhere, he also points out that “no one ever stays satisfied 
with reorganization because it never seems to do the trick – if the trick is to prevent 
intelligence failure.”166 Thus, the 9/11 Commission could not find a fix to the problem 
of the U.S. intelligence community because the problem is essentially unfixable. 
This criticism, however, overlooks a number of important realities. As chapter 3 
of this thesis has shown, the U.S. intelligence community did not perform well before 
9/11. The intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the threats of transnational terrorism 
even though there were voices both from within and from outside of the intelligence 
community. Moreover, it can be argued that not all of intelligence failures and surprise 
attacks can be prevented, but in the case of 9/11 there were many opportunities that 
could have grasped the danger of terrorist attacks if the system was better organized and 
better adapted to the threat. Better allocation of personnel, better incentives for analysts 
and removing obstacles to information sharing could have led to at least higher chance 
of thwarting the attacks in preparation if not to preventing them at all. 
Moreover, it is true that the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission did examine 
the events preceding the 9/11 attacks from hindsight, however, as was also discussed in 
chapter 3, there were twelve commission, think tank and presidential initiative reports, 
which had made the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission already throughout the 
1990s. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission cannot be accused of picking the most obvious 
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problems of the intelligence community after the attacks happened, because all of the 
problems addressed by the 9/11 Commission were already recognized before 9/11.  
Thus, it is possible to argue that if there had been a substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on the discussed pre-9/11 
recommendations, the intelligence community’s efficiency and effectiveness would 
have been enhanced and the chance to prevent the terrorist attacks would have been 
much larger. 
 
5.2. Is There a Need for the DNI? 
Questions also arose whether a centralized structure of the intelligence 
community is the right one. Again, Rovner and Long are against. They argue that 
“decentralized intelligence offers several potential benefits. Greater autonomy for field 
operators would allow them to recruit unsavory informants – even terrorists – without 
fear of reprimand from the home office. Loosening centralized standards would also 
favor entrepreneurial analysts who prefer to freely communicate with their peers and 
policy counterparts instead of having to follow strict guidelines on communication.”167 
They also point out that increased centralization through the DNI would hamper 
informal interaction between analysts. 
Richard Posner also calls for more decentralization. In his 2006 book Uncertain 
Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in the Throes of Reform, he praises the value 
of complementarity and competition in intelligence, prevention of groupthink and 
motivation of employees by their belonging to only a part of the intelligence community 
and not the whole system as such.168 
However, it is important to clarify that centralization and decentralization of the 
U.S. intelligence community are not mutually exclusive organizing principles. There are 
many companies and organizations where organization is based on both strong central 
authority and decentralized management. Nevertheless, the right balance between 
centralization and decentralization is crucial. Too much centralization can slow down 
innovation, hamper swift and nimble action and have negative influence on employees’ 
morale. On the other hand, too much decentralization can impede coordination and 
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information sharing, evokes distrust, and creates centers of power which refuse reform. 
Thus, the key question is not whether to centralize, but how much and what. 
Therefore, to answer the question asked in the subheading, the U.S. intelligence 
community needs the DNI, however, with much stronger authority than it currently 
posses in order to be able to coordinate the U.S. intelligence community as a unified 
entity but also in order to have enough power to oversee and promote enough 
decentralization which would allow for healthy amount of competition and innovation. 
Suggestions of how to achieve this equilibrium in the U.S. intelligence community 
organization will be made in the last subchapter. 
 
5.3. What to Do Next: Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyzed some of the main obstacles and problematic 
aspects of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform. Two main problems were 
characterized: first, the inability of the newly established institutions such as the DNI 
and the NCTC to properly coordinate and incorporate the intelligence community and 
its agencies, and second the inability and also unwillingness of the old agencies such as 
the CIA and the FBI to adapt to the changed environment and to implement the 
provisions of the intelligence reform legislation. Reasons for these problems were 
identified as being mostly of organizational character based on bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry and institutional inertia. They include poor management, lack of 
incentives for personnel and recruits, inefficient clearance system hampering 
information sharing, and technical deficiencies. 
Therefore, it is important to identify possible solutions to improve the efficiency 
of the U.S. intelligence community. That is to promote such measures, which would 
overcome the organizational obstacles to the intelligence reform and enhanced the 
ability of the U.S. intelligence community to prevent terrorist attacks, i.e. to support its 
effectiveness. It is possible to recognize four main steps leading to more efficient U.S. 
intelligence community. 
First, powers and authorities vested in the newly created position of the Director 
of National Intelligence must be strengthened. However, rather than issuing new 
legislation, the DNI should fully exploit the authorities he currently has under the 
IRTPA and insist on his budgetary authorities in order to promote greater efficiency 
within the U.S. intelligence community. Even though the DNI’s powers are limited, he 
should use them in full scope. If he fails to exercise them, it will create a precedent for 
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weak or only virtual authorities of the DNI and discredit the position of the DNI as 
such. As Gordon Lederman suggests, “the DNI should thoroughly review the budget of 
each intelligence entity and refuse to include any programs in the next year’s budget 
proposal that fail to correspond to the DNI’s vision for integration. The DNI should also 
use his apportionment authority to hold entities’ feet to the fire, authorizing the release 
of selected appropriated funds only once the DNI is satisfied with the pace of 
integration.”169 This would allow the DNI to establish himself as the chief executive 
officer and to build up the unified intelligence enterprise, as was envisioned by the 9/11 
Commission. 
Second, in order to act efficiently as a chief coordinator, the DNI should leave 
some of the responsibilities connected with the preparation for the Presidential Daily 
Briefs to designated mission managers. This would allow the DNI to focus more on the 
organizational transition and management of the intelligence community. Moreover, 
orienting the U.S. intelligence community towards specified missions such as 
counterterrorism (here the mission manager is the Director of the NCTC), counter 
proliferation or by region, i.e. Iran, North Korea would help to break the stovepipes and 
enhance interagency cooperation.170 Also, the mission of the Office of the DNI must be 
clarified in order to prevent creating just another bureaucratic layer to the intelligence 
community organization and to support the DNI’s chief managerial role in a proper 
manner. Thus the ODNI’s roles, responsibilities and lines of authority have to be clearly 
declared.  
Third, culture of a single, unified enterprise needs to be created to promote 
better organizational incentives and to motivate intelligence personnel. The Joint Duty 
Program has to be endorsed by creating incentives for both managers to send their 
qualified personnel and also for the intelligence personnel themselves to produce quality 
outcomes while on their duty. In order to evaluate performance, as well as the post-
rotational career moves a rating system of a kind should be developed. Common 
organizational culture could be also enhanced by integrated training. Arthur S. Hulnick 
argues that “a centralized basic course would not only save money, but also build the 
kinds of relationships that would enhance information sharing and cross-agency 
assignments.”171 After the basic course a specialized courses within the respected 
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agencies would follow but the first training under the auspices of the intelligence 
community “brand” would help in establishing an integrated institutional culture. This 
common institutional culture, if promoted with the right incentives, would help prevent 
turf wars among agencies and improve cooperation. On the other hand, incentives for 
healthy competition in analysis should be supported and a certain amount of 
decentralization should be encouraged in order to avoid the problem of groupthink. 
Fourth, removing the overly complicated system of security clearances is 
essential for improving efficiency of the intelligence community. So far, each agency 
has its own system of providing security clearances and background checks and the 
agencies mostly do not recognize each others clearances, which seriously hampers 
information sharing. A unified system created under the supervision of the DNI would 
remove this obstacle. 
If done right, these proposals would help lessen the identified organizational 
obstacles to the intelligence community change. Improving managerial capabilities can 
help to, at least partially, overcome bounded rationality; establishment of integrated 
institutional culture can mitigate institutional inertia within the individual agencies; and 
incentives for information sharing can moderate structural secrecy. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that for all these suggestions to be 
successfully implemented a support of senior officials, beginning with the president, as 
well as of the legislators is crucial. Thus, the trade-off between decision makers’ 
incentives and capabilities has to create enough interest, as well as actual capabilities to 
seriously invest into substantial intelligence reform in order to improve intelligence 
community’s abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Much of the evidence presented in this chapter and previous one highlight that 
reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11 is still a work in progress. 
However, adopting the suggested proposals would not only improve the efficiency of 
the intelligence community but would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. The 
interconnectedness of the effectiveness and efficiency criteria illustrated earlier in 
Figure 1.1 is clearly evident. Continuous organizational problems hampering the 
efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community have had a negative impact on 
effectiveness; that is on its abilities to prevent terrorist attacks. A case in point is the 
failed attempt to detonate a bomb on an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. 
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This incident was preceded by a number of systemic mistakes caused by the lack of 
efficiency within the intelligence community.172 Such recent evidence demonstrates that 
current initiatives to overcome organizational obstacles within the U.S. intelligence 
community have had limited success. If such security lapses are to be avoided in the 
future the United States government must address the question of what policies will 
ensure the most effective and efficient means of countering terrorist threats. 
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Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored the vulnerability and 
unpreparedness of the United States for such an attack. Most importantly, 9/11 
highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and operational capabilities to 
counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community could not operate in an 
integrated manner because its structure was a Cold War relic with no single actor with 
ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch lacked an effective coordinated 
planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
Soon after 9/11 critical voices sprung up calling for substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community in order to improve its abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
The purpose of this diploma thesis has been to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 
intelligence community reform on the basis on its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Throughout this research, the criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been conceptualized as the 
ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, whereas ‘efficiency’ 
has been operationalised as measures undertaken at the organizational level within the 
intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist attacks.  
At the beginning of this thesis, two key questions were raised. The first of these 
questions inquired into whether the U.S. intelligence community became more effective 
and efficient following the attacks of September 11, 2001? The evidence presented in 
the chapters 2 through 5 suggests that the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 is 
mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist attack). However, it is 
not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack of leadership, inability 
or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right incentives 
for current personnel and potential recruits to the intelligence community. These 
institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the intelligence community, which 
consequently endanger the intelligence community’s effectiveness in countering 
terrorist threats.  
The second question asked in the introduction of this thesis delved into why in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 intelligence failure, has a thorough 
reform of the intelligence community not materialized? The hypothesis that the 
adoption of substantial intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) 
was obstructed by a number of factors proves to be correct. First, the nature of U.S. 
intelligence organizations hindered extensive reform. Second, the rational choices of the 
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U.S. leadership (i.e. the executive and legislative branches of government) did not 
facilitate a process of significant change. Third, the American public’s democratic 
principles were sometimes in conflict with proposals that were seen to undermine civil 
liberties. Out of these three obstacles to substantial reform of U.S. intelligence, the 
organizational obstacles have been identified as the most significant factor in the 
resistance to reform. Therefore, most attention has been paid to the analysis of the 
organizational processes within the intelligence community’s institutions. 
The main argument presented throughout this diploma thesis has been that the 
original aim of reform was to transform the U.S. intelligence community into a single, 
unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks and 
efficient in doing so. This goal has not been realized. Instead, although the post-9/11 
intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain. 
In order to analyze and evaluate reform of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence system 
an organizational model has been adopted. In this model, it has been argued that 
institutional reform is very difficult due to the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within U.S. intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within intelligence agencies’ culture. 
Moreover, the intelligence institutions operate in a political and societal 
environment that creates additional constraints on their ability to adapt and reform. 
These external processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by 
American political leaders who often act in a manner that might be reasonably described 
as being motivated by rational self-interest. In addition, American public opinion and its 
adherence to democratic values based on protection of civil liberties has also been an 
important contextual variable. In general, intelligence community reform is a very 
difficult and long term process and this situation is not helped by public fears about any 
measures that might undermine civil liberties. As a result, the lack of popular support 
for strengthening of the U.S. intelligence community’s powers have often provided 
insufficient incentives for decision makers to embark on root-and-branch reform of the 
intelligence services. 
Chapter 2 has revealed this was the situation that permeated repeated attempts to 
reform the US intelligence community before 9/11. Throughout the 1990s a number of 
attempts were made to adapt the U.S. intelligence community to the changing nature of 
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threats that arose after the end of the Cold War. The transnational and asymmetric 
threats (especially terrorism) superseded the single danger posed by the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. The spectrum of present and potential targets was broadening and the 
intelligence community had to deal with an overwhelming amount of information 
stemming from these threats.  
Twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task 
forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
during the 1990s; and together these bodies made 340 recommendations to reform the 
intelligence community. Many of these proposals suggested improvement in the 
intelligence community’s sense of corporate identity; enhancing human intelligence; 
encouraging information sharing and improving personnel issues; and creating a better 
system of setting intelligence priorities. All of these suggestions were proposed by the 
Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission after the 9/11 as well. It is important to note that 
before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, there were not enough incentives 
for policy makers or intelligence community leaders to embark on a substantial reform 
agenda.  
The assumption introduced in this thesis has been that the shock of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks would create such incentives; however, chapter 3 presented evidence 
that tends to contradict this hypothesis. The immediate reaction of the Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress to events of 9/11 was focused on (a) quick fixes 
such as the enactment of the USA Patriot Act removing many barriers for domestic 
surveillance, or (b) wide governmental changes promoted through a new homeland 
security agenda. None of these initiatives represented what might be reasonably called a 
comprehensive approach towards reforming and integrating the intelligence community. 
Thus, the momentum for change generated by the tragic events of 9/11 vanished.  
Another opportunity to enforce far-reaching changes to create a more effective 
and efficient U.S. intelligence community occurred with publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report. Chapter 4 examined the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations embedded in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) enacted in 2004. A number of problems have been identified regarding the 
IRTPA. First, the impact of this law was diluted during the legislative debate in the U.S. 
Congress where the Defense Department lobby successfully obstructed many changes 
that would have endangered its exclusive position within the intelligence community. 
The DOD’s dominant position is evident from the fact that it secures 80 percent of the 
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intelligence community’s overall budget. Second, the IRTPA created new intelligence 
institutions such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National 
Counterterrorist Center (NCTC). However, the act does not vest enough power in them 
to allow them to attain a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. This limitation 
appears to be especially true in the case of the DNI where its position has been impaired 
and its coordination and managerial powers have been hampered. Therefore, the DNI is 
unable to overcome the organizational obstacles embedded in the intelligence 
community’s organizational culture. Third, the organizational obstacles outlined in this 
study refer primarily to the old intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, and 
their resistance to adapt to the new security environment and to implement properly the 
IRTPA provisions.  
The argument presented in this study of the organizational features of U.S. 
intelligence has been pointing to its lack of efficiency. Such inefficiency is particularly 
evident in the inability of the newly created institutions to properly manage and 
coordinate their activities and the unwillingness of the older established agencies to 
adapt and to embrace the new provisions. 
In order to improve efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community, a number of 
proposals have been suggested. These were outlined and discussed in chapter 5. A 
central feature of these proposals is the agency charged with the management of reform 
– the DNI. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a central and 
persistent failing of the U.S. intelligence community in the post Cold War period has 
been the inability to develop more effective and efficient channels of coordination. Here 
the institutional focus of this research has demonstrated why the logic of organizations 
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. With regard to the DNI, four concrete proposals for 
reform are pertinent.  
First, enhancing the power of the DNI through uncompromising exploitation of 
all authorities vested in it under the IRTPA. Second, the DNI’s focus should be on 
organizational transition rather than the time consuming task of preparing the daily 
presidential briefings. Third, this change would facilitate creating an organizational 
culture that pursues a single mission providing the motivation and incentives for 
enhanced cooperation. Fourth, such reform would reduce the extremely complicated 
system of security clearances which debilitates information sharing. If these steps for 
increasing the efficiency of the intelligence community are implemented, then the 
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effectiveness of the intelligence community in preventing surprise attacks is also likely 
to improve. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this study highlights an important 
general point: reform of the U.S. intelligence community is essentially a work in 
progress. This has important consequences not only for stakeholders’ (i.e. citizens, 
policy makers, intelligence providers and scholars) understanding of how the U.S. 
intelligence community operates, but also the most appropriate means of evaluating its 
strengths and weaknesses. In this diploma thesis, U.S. intelligence has been modeled 
using an input-output approach developed within systems theory where intelligence 
outputs have been evaluated on the basis of two criteria, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Such an approach has the merits of reducing a very complex set of organizational 
relationships to a small number of core features that facilitate generalization. However, 
this approach is limited as it adopts a static structural perspective and cannot deal 
effectively with the essentially strategic nature of institutional change. 
For this reason future research on reform of the U.S. intelligence community 
should focus on the operations of the DNI. Such research would deal not only with 
institutional structures but also with the strategic interactions that are a defining feature 
of the DNIs work. In this respect, the New Institutionalism literature and insights 
derived from formal modeling such as Game Theory would provide the foundations for 
a more detailed account of why the U.S. intelligence community has experienced such 
difficulty in improving coordination.  
Such a theoretical approach would facilitate identifying and constructing 
empirical indicators, or benchmarks, that would allow both scholars and practitioners to 
evaluate the success of different reform plans. Such a theoretical approach and 
methodology has the important advantage of reflecting the evolutionary nature of 
intelligence community change. The research presented in this diploma thesis represents 
an important and necessary first step in such a research agenda by mapping out the 
context and key players and providing a concise evaluation of the main institutional 
problem – coordination.  
- 79 - 
 
Summary 
The argument presented in this thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research question addressed in this thesis and the 
research model based on effectiveness and efficiency is introduced. 
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological background for this 
research thesis. This work commences with a definition of intelligence and a brief 
discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence 
community reform are introduced. The organization theory approach to study 
intelligence community is recognized as the most appropriate. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It examines 
the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the repeated 
attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of transnational threats. 
This is followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these reform attempts. The evidence 
presented in chapter 2 suggests that the post-Cold War change of threat environment did 
not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s intelligence 
services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence community 
was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was unprepared to 
prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as to 
why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from happening 
again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations are 
examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President Bush, undertaken 
simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, and their impact 
on the intelligence community reform are discussed. These new security policies 
include enactment of the USA Patriot Act, promoting the homeland security agenda and 
establishing the Terrorist Threat Information Center. The analysis presented in this 
chapter leads to a conclusion that none of these initiatives presented a comprehensive 
plan of reform of the U.S. intelligence community. 
Chapter 4 delves into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions is 
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evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. The idea behind the 9/11 Commission recommendations was to create a 
unified intelligence community, which would work both effectively and efficiently on 
its mission to counter terrorist threats. The evidence presented in chapter suggests that 
only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community 
is still a work in progress. 
Chapter 5 provides some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient are proposed. It is argued that adopting the suggested 
proposals would not only improve the efficiency of the intelligence community but 
would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. 
In the concluding chapter the two research questions are answered and the main 
arguments of this diploma thesis summarized. Suggestion on future research on reform 
of the U.S. intelligence community focusing on the operations of the DNI using the 
New Institutionalism theory and Game Theory approaches are made.  
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Anotace 
Diplomová práce „Reforma zpravodajských složek Spojených států amerických 
po 11. září 2001: Posílení schopností Spojených států v boji proti terorismu?” zkoumá 
reformu zpravodajských složek USA přijatou po teroristických útocích z 11. září 2001 
s cílem zlepšení protiteroristických schopností Spojených států. Jednoduchý model 
vstupu-výstupu vycházející ze systémové teorie byl vytvořen k evaluaci výstupů 
reformy zpravodajských služeb USA po 11. září na základě efektivity (effectiveness) a  
výkonnosti (efficiency). Kritérium efektivity (effectiveness) je chápáno jako schopnost 
zpravodajských složek zabránit teroristickým útokům, zatímco pod výkonností 
(efficiency) jsou rozuměny opatření a procesy podniknuté na organizační úrovni v rámci 
zpravodajských složek za účelem zabránění teroristickým útokům. Z představené 
analýzy vyplývá , že zpravodajské složky Spojených států amerických po 11. září jsou 
převážně efektivní (tj. od 11. září nedošlo k žádnému teroristickému útoku na USA 
v takovém rozsahu jako útoky z 11. září). Avšak nejsou výkonné (efficient) z důvodu 
organizačních problémů, které zahrnují nedostatečný management, neschopnost nebo 
neochotu jednotlivých zpravodajských agentur spolupracovat a sdílet informace, a 
nedostatečnou motivaci zaměstnanců i případných zájemců o práci ve zpravodajských 
službách. Tyto institucionální nedostatky pak vedou k nevýkonnosti (inefficiency) 
zpravodajských složek, která následně ohrožuje efektivní (effective) zpravodajskou 
obranu před teroristickými hrozbami. 
 
Annotation 
Diploma thesis “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Post-9/11: Strengthening 
the U.S.’s Ability to Fight Terrorism?” examines the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 implemented in order to improve ability of 
 the United States to counter terrorist threats. A simple input-output model developed 
within systems theory is used to evaluate the post-9/11 intelligence reform outputs on 
the basis of effectiveness and efficiency. The criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been 
conceptualized as the ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, 
whereas ‘efficiency’ has been operationalized as measures undertaken at the 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist 
attacks. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the U.S. intelligence 
community since 9/11 is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist 
attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack 
of leadership, inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to 
provide the right incentives for current personnel and potential recruits to the 
intelligence community. These institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the 
intelligence community, which consequently endanger the intelligence community’s 
effectiveness in countering terrorist threats.  
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the equilibrium of U.S. 
perceptions of terrorist threats. This form of violence was not new in American 
historical experience, the threat and use of psychological and physical force by 
individuals, sub-national groups, and state actors aimed at attaining political, social and 
economic objectives in violation of domestic and international law have challenged the 
United States many times in the past. However, this unprecedented (in its extent and 
brutality) action against ordinary citizens of the United States carried out on American 
soil, underscored the vulnerability and unpreparedness of the country for such an attack. 
Most importantly, it highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and 
operational capabilities to counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community 
found it difficult to operate in an integrated manner because its structure was a Cold 
War relic with no single actor with ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch 
lacked an effective planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
The first problem is that the U.S. intelligence community during the 1990s was 
still operating on a structure designed to counter one single enemy – the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. Therefore, a number of cold war legacies were disabling the 
intelligence community to adapt and to react to the rapid growth of transnational threats, 
especially international terrorism. These legacies were all based on divisions and 
boundaries. On the organizational side, the collection of intelligence was divided into 
“stovepipes” by source: human intelligence (HUMINT) under the CIA, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) under the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) under the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The analysis part 
was also organized primarily by agency and not by issue or problem. The CIA was 
responsible for “all-source” analysis, but other agencies had their analysis units as well, 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The second division was, thus, on the CIA/DOD line. The CIA was an 
independent entity, while agencies performing signals and imagery intelligence were 
located within the DOD. Focusing on one target supported competition between the 
agencies, which proved generally beneficial during the Cold War. But the competition 
also led to many turf wars between the agencies and had a negative effect on 
cooperation, which became crucial for countering the transnational threats. The last 
divide was on the domestic-foreign intelligence axis. Out of concern for civil liberties, 
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the CIA was prohibited from performing internal security functions. These powers were 
vested in the FBI, which, however, was first and foremost a law enforcement agency, 
and therefore oriented mostly reactively not preventively. Moreover, the barrier between 
domestic and foreign intelligence had negative effects on information sharing and 
cooperation as well.  
The second problem was that of determining priorities. Transnational threats 
were not new for U.S. intelligence community, but they were treated as marginal within 
the Cold War context. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the growing 
importance of transnational threats, led by terrorism, were recognized both by 
intelligence officials as well as the decision makers. However, the transition from 
focusing on one single target, which is essentially bounded by borders and hierarchical 
in structure to targets which are asymmetric and, by definition, transnational, was not 
realized in a swift enough fashion in order to prevent the attacks from happening. 
All of these problems were addressed already before 9/11. Twelve bipartisan 
blue-ribbon commissions, independent think tank task forces and presidential initiatives 
recognized the post-Cold War deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community and 
made hundreds of recommendations to improve it. However, they were largely ignored 
by both the decision makers, as well as intelligence officials. The changed post-Cold 
War environment was not a sufficient impetus for making a substantial reform of how 
intelligence institutions operated. It seemed that only a catastrophe of 9/11 scope would 
provide the right momentum for change.  
 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two interconnected questions. The first 
question is whether the U.S. intelligence community has become more effective and 
efficient since 9/11? Throughout this research, effectiveness is understood as the ability 
to prevent surprise attacks, whereas efficiency means measures undertaken on 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those attacks. 
Close examination of the governmental actions carried out in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, as well as of the proposed reform embedded in the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act and its subsequent implementation into practice shows 
that the U.S. intelligence community is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any 
successful terrorist attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, 
which in return adversely affect the effectiveness of the intelligence community in 
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countering terrorist threats. These organizational problems include lack of leadership, 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right 
incentives for personnel and potential recruits. These organizational deficiencies reduce 
the intelligence community’s efficiency, which thereafter endanger its effectiveness. 
The second question explores why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by 
the 9/11 intelligence failure, a comprehensive reform of the intelligence community has 
not materialized. In this thesis it is hypothesized that the adoption of substantial 
intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) was obstructed by 
three main factors. First, reform was obstructed by the nature of the intelligence 
organizations themselves. Second, reform was hindered by the rational choices of the 
U.S. leadership (both the president and the legislators). Third, the reform agenda was 
strongly shaped by American citizens’ democratic principles and their core beliefs 
regarding civil liberties. However, among these three obstacles to intelligence reform, 
the institutional aspect is perhaps the most important as institutions are the means by 
which public preferences are transformed into concrete policies. In other words, 
organization matters.1 Organizational structure, culture and management all influence 
how effective and efficient the system will be. Furthermore, in order to keep this thesis 
within a reasonable range, most attention will be paid to the organizational obstacles to 
intelligence reform. 
The two main categories for evaluating the U.S intelligence community before 
and after 9/11 are its effectiveness and efficiency and the relationship between these two 
criteria (independent variables) are summarized in Figure 1. The level of effectiveness 
is defined as ability to prevent the terrorist attacks from happening. Even though it is, as 
many authors conclude, impossible to prevent all surprise attacks the effectiveness of 
intelligence community may be evaluated on the basis of how many attacks were 
successfully prevented.2 The record of successful terrorist attacks on American targets 
before 9/11 is thus zero, whereas given that no terrorist attack of 9/11 scope was 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, terms organization and institution and their derivatives are treated as 
equal. 
2
 See for example: Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable”. World Politics 31 (1): 61-89 or more recently: Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of 
Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Colombia University 
Press. or Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the Wake of 9/11. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. or Pillar, Paul R. 2006. “Good Literature and Bad 
History: The 9/11 Commission’s Tale of Strategic Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 21 
(6): 1022-1044 or most recently Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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committed since 9/11 this fact may be reasonably interpreted as showing the 
effectiveness of U.S. intelligence community.3 
 
Figure 1. Effectiveness and Efficiency of U.S. Intelligence Community before and 
after 9/11 
 
Note: Effectiveness is understood in this study as the ability to prevent surprise attacks. Efficiency means 
measures undertaken on organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those 
attacks. Figure 1. shows that the pre-9/11 intelligence community was neither effective nor efficient. The 
intent of the post-9/11 reform was to create both an effective and efficient intelligence community 
indicated by the dotted arrow. The actual implementation of the intelligence reform legislation and 
executive actions did lead to enhanced effectiveness, but not to increased efficiency (as shown by the 
large clear arrow). 
 
The efficiency criterion is understood here as the number of actions undertaken in order 
to achieve a certain level of effectiveness. These include adapting and prioritizing 
among threats, cooperation and information sharing among agencies, creating a strong 
centralized leadership recognized by everyone, and creating the right incentives for 
personnel working in the intelligence services. Before 9/11 none of these actions was 
accomplished to a degree that was in hindsight considered acceptable (i.e. preventing 
the 9/11 attacks). But what is more surprising is that even after 9/11, the intelligence 
reforms have still not managed to create efficient intelligence community.  
Thus, the original aim of transforming the U.S. intelligence community into a 
single, unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks 
as well as efficient in doing so has not been realized.4 Although, the post-9/11 
                                                 
3
 There are opinions suggesting that there in fact was a number of terrorist attacks on American targets 
since 9/11, such as the Virginia snipers case (see e.g. Gruen, Madeleine, Hyland Frank. 2008. “No Attack 
in the U.S. since 9/11? available at:< 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/no_attack_in_the_us_since_911.php> [accessed 28.4. 2010]), 
however compared to the scope of successful Al Qaeda attacks during the 1990s such as the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing and the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy attacks and the 9/11, the post-9/11 
incidents are not of an equal importance. 
4
 Reform of the U.S. intelligence community as a centralized and unified enterprise was proposed by the 
9/11 Commission and accepted by the subsequent legislative and presidential action. 
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intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain unresolved. 
 
Roadmap of the Research 
The argument presented in this diploma thesis will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 will provide the theoretical and methodological background for this research 
thesis. This work will commence with a definition of intelligence and a brief discussion 
of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical approaches to the 
study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence community reform will be 
introduced. Lastly, the Eastonian input/output methodology employed in this research 
study will be presented. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It will 
examine the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the 
repeated attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of 
transnational threats. This will be followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these 
reform attempts.  
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as 
to why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from 
happening again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and 
recommendations will be examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President 
Bush, undertaken simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, 
and their impact on the intelligence community reform will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 will delve into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions will be 
evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. 
Chapter 5 will provide some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient will be proposed. 
 
The original research proposal for this thesis submitted and accepted in June 2009 
intended to study the change in U.S. homeland security after 9/11 with an aspect of 
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intelligence reform as a part of the research. However, throughout the preparation and 
study period of the thesis, the whole topic of homeland security and intelligence reform 
appeared to be too broad for the range of the diploma thesis. Therefore, the author in 
consultation with her advisor reduced the focus of the research to the U.S. intelligence 
reform only. This approach will enable this thesis to delve in more depth into the 
problem of U.S. intelligence reform. The homeland security aspect is mentioned in part 
3.2.2, but it serves only as additional factor in the intelligence reform analysis. 
 
- 14 - 
 
1. Studying Intelligence and its Reform: An Academically Forgotten 
Field 
The subject of intelligence and especially of intelligence reform has been 
generally overlooked by both political scientists and organization theorists. This is 
because the study of intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is difficult 
because much of the evidence and data is secret. More will be said on this point in 
section 1.2. In addition, there is at present no widely accepted definition of intelligence 
and this lack of conceptual clarity also makes the study of intelligence difficult. 
Notwithstanding, the problems associated with secrecy surrounding intelligence work it 
is essential from the outset to develop an explicit working definition of what is meant by 
the term “intelligence”, what can be understood as intelligence, and also its relationship 
to national security and foreign policy making. These issues will be dealt with in the 
first section of this chapter. 
In the second section different academic approaches to the study of intelligence 
will be introduced. These contrasting approaches may be interpreted as different facets 
of the study of intelligence. They include topics such as relationship of intelligence to 
policy making, to democratic principles and the ethics of intelligence or the study of 
intelligence failure in general. However, the question of intelligence community reform 
has not been discussed in great depth so far within the political science or organizational 
literatures.  
For this reason, there is at present no “ready-made” theory, which could be used 
and applied to U.S. intelligence community reform post 9/11. Thus, in order to explain 
the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community to both the pre- and post-9/11 efforts a 
combined approach of organization and bureaucracy theory with aspects from political 
science and decision making must be developed. Lastly, this chapter will present the 
research method used in this thesis. 
 
1.1. What Is Intelligence and Why Is It Important for National Security? 
According to Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading expert in intelligence studies, there 
are several ways to think about intelligence:5 
                                                 
5
 There has been a rich ongoing discussion about what intelligence is, which due to space constraints 
cannot be delved into here, and thus Mark Lowenthal’s approach was chosen. For more information on 
definitions of intelligence, see e.g. Davis, Jack. 1992. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949”. Studies in 
Intelligence 36 (5): 91-104. 
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• Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which 
certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, 
and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are 
conceived and conducted. 
• Intelligence as a product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of 
these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operation 
themselves. 
• Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that 
carry out its various functions.6 
 
Throughout this thesis, the third type of intelligence perception will be mostly used 
because it addresses the key aspect of intelligence analyzed in this thesis – intelligence 
community as an institutional body and its parts. 
Another way of thinking about intelligence is to see it in terms of the craft of 
intelligence, which has two basic components. The first is collection – that is gathering 
of particular information about intelligence targets. Collection is done through different 
methods, such as human intelligence – spies and informants; signals intelligence – 
intercepted communications; imagery intelligence – maps, pictures, etc.; and open 
source intelligence – information derived from publicly available sources. The second 
component is analysis – that is studying collected information and deriving conclusions, 
judgments, or predictions.  
According to one intelligence scholar, “in general, analysis should drive 
collection so that collection focuses on obtaining the information that analysts need in 
order to render their conclusions, judgments, or predictions. ‘All-source analysis’ refers 
to analysis of an intelligence topic using information collected by all relevant 
methods.”7 This process of tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating 
intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. Special functions outside of the intelligence 
cycle are covert actions and counterintelligence, which is focused on protecting the 
country, as well as intelligence agencies, from the activities of other foreign intelligence 
services8. 
                                                 
6
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 8. 
7
 Lederman, Gordon N. 2005. “Restructuring the Intelligence Community”. p. 89 in Peter Berkowitz 
(ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution. 
8
 Turner, Michael A. 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield., p. 41. 
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Intelligence, in the meaning of a finalized product, is an essential part of national 
security policy making. It can provide crucial information about the potential enemy or 
support (or provide evidence against) a certain national security policy action. As 
Robert Jervis contends, “the purpose of intelligence is to provide an understanding of 
the world on which foreign policy can be based and to support instruments to influence 
and possibly deceive others.”9 Policymakers generally accept the intelligence as an 
important part of their decision and policymaking. However, the role and importance of 
intelligence varies in each administration. Again using in words of Robert Jervis, 
“policy makers say they need and want very good intelligence. They do indeed need it, 
but often do not want it.”10 This means that sometimes the view of intelligence analysts 
is not the same as that of the decision makers. This is because it is not always the case 
that intelligence submitted to decision makers is supportive of a government’s preferred 
policy goals. Thus, the relationship between decision makers and intelligence is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
1.2. Academic Approaches to the Study of Intelligence 
The essence of intelligence, both in the meaning of the information provided as 
well as the process, is secrecy. According to Michael Warner, “even the accidental 
disclosure of some analytical, informational, or operational advantage over a rival or an 
enemy is presumed to be tantamount to the loss of that advantage while it is still 
potentially useful.”11 The fact that intelligence is conducted with some level of secrecy 
makes it very hard for the scholars of intelligence to undertake comprehensive analyses. 
As Warner concludes, “intelligence studies have been conducted one way on the 
‘outside’ with no official access to original records, and another way on the ‘inside’, 
where a few scholars have intermittently enjoy sanctioned (if not always complete) 
access to the extant documentation.”12 Thus, an imbalance is created where studying 
intelligence from the outside is extremely difficult and in a sense incomplete, and on the 
other hand the internal sources and studies are difficult to verify. 
                                                 
9
 Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception, and Deception”. p. 70 in Jennifer E. 
Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
10
 Jervis, Robert. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform”. The 
Forum 4 (1): 1. 
11
 Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence”. p. 17 in Loch K. Johnson 
(ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Due to the element of secrecy and also due to the various meanings of 
intelligence, there is little published material on how to study intelligence. Thomas 
Bruneau and Steven Boraz point to the striking fact that “whereas intelligence officers 
and the organizations within which they function in the intelligence community are 
extremely rigorous methodologically in concluding their work, when we turn to the 
study of intelligence structures and processes by outsiders and retired intelligence 
professionals, there is little rigor and virtually no consensus on how to research and 
analyze the intelligence community.”13  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the failure of intelligence community to 
prevent them, attention of scholars as well as former intelligence officials to study 
intelligence heightened, however there is only little available analysis on the 
organization of intelligence and its reform. Even the aforementioned Bruneau and Boraz 
focus in their volume Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness, on the question of relationship between democracy and intelligence. Thus 
they analyze topics such as democratic control of intelligence, the legislative and 
judicial oversight, the problem of civil rights protection with connection to intelligence, 
and the transformation of intelligence from a tool of state oppression in transitional 
countries.14 Many other authors have also focused on the question of ethics and 
intelligence, such as Michael Herman15, or on intelligence oversight in the United 
States, for example L. Britt Snider16 or Jennifer Kibbe.17 
Other authors envisage the U.S. intelligence community reform after 9/11 
through the lenses of changes in intelligence analysis, technology, and intelligence 
collection methods and practices. Here the volume Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, 
Obstacles, and Innovations edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce18 stands out 
                                                 
13
 Bruneau, Thomas C., Boraz, Steven C. 2007. “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness”. P.1 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to 
Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”. Intelligence and National 
Security 19 (2): 342-358. 
16
 Snider, L Britt. 2005. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 11”. Pp. 239-258 in 
Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
17
 Kibbe, Jennifer. 2010. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: In the Solution Part of the Problem?” 
Intelligence and National Security 25(1): 24-49. 
18
 George, Roger Z., Bruce James B. (eds.). 2008. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and 
Innovations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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for its comprehensive treatment of this subject matter. Among other scholars focusing 
on these topics are Stephen Marrin19 and Deborah G. Barger20. 
Third group of authors, who touch upon the problem of intelligence reform, 
focuses on the question of intelligence failure and its prevention. Their approach 
explains that intelligence failures are inevitable and impossible to prevent. Therefore, 
there is no need for substantial reform intelligence community because it in general 
works well. Moreover, reforms of the whole intelligence community would negatively 
affect those parts of the system that produce good results. Main proponents of this 
approach are mostly former intelligence professionals, for example Richard K. Betts21, 
Richard Posner22, and Paul R. Pillar.23 
All of these approaches to the study of intelligence address a certain type of 
change or reform of intelligence, in all three of its meanings. However, none of them 
analyze the organization of intelligence and its importance. Neither do they present a 
suitable theoretical framework for evaluating the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after 9/11 in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. Only three authors 
tackle the question of intelligence community reform from an organizational point of 
view. The first is Amy Zegart, who in her book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11,24 creates a combined theoretical approach to study adaptation failure of 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on both organization theory and political 
science theory of rational choice decision making. Even though this scholar applies her 
framework to an explanation of U.S. intelligence community failure before 9/11, her 
combined framework proves useful even for evaluating the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community reform. The second is a couple of authors, Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas 
Skelley, who in their chapter Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory25 provide an insight of organization theory on the organizational 
structure, culture and management of the intelligence community. The next part of this 
                                                 
19
 Marrin, Stephen. 2007. “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic 
Responsibilities”. Intelligence and National Security 22 (6): 821-846. 
20
 Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation. Available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf> 
[accessed 20.3. 2010]. 
21
 Betts, Richard K. 2007. 
22
 Posner, Richard A. 2005 and 2006. 
23
 Pillar, Paul R. 2006. 
24
 Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
25
 Hastedt Glenn P., Skelley, Douglas B. 2009. “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory”. Pp. 112-130 in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.). Intelligence 
Theory: Key Questions and Debate. New York: Routledge. 
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chapter will present the main arguments for an organizational approach to the topic of 
U.S. intelligence community reform.  
 
1.3. Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform 
In order to build a model of the U.S. intelligence community reform, which 
would allow its proper evaluation and explanation, both organization theory as well as 
the theory of new institutionalism and rational choice decision making will be used. 
Even though, the main focus is on the organizational side of the intelligence 
community, its internal structures, cultures and management, attention also has to be 
paid to processes outside of the U.S. intelligence community. These explain the 
influence of leadership decision-making as well as the institutional design of the 
American democratic principles on the final outcome of the intelligence reform. 
Organization theory consists of a system of competing ideas some of which are 
useful for explaining the failure of the intelligence reform to create a more efficient 
intelligence community. Classical organization theory is focused mostly on private 
corporations and businesses, thus it is necessary to adopt a bureaucratic perspective 
from organization theory. Here the logic may be summarized as follows. First, internal 
change is difficult for private companies26 and even more for governmental 
organizations.27 Second, internal resistance to change is powerful because it is based on 
both the organizational structure and also on an entrenched culture of values, norms, 
ideas and identities.28 Three reasons why organizations resist change can be 
characterized in the following manner.  
First, there is the bounded rationality of organizational leaders, who settle for 
options to internal change that seem to them to be good, but which in fact might not be. 
However, because the leaders have usually incomplete information, cannot predict the 
future and are bound by cognitive constraints, it can lead them to adopt changes which 
might be poorly identified, while the real problems are not addressed and deficiencies 
prevail.29 
                                                 
26
 Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. The Limits of Organizational Change. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Egeberg, Morton. 2003. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective”. Pp. 
116-126 in B. Guy Peters, John Pierre (eds.). Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage 
Publications. 
29
 Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press. 
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The second reason is structural secrecy. In order to be efficient, organizations 
specialize and divide to proficient subunits focusing on specific tasks. However, this 
kind of specialization prevents the efficient movement of knowledge and information 
within an organization. The resulting outcome is that “people in one part of the 
organization often lack the expertise to understand the work of people in other parts of 
the organization.”30 Structural secrecy makes it hard for managers to understand what 
exactly are the subunits doing and what needs to be changed. “The very structures, 
rules, and technologies designed to improve efficiency sabotage the organizations 
ability to learn and change.”31 
Finally, the liability of time or institutional inertia is the third factor limiting the 
organizational change. All organizations become more resistant to change as routines, 
norms, and relationships get established over time. Here, the problem is multifaceted. 
Organizational management supports standardization in operating procedures, 
motivation of employees, etc. But the very measures that create stability and reliability 
reduce the probability of change.32 In addition, the growing homogeneity of 
organizational culture – i.e. norms, relationships, and behaviors – leads employees to be 
naturally resistant to change of the way things have been done because they have 
become comfortable and used to the old procedures.33 
These three obstacles to change apply to all organizations. However, change is 
even harder for government agencies. This is because governmental institutions are 
generally designed to be both stable and durable and hence resistant to change. 
Government institutions place a high value on reliability, predictability and consistency 
in performing their tasks.34 Moreover, it is much easier for government agencies to 
resist change because they are not operating in a competitive market environment, 
which motivates private companies to adapt in order to survive.  
Also, the political environment in which government institutions work makes it 
difficult for them to change. The political backing for the creation or reform of a 
governmental agency relies on compromising political coalitions. Political opposition in 
                                                 
30
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 52 
31
 Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 110. 
32
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the American democratic political system has various means to limit or hamper the 
reform or creation of a new agency.35  
Another obstacle to governmental agency change in comparison with the private 
sector is that managers of governmental organizations are restricted by many more 
rules, conflicting goals and bureaucratic red tape. The process of managerial decisions 
such as hiring and firing employees, or acquiring more funds is required to move 
through a complicated system of bureaucratic layers, which ultimately makes it difficult 
for the governmental agencies to change. 
Another way of changing agencies that do not manage internally is an imposed 
change from the outside, through executive or legislative action. These processes are not 
at the core of the argument of this thesis, but have a certain effect on the final outcome 
of the U.S. intelligence community reform and therefore need to be mentioned. 
Especially important is the fact that even here obstacles to organizational change 
emerge. These consist of the rational self-interest decision making of both the president 
as well as the legislators.  
For presidents the incentives to improve organizational effectiveness exist and 
presidents are expected to promote it. However, presidents must prioritize among issues 
on their packed agendas. With limited election terms, presidents focus mostly on issues 
that directly concern voters, rather then on changing the complicated organizational 
design of governmental agencies. As Zegart concludes, “presidents are especially 
reluctant to push for agency reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of 
anticipated resistance.”36 Also for legislators the topic of agency reform is mostly not 
attractive enough to delve into. Especially the intelligence reform has weak connection 
to voters in their electoral districts.  
A second external barrier to intelligence reform stems from some key principles 
of American democracy, its decentralized system of federal government and stress on 
civil liberties. The federal system of government, as was already mentioned, enables 
political opposition to mitigate the final outcomes of proposed reforms. Also, the 
emphasis on civil liberties usually complicates any attempts to reform and centralize the 
intelligence community out of the fear of civil rights violations if more power was 
vested in the intelligence community. 
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This overview of the intelligence and organizational literatures highlights a 
number of key themes relevant to reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
All organizations by their very nature are resistant to substantial change and are 
constrained by rational self-interest of key decision makers. In addition, public 
institutions must take into account their political environment. In the case, of 
intelligence organizations strong popular support for liberal democratic principles is a 
central consideration. Each of these three themes provides the building blocks for the 
research methodology used in this thesis. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
Given the complex theoretical framework applied to the study of the U.S. 
intelligence community reform, the research methodology requires a comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the actual research method used in this thesis may be summarized as an 
analytical and evaluative organizational narrative. The research methodology used in 
this thesis is based on an Eastonian37 input/output perspective on intelligence reform. 
The basic features of this methodological approach are presented schematically in 
Figure 1.1. 
Within this Figure 1.1 the development of the U.S. intelligence community 
before 9/11 as well as actions undertaken in order to promote intelligence reform post 
9/11 are considered to be inputs into the original institutional design of the intelligence 
community. Thereafter, the impact of the pre-9/11 situation and post-9/11 reform 
proposals will be evaluated using an organizational and rational-decision making 
framework. Lastly, the output or actual implementation of the legislation reforming the 
U.S. intelligence community will be evaluated based on the criteria of effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
The intelligence institutions depicted by the box in the centre of Figure 1.1 
consists of the internal organizational processes present within the U.S. intelligence 
community. These internal processes include the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within the intelligence agencies culture. 
The internal organizational processes are influenced by external processes entrenched in 
                                                 
37
 David Easton, a renowned political scientist, created a model of political system based on input and 
output factors which are influenced by external environment. For more on Easton’s application of systems 
theory of political science, see e.g. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
- 23 - 
 
the political and societal environment. The external environment processes consist of 
executive and legislative decisions made by the self-interest rationale of political 
leaders, as well as of the democratic societal values of citizens on the basis of deeply 
held beliefs regarding civil liberties. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the research methodology 
 
Note: This systems theory approach to intelligence provision, based on the work of Easton,38 views the 
work of intelligence institutions as being a product of the inputs into these institutions and the 
environment within which intelligence institutions operate. This model does not deal directly with the 
internal operations of intelligence institutions but suggests that institutional factors play an important 
role in mediating policy inputs and outputs. 
 
The pre-9/11 socio-political context will be discussed in chapter 2. This context is 
viewed in Figure 1.1 as providing a key input to the development of the U.S. 
intelligence community before 9/11. Within the approaches to the study of intelligence 
presented in section 2.2 of chapter 2, all of the previously mentioned themes such as 
limits of intelligence oversight, methods and practice of intelligence agencies 
influencing institutions decisions and actions, and the advocacy of the status quo by 
former intelligence professionals add to the pre-9/11 input will be discussed. Each of 
these themes has influenced the internal organizational design and culture of the U.S. 
intelligence community. 
Later in chapter 3 the focus will shift to an examination of the input provided by 
reactions to the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on governmental and legislative initiatives to 
reform the U.S. intelligence community. These actions have also had an impact on the 
internal institutional processes within the intelligence community. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
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thereafter evaluate all the interconnected input processes influencing the final output of 
the post-reform intelligence community in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. 
The evidence for the analysis and evaluation of the U.S. intelligence community 
reform presented in following chapters is drawn from a wide range of unclassified and 
declassified policy documents. This type of evidence is composed of various 
commission recommendations, official reports and working papers analyzing the pre-
9/11 and post-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence community, internal agency evaluation 
documents of the progress of implementing the intelligence reform propositions, various 
official strategies, and miscellaneous pieces of legislation related to the intelligence 
community reform. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical and methodological framework for this research 
thesis has been presented. The theoretical approach adopted draws inspiration from 
insights derived from the literatures on intelligence and organizations. These insights 
have been used in conjunction with an Eastonian systems model to construct a 
methodological approach exploring the two main influences, or inputs, on intelligence 
institutional reform and the enhanced security provision provided by intelligence 
organizations collectively. This policy output will be evaluated in terms of two central 
criteria: effectiveness and efficiency. Given the relative underdevelopment of the 
scholarly study of intelligence community reform such a methodological approach 
seems a reasonable approach to adopt when dealing a large volume of detailed evidence. 
In the next chapter, the process of applying the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives developed in the foregoing pages will be “put to the test” and used to 
marshal the evidence to address the two key questions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. 
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2. U.S. Intelligence Community before 9/11: Searching for Direction 
For about forty years the United States intelligence community focused on one 
overriding target: the Soviet Union, and its satellites. Attention and resources were 
mostly directed against Soviet nuclear forces and its conventional forces threatening 
Western Europe.39 However, with the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community, 
as well as the whole direction of the U.S. foreign policy, faced a dilemma of finding its 
purpose in a new unipolar world.40 The old adversary had disappeared and a new one 
was coming in many different forms and shapes. The intelligence community was 
expected to adapt to these new threats and to focus on a changed set of targets. The 
ability (or inability) to adapt to these changes forms part of the pre-9/11 input to the 
intelligence community reform agenda outlined earlier in the systems theory model 
presented in Figure 1.1. 
This chapter will first focus on the change of the intelligence environment after 
the end of the Cold War and the challenges posed by transnational threats. Although 
these threats were not new to the U.S. intelligence community, they were never in the 
forefront of its attention. In the second section, various attempts to reform the 
intelligence community before 9/11, based on the changing threats and targets, will be 
presented. These were set forth in recommendations of a number of bipartisan blue-
ribbon commissions, nonpartisan think tank reports and governmental initiatives 
undertaken during the 1990s. The final part of this chapter will examine the main 
obstacles to implementing these proposals and recommendations for a reform. 
 
2.1. Post-Cold War Environment: Adapting to New Threats 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
communist threat had diminished and there was no apparent threat from any foreign 
military power or any hostile ideology of comparable reach to that of the Soviet 
                                                 
39
 Maddrell, Paul. 2009. “Failing Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats”. International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22 (2): 199.  
40
 The concept of the United States as the world’s only leading superpower and the future of America’s 
grand strategy was vastly  analyzed by many outstanding scholars of international relations, e.g.: 
Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. “The Unipolar Moment”. Foreign Affairs 70 (1): 23–33; Layne, 
Christopher. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise”.  International Security 
17 (4): 5–51; Layne, Christopher. 1997.  “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future 
Grand Strategy”. International Security 22 (1): 86–124; or Nye, Joseph S. 2002. “Limits of American 
Power”. Political Science Quarterly 117 (4): 545-559. 
- 26 - 
 
Union.41 However, different types of threats to U.S. national security emerged. These 
threats were known to U.S. policy makers and intelligence analysts during the Cold 
War, but they were mostly understood as being peripheral to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its communist counterparts.  
The main characteristic of these threats is their asymmetric and transnational 
nature. The asymmetry is postulated by the non-state character of their actors, which 
can be mostly described as armed groups. According to Richard H. Schultz, a leading 
expert on the topic of asymmetric threats and armed groups, there are four categories of 
armed groups: terrorists, insurgents, militias, and organized crime. “All armed groups, 
to varying degrees, challenge the state’s authority, power, and legitimacy. Some do so 
by seeking to overthrow the government and replace it, while others attempt to weaken, 
manipulate, or co-opt the state.”42 This is achieved through the use violence and force in 
unconventional and asymmetric ways. The transnational aspect of these threats can be 
characterized by their disrespect for national boundaries and cross border operational 
mode. These threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.43 
Transnational threats and the actors responsible for them were not new for U.S. 
intelligence; the intelligence community had been active against organized crime and 
drug traffickers even during the Cold War. Similarly, terrorism was a re-occurring issue 
with recognized threats of Middle East terrorism since the 1970s and state-sponsored 
terrorism of the 1980s. But as Gregory Treverton points out, the novelty was: (1) in the 
growing importance of transnational threats, especially of terrorism, and (2) in the range 
of concern for transnational threats, which (again most notably terrorism) became the 
primary activity for intelligence.44 
Also, the spectrum of present and potential transnational threats has been 
broadening, thus creating the need for the intelligence community to adapt in order to be 
able to follow this growing number of targets. Whereas during the Cold War the 
problem was a general lack of information, the post-Cold War environment presented 
the opposite challenge for the intelligence community – too much information 
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stemming from the vast range of transnational threats. Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading 
scholar of intelligence studies, contends that “deciding what to focus on in the absence 
of the overwhelming Soviet threat and in the midst of nearly a decade of severe budget 
cuts was a daunting managerial challenge”.45 
The terrorist threats did, indeed, stand out among the many other transnational 
threats identified after the end of the Cold War. Some intelligence officials argued that 
intelligence agencies did recognize the importance of the terrorist threats and allocated 
its resources and launched new programs to combat terrorism well before 9/11. As 
former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates stated in 1994, the U.S. 
intelligence community started to readjust its priorities and shifted its resources away 
from the Soviet and other communist-related targets and missions soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, 58 percent of the whole intelligence 
community’s budget were devoted to following the Soviet-related threats, while by 
1993 this figure had dropped to just 13 percent.46 Even though specific budget figures 
for the intelligence community are classified, it appears resources were reallocated to 
fight terrorism. As the conclusions of the Joint Inquiry suggest, despite the time of tight 
budgets during the 1990s, direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.47 
Moreover, both within the CIA and the FBI incentives to transform and to 
address the terrorist threats evolved. According to the testimony of former Director of 
the FBI (1993-2001) Louis J. Freeh before the 9/11 Commission, the FBI had more than 
tripled its counterterrorism budget by 1999; it had also doubled the number of agents 
working on counterterrorism cases and expanded the number of its Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF) to improve coordination with local law enforcement.48 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2003, stated in 
his testimony before the Joint Inquiry that both the CIA as well as the intelligence 
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community as a whole had focused on the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other 
Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or Egyptian Islamist Jihad. An 
interagency approach was adopted through the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), under 
the auspices of the DCI. Among other CIA initiatives were: a new comprehensive 
strategy against al Qaeda called “The Plan”, a nationwide program for hiring qualified 
personnel for counterterrorism tasks, a counterterrorism educational programs, and 
measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI such as exchange of senior 
officials.49 
However, as Gregory Treverton, a renowned intelligence expert, points out, the 
U.S. intelligence community faced a number of Cold War legacies, which were 
mismatched to the changed threats. First, it was the boundaries between intelligence and 
law enforcement, foreign and domestic, and between public and private, which were 
created out of concern for civil liberties. These boundaries were then reinforced by the 
institutional legacy, which organized intelligence by source based on “stovepipes”50 on 
the collection side, and by agency not by issue or problem on the analysis side. During 
the Cold War, this division enhanced competition between analysts and provided 
different perspectives on the same issue, while the agencies could tailor their analysis to 
the needs of their consumers. The final Cold War legacy was a product of the 
boundaries. Domestic intelligence performed by the FBI was twice circumscribed. The 
FBI was first and foremost law enforcement organization, thus focused on reaction and 
prosecution, rather than on prevention. Moreover, “the domestic-intelligence function 
was limited by the boundary between intelligence and law enforcement, a ‘wall’ that 
extended inside the FBI and inhibited cooperation among intelligence and law 
enforcement officials working on similar issues.”51 
The intelligence community pre-9/11 attempted to transform itself amid the new 
terrorist threats by reallocating resources and creating new initiatives. However, the 
pace of the transformation was not efficient enough given the limited resources as well 
as the obstacles within the organizations stemming from the Cold War legacy of the 
institutional design of the intelligence community. As a result, the events of 9/11 
highlighted the unpreparedness and ineffectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community 
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to prevent a terrorist attack. Most of the deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community 
and the importance of adaptation of the intelligence community organization to the 
transnational threats were identified by various commissions and initiatives throughout 
the 1990’s. Their main ideas and recommendations will be examined in the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
2.2. Pre-9/11 Attempts to Reform the U.S. Intelligence Community52 
The end of the Cold War brought on a debate not only about the role of the 
United States in the international system, it has also stirred up a discussion about the 
importance of intelligence for the U.S. national security and foreign policies53 as well as 
about the best way the intelligence community should be organized in order to face the 
changed threats. Amy Zegart, a leading expert on U.S. intelligence reform and national 
security, created an intelligence reform catalogue consisting of twelve major bipartisan 
commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces. This catalogue 
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts between 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
this respect, Zegart contends that “All of their reports urged reform within intelligence 
agencies, across the Intelligence Community and other parts of the U.S. government.”54 
Using Zegart’s approach to analyzing the pre-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence 
community has the advantage of eliminating the problem of hindsight, instead it allows 
us to focus on what the intelligence officials and policymakers really knew before 9/11. 
Table 2.1 presents the twelve initiatives, out of which six were high profile 
bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions chaired by Congressional leaders and top 
governmental officials such as former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, former 
Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and Harold Brown, William Webster former director of 
both the CIA and FBI and Ambassador Paul Bremer. Three studies were developed by 
leading nonpartisan think tanks: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Institute 
for Public Policy, and the 20th Century Fund. The remaining three reports stemmed from 
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governmental initiatives: President Clinton’s interagency National Performance Review, 
the FBI’s 1998 Strategic Plan, and a House Intelligence Committee staff study.55  
 
Table 2.1. Intelligence Reform Catalogue of Unclassified U.S. Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism Studies, 1991-2001 
 
Year 
Issued 
Study Name Number of 
Recommendations 
1993, 
1995 
National Performance Review (Phases I and II) 35 
1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) 
39 
1996 Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force 29 
1996 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study 
(IC21) 
75 
1996 20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence 18 
1997 National Institute on Public Policy Report on Modernizing 
Intelligence (Odom Report) 
34 
1998 FBI Strategic Plan 1998–2003  60 
1999 Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Deutch Commission) 
57 
1999, 
2000 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore 
Commission), Reports 1 and 2 
60 
 
2000 Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement 
(Webster Commission) 
21 
 
2000 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) 36 
2001 U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-
Rudman Commission), Phase III Report 
50 
 Total 514 
Source: Adapted from Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 29. 
 
Together the studies proposed 514 recommendations on wide range of issues. Only six 
of the studies focused specifically on intelligence issues; the other six dealt with topics 
ranging from counterterrorism (The Gilmore and Bremer Commissions), proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (The Deutch Commission), federal law enforcement (The 
Webster Commission), to emerging 21st century threats to the U.S. national security in 
general (The Hart-Rudman Commission). Out of the 514 recommendations, 
approximately two-thirds of them, or 340, focused exclusively on improving and fixing 
the U.S. intelligence community. It should be noted that even the law enforcement and 
counterterrorism studies paid a great amount of attention to the problems of the 
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Intelligence Community. “Tellingly, every study during the period included discussion 
of major intelligence deficiencies and every study issued recommendations to fix them. 
Together, the counterterrorism and law enforcement studies contributed one-third of all 
intelligence reform recommendations.”56 
Zegart has identified four categories of major organizational problems on which 
the studies mostly agreed: (1) the intelligence community’s lack of coherence or 
“corporateness”; (2) insufficient human intelligence; (3) personnel systems that failed to 
align intelligence needs with personnel skills or encourage information sharing; and (4) 
weaknesses in setting intelligence priorities.57 It is important to note that each of these 
four categories were later identified by both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 
9/11 Commission as the ultimate blunders leading to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. 
The lack of “corporateness” can be best understood through the structural 
shortages in organization and lack of leadership in the U.S. intelligence community. As 
the Council on Foreign Relations report pointed out, “the intelligence community was 
less a community than a collection of more than a dozen largely autonomous 
components spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the world” with no one in 
charge of them.58 Despite the official role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
as the main leader of the intelligence community being responsible for proposing 
strategies and coordinating efforts across the intelligence agencies, the DCI was in 
reality overpowered by the Secretary of Defense which controlled over 80 percent of the 
intelligence budget. In this sense, the 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study 
criticized what it saw as “the glaring gap” between the DCI’s responsibilities and its 
authorities.59 
Inadequate human intelligence capabilities were criticized by a majority of the 
reports. In this respect, it was recommended that the recruitment process requiring prior 
approval from the CIA before individuals suspected of civil rights violations could be 
recruited60 be re-evaluated or abolished. The Bremer Commission recommended the 
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DCI to issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines would no longer apply to recruiting 
terrorist informants and identified aggressive recruitment of human intelligence sources 
on terrorism as one of the intelligence community’s highest priorities.61 A similar 
suggestion was made by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which also warned against the 
steep decline of intelligence budgets and its impact on human intelligence.62 
The problems of personnel systems and information sharing were addressed by 
nearly one-third of the recommendations. The House Intelligence Committee staff study 
concluded that the intelligence community “continues to face major personnel crises 
that it has, thus far not addressed in any coherent way”.63 Hand in hand with the 
personnel issues, the importance of information sharing was stressed. The Aspin-Brown 
Commission as well as the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Council on Foreign 
Relations Task Force recommended improvements in information sharing between the 
intelligence agencies and better cooperation with law enforcement agencies on domestic 
intelligence issues.64 
Many of the recommendations proposed during the 1990s also focused on the 
lack of attention of both the intelligence officials as well as policymakers to setting 
intelligence priorities. The emergence of transnational threats at the end of the Cold War 
resulted with more issues to be covered by the intelligence agencies with less sources 
and little guidance about how to prioritize among them. The 1996 House Intelligence 
Committee called the requirements process “one of the most vexing aspects of 
intelligence management” and called for creation of “an overarching concept for 
coordinating intelligence requirements, especially when faced with declining resources, 
a growing customer base, and increasingly diverse requirements”.65 The lack of 
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effective prioritizing process was criticized even five years later by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission, which was concerned with the “dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of 
important countries, regions, and functional challenges”.66 
As Zegart contends, of the 340 recommendations for changes of the U.S. 
intelligence community, only 35 were successfully implemented, and 268 – or 79 
percent of the total – resulted in no action at all.67 There was only one legislative 
initiative that attempted to implement the various commissions’ recommendations and 
one initiative that served as a starting point for all of the studies included in the 
Intelligence Reform Catalogue. This first attempt to reflect the changed situation of the 
post-Cold War world was made by Senator David Boren and Representative Dave 
McCurdy in 1992.68 Both of these legislators introduced two nearly identical proposals 
to reshape the structure of U.S. intelligence community including the replacement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence with a Director of National Intelligence, who was 
supposed to preside over four separate agencies – one for each category of intelligence 
collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) and the fourth for newly created agency 
responsible for analysis.69 Moreover, the DNI was supposed to have budget authority 
over all kinds of intelligence, including military. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was 
not adopted, and as Richard A. Best notes, “observers credited strong opposition from 
the Defense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with 
inhibiting passage of the legislation”.70 
The other main legislative initiative was the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
the 1997 Fiscal Year (FY1997), which attempted to act upon the recommendations of 
the Aspin-Brown Commission and the IC21 Study. Two deputy DCI positions were 
established, one for Deputy DCI and the other for a Deputy DCI for Community 
Management, both Senate-confirmed positions. Moreover, the act gave the DCI 
authority to develop and present to the President an annual budget for the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program and to participate in the development of a military 
intelligence budget. Despite the effort that went into the FY1997 legislation, attempts 
intended to enhance the DCI’s community-wide role were not fully implemented. The 
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FY1997 Act established four new Senate-confirmed positions having responsibilities 
that extended across all intelligence agencies. From its enactment until it was 
superseded by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Senate 
confirmed only two individuals to these positions, who both left office in 2003 and were 
never replaced. In addition, the DCI’s authorities in the preparation of budgets for all 
intelligence agencies had not been fully exercised.71 
Analysis of the intelligence reform catalogue data on various attempts to reform 
the U.S. intelligence community amid the growing threats of transnational terrorism 
indicates that intelligence officials as well as policymakers recognized the importance 
of these threats and the necessity to adapt to them. However, both legislators and 
intelligence specialists failed to achieve the necessary reforms to eliminate the 
deficiencies identified. Even after legislation implementing the recommendations was 
adopted, proponents of reform failed to oversee its full realization. The FY1997 Act is 
one example of such failures. There are a number of reasons why these attempts were 
thwarted. These reasons will be examined in the final section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Obstacles to Reform pre-9/11 
Answering the question why were the pre-9/11 recommendations largely 
ignored by intelligence officials as well as the policymakers requires a multifaceted 
perspective. The first and largest obstacle was the general aversion of organizations 
toward reform. Such resistance opposed both internal initiatives espousing change and 
external attempts imposed through legislation or executive action. The second obstacle 
is embedded in the very principles of American democracy, which are based on 
protection of civil liberties, as well as on the fragmentation and decentralization of the 
U.S. system of government. The third obstacle is based on the rational interests of the 
U.S. leaders, i.e. the tradeoffs between incentives for change and the actual capabilities 
to make the change, which largely effect the decision making of the U.S. leaders. This 
three level approach facilitates creating an explanatory model of resistance to reform of 
the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 despite the widespread recognition of the 
threat posed by terrorism during the 1990s. 
 
2.3.1. Organizational Obstacles 
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As noted in chapter 2, organizations in general do not change easily72, for 
government agencies change is even harder73, and for the intelligence community it is 
particularly so.74 All organizations have to overcome three types of problems when 
attempting to change: (1) bounded rationality75 – cognitive limits of individuals 
affecting the decision-making and management of organizations; (2) structural secrecy 
or information asymmetry76 – specialization of subunits preventing knowledge sharing; 
and (3) liability of time or institutional inertia77– growing resistance to change as 
routines, norms and relationships become established. As Amy Zegart contends, for 
government agencies these problems are heightened, because they lack three key 
advantages that the business organizations enjoy.78 
The first is the lack of market competition, which in private sector creates the 
incentives for reform to promote better efficiency and effectiveness if they want to 
survive. Government agencies do not face this immediate threat of diminishing or 
replacement due to poor performance. The Congress does have oversight capabilities. 
However, its powers to dissolve an intelligence agency are limited. 
The second advantage that government agencies lack is that the owners and 
employees of private companies generally want them to succeed and therefore create 
and support the incentives for change. On the contrary, government agencies’ reform is 
often thwarted by political opponents who obstruct the legislative process and thus limit 
the likelihood for success of reform. In the case of the U.S. intelligence community, the 
role of the Department of Defense lobby proved crucial as it effectively blocked many 
of the initiatives attempting to reorganize the community that would reduced its 
authority in any way.79 
The third disadvantage when comparing the government agencies to the private 
sector are the limits imposed on the actual managerial work of public sector officials, 
who are bound with bureaucratic red tape and have much less freedom in their decision-
making as opposed to managers of private companies. Intelligence officials serve many 
different consumers from the president, his advisors and members of the Congress, who 
                                                 
72
 Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. 
73
 Kaufman, Herbert. 1976. 
74
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p.52. 
75
 Simon, Herbert A. 1976. 
76
 Egeberg, Morton. 2003. 
77
 Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John. 1984. 
78
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 54-56. 
79
 Turner, Michael A. 2005. “Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment”.  International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18 (3): 388. 
- 36 - 
 
all have different and often conflicting preferences. This makes it very difficult to make 
internal adjustments.80 
 
2.3.2. Democratic Principles 
American democratic principles limited external intelligence reform in two 
ways. First, as was already mentioned above, there is the fragmented and decentralized 
political system based on separation of powers, congressional committee system, and 
majority rule. Within this system it is possible for political opponents to hinder the 
enactment of new legislation and thus curb or thwart any reform process altogether.81 
Another way in which the democratic process negatively influenced the 
intelligence reform attempts was its emphasis on civil liberties. Any change of the U.S. 
intelligence community, which would led to heightened domestic intelligence or 
cooperation of CIA on domestic affairs was immediately criticized. Such opposition 
was based on fears of limiting civil liberties and creating a “big brother” kind of 
institution – something highly unpopular with the American public.82 
 
2.3.3. Rational Decision-making 
The last obstacle is a result of the differing capabilities and incentives of 
decision-makers. Both the president and legislators are well-aware of the difficulty of 
enforcing a major intelligence reform. The general unpopularity of the topic among 
voters as well as the community itself lowers the decision-makers incentives even more. 
Moreover, national security bureaucrats promote their own interests. These are mostly 
adhering to the status quo as no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to any 
other ‘rival’ organization.83 
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2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. More 
specifically, this chapter has explored the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community 
to various reform initiatives during the 1990s. A variety of explanations have been used 
to account for such institutional resistance to comprehensive reform. One influential 
approach based on historical experience, suggests that real reform or change is only 
possible amid a catastrophe or crisis. Pearl Harbor and entrance into WWII were the 
impetus leading to the creation of the CIA and a subsequent restructuring of the whole 
system of the U.S. national security.  
Since the immediate post-war era, no major attempt to reorganize and reform the 
U.S. intelligence community had been successful until the enactment of the Intelligence 
and Prevention Terrorism Act. It seems that the post-Cold War change of threat 
environment did not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s 
intelligence services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence 
community was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was 
unprepared to prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Only after the events of 9/11 and from the perspective of hindsight did the 
deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community become widely visible and hence 
impossible to ignore. The question of whether the worst terrorist attack in the history of 
the United States was a catalyst strong enough to promote effective and efficient 
intelligence reform will be examined in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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3. 9/11 and its Aftermath: Searching for Answers and Solutions 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in American 
history. Their extent and brutality combined with the fact that they were carried out on 
the American soil provided unique opportunity not only for the reform of the U.S. 
intelligence community, but also for the biggest transformation of the U.S. government 
since 1947. Suddenly, the shocked American public was willing to sacrifice some of its 
civil liberties in exchange for protection. Also, the rational self-interests of the President 
as well as the legislators shifted towards support for the intelligence reform.  
After the first shock from 9/11 passed over, a wide-ranging debate was 
prompted over the role of intelligence in failing to recognize the threat and prevent the 
terrorist attacks. Two commissions were established to investigate the failure. First was 
the Joint Inquiry conducted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees and second was the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). The conclusions and 
recommendations of these committees pointed out some of the essential weaknesses 
within the intelligence community and became an important starting point for 
subsequent intelligence community reform.  
Moreover, in the immediate reaction to 9/11, President Bush and the U.S. 
Congress promoted other initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. These initiatives affected also the U.S. intelligence 
community. The first one, enactment of the USA Patriot Act had a positive impact as it 
removed the barriers of information sharing between the law enforcement and 
intelligence. The second initiative, the homeland security agenda, turned out to have a 
more ambiguous impact. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
responsible among other functions for domestic intelligence gathering and analysis 
created another level in the already fragmented intelligence community. Also, the 
creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) produced more confusion 
about the roles of intelligence community and the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. 
This chapter will present the main findings and recommendations of the Joint 
Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission. Thereafter, there will be an examination of the 
initiatives that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, such as the USA 
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Patriot Act, the development of homeland security agenda, and the creation of the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center and their implications for intelligence reform.   
As was the case with the pre-9/11 context of the U.S. intelligence community, 
these initiatives also serve as an input factor to the evaluation of the final outcome of the 
U.S. intelligence community reform, its efficiency and effectiveness (see Figure 1.1). 
 
3.1. Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations 
Shortly after 9/11, questions concerning the failure of intelligence to avert the 
terrorist attacks were raised. There was pressure to find out what had led to the attacks 
and who was responsible. Was the U.S. intelligence community properly organized for 
the transnational, non-state actor threats? Had policymakers known about the threat and 
failed to act? These were the types of questions that were asked both by the U.S. public 
as well as by the legislators themselves. It is apparent from the previous chapter that the 
threats were known and that there were many hints pointing to the insufficient 
organization of the intelligence community, however, only after 9/11, for the first time 
since the end of the Cold War, people actually seemed to pay attention. 
First, the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Intelligence Committees established a Joint Inquiry with three principal goals: (1) to 
conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have 
known prior to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the 
United States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist 
attacks against the United States and its interests; (2) identify and examine any systemic 
problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or 
preventing these attacks in advance; and (3) to make recommendations to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist 
attacks.84 
Among the main findings of the Joint Inquiry was that “prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was neither well-organized, nor well-equipped, and did not 
adequately adapt to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets 
within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage 
provided by U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities.”85 Put simply, as the 
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Joint Inquiry recognized, the intelligence community was not properly organized for a 
transnational threat such as al Qaeda. 
Other findings included: (1) the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy both on governmental as well as intelligence level; (2) inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources and problematic intelligence community budgeting practices and 
procedures; (3) inefficient use of new technology and reliance on outdated technologies, 
thus having a negative impact on collaboration between the intelligence community 
agencies as well as their adaption to the nature of the terrorist threats; (4)  lack of 
incentives for analytical positions, which were seen as dead-end jobs in the community 
and which led to analytic deficiencies, thus seriously undercutting the ability of U.S. 
policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat; (5) lack of information sharing 
not only between intelligence community agencies, but also within individual agencies, 
and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, and also between 
intelligence community and relevant non-intelligence community agencies, such as law 
enforcement and border protection; (6) lack of reliable and knowledgeable human 
sources; (7) lengthy and perilous application process for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance leading to a diminished level of FBI coverage of 
suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States; (8) lack of strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.86 
 In its final report, the Joint Inquiry proposed nineteen recommendations, which 
included establishing a powerful new director of national intelligence, revamping the 
intelligence priority process, and considering whether new domestic intelligence agency 
should replace the FBI. However, as M. Kent Bolton contends, the Joint Inquiry’s 
thorough work – it studied some one million documents and interviewed some 500 
persons – “raised more questions than it answered; it thereby provided an impetus for 
subsequent postmortems.”87 This succeeding task was undergone by the 9/11 
Commission, the mother of all postmortems. 
 The 9/11 Commission built on the findings of the Joint Inquiry and added some 
more insights stemming from 1200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of various 
documents. The 9/11 Commission took the reshaping of the U.S. intelligence into a new 
level. Gregory Treverton points out that “its report was dramatic and made several 
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recommendations – primarily to reshape the organization of U.S. intelligence but also to 
begin to change the way it does business.”88 
 Regarding intelligence, the 9/11 Commission identified six problems, which 
created the need to restructure intelligence: (1) structural barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work – the problem of organizing national intelligence around collection 
disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission; (2) lack of common standards 
and practices across the foreign-domestic divide that created the inability to pool 
information gathered abroad with information gathered in the United States; (3) divided 
management of national intelligence capabilities, which limited influence of the DCI 
over the three intelligence agencies housed within the Department of Defense (the NSA, 
the NGA, and the NRO); (4) weak capacity of the DCI to set priorities and move 
resources; (5) too many tasks carried out by the DCI – the fact that DCI had three jobs 
as head of the community, principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters, and 
head of the CIA combined with his weak authorities even limited his managerial 
abilities; (6) too complex and secret nature of intelligence community, which made 
public comprehension of the intelligence agencies and the rules surrounding them 
impossible.89 
 Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission recognized the fact that even though the 
DCI was responsible for community performance, it lacked three authorities critical for 
any agency head or chief executive officer: control over purse strings, the ability to hire 
or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure 
and personnel.90 In order to address these problems the 9/11 Commission made six 
broad proposals, which underscored the need not only to create the technical 
infrastructure to better share intelligence but also to rethink the perspective of “need-to-
know” and other security requirements that frustrated sharing. The 9/11 principal 
recommendations were to91: 
 
• Create the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), located in 
the White House and possessing real authority over the budgets of the fifteen 
U.S. intelligence agencies 
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• Institute a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reporting to the DNI, 
responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence 
• Establish national intelligence centers, organized around discrete issues on 
the model of the NCTC, under the authority of the DNI 
• Make the CIA director a position separate from the DNI and charge him 
primarily with building better espionage capacity for the nation 
• Rethink the web of “need-to know” and other security procedures that 
frustrate not just sharing but also intelligence work as whole 
• Not to create a separate domestic-intelligence service, instead to encourage 
the FBI to move forward with changing its mission from pure law 
enforcement to terrorism prevention  
 
The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations fit to each of the 
four categories (lack of “corporateness”, personnel/information sharing, strategic 
mission and priorities, and human intelligence) of the twelve pre-9/11 commissions and 
task forces’ proposals for reform. Therefore, it is possible to see some consistency in the 
pre- and post-9/11 attempts to reform the U.S. intelligence community. As chapter 2 
showed, the pre-9/11 attempts were generally ignored by the decision-makers and 
resisted by the intelligence agencies themselves. The general idea behind the 9/11 
Commission reform proposal was that after 9/11 the incentives for adoption of the 
reform have changed and it was therefore possible to usher in a sweeping reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community. The next chapter will address this assumption.  
But before we move to an interpretation of the implementation of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, it is important to pay attention to other developments, 
which happened simultaneously with the work of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 
Commission.  
 
3.2. Immediate Reaction and its Implications for Intelligence Reform 
The surprise of the 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in sweeping response of the 
Bush administration and the U.S. Congress in order to boost domestic counterterrorist 
policies. This immediate reaction included enactment of the USA Patriot Act, 
development of a homeland security agenda and subsequently the establishment of the 
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Department of Homeland Security. Both of the initiatives had implications for the 
intelligence community reform. 
 
3.2.1. USA Patriot Act 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration presented Congress 
with proposals to expand police and prosecutorial powers to enhance the fight against 
terrorism”.92 Six weeks later, these proposals culminated in the adoption of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA Patriot Act93. It passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by wide margins – 375 to 66 and 98 to 1 respectively.94 
As a result of the speedy manner in which Congress presented (Oct. 23), debated, and 
implemented this policy (voting in the House was held on Oct. 24 and in the Senate on 
Oct. 25) there was little controversy surrounding its inception.95 
The main aim of the USA Patriot Act was to strengthen the abilities of the U.S. 
government agencies to collect and share information regarding ongoing investigations 
of terror plots. And also to enable the U.S. government to be better equipped to identify, 
investigate, follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists. Among the most 
important provisions included in the act were:96 
 
• It allowed for federal warrants to be effective nationwide and no longer 
limited to special districts; 
• It enabled law enforcement to obtain subpoena power for alleged terrorists’ 
communications, including fixed and wireless telephones, e-mail, web 
surfing, as well as unopened voice mail and e-mail; 
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• It attached roving wiretaps to alleged terrorists and thereby eliminated the 
need for the government to request wiretaps for specific telephone numbers 
as previously required; 
• It improved coordination and cooperation, such as information gathering 
between US intelligence and law enforcement investigators, with respect to 
terrorist organizations; 
• It allowed law enforcement to use new subpoena power to obtain payment 
information such as credit card or bank account numbers, of suspected 
terrorists who are utilizing the Internet; 
• It created rules to counter terrorists’ access to, and use of illicit funds as well 
as to prevent or impede other improper terrorist activities; 
• To punish those who aid or harbor terrorists. 
 
The importance of the USA Patriot Act with regards to the U.S. intelligence was 
embedded in the provisions which enhanced domestic surveillance as an amendment of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Also, the Act provided for possible 
sharing of information on criminal probes between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government. Thus, eliminating one of the main 
deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence criticized even before 9/11. 
However, from the point of promoting substantial intelligence reform, the USA 
Patriot Act was only a quick fix, which did not (and was not intended to) address the 
structural deficiencies of the intelligence community. 
 
3.2.2. Homeland Security 
The U.S. government also moved in another direction, as President Bush started 
to focus more on creating a broad concept of a unified approach to protecting the 
homeland against future terrorist threats. This strategy also had an intelligence element, 
however there were many problems connected with the homeland security agenda. 
The first steps taken in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken already less than one month after the attacks. On October 8, 
2001 Tom Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and the Director of the newly established Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS). The Office’s mission was to “develop and coordinate the 
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implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks. The Office’s objective was to coordinate the executive branch’s 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”97 
At the end of October 2002, the Homeland Security Council was created by the 
President. Again, Tom Ridge was put in charge of this council. Among the members of 
the HSC were: the President and the Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
and Health Care, the Attorney General, the Director of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Director of FBI, and the Director of CIA. The HSC’s role was to 
ensure the coordination of all homeland security related activities across the whole 
spectrum of federal, state and local offices and agencies. 
However, this model of so called “presidential advisor” proved insufficient. “In 
particular, critical voices in Congress pointed to inherent weaknesses in Ridge’s post. 
Without any budget authority, they argued, the Homeland Security czar lacked 
sufficient human and financial resources, had no way to enforce decisions, and relied 
primarily on the power of persuasion, albeit as a trusted advisor with unfettered access 
to President Bush.”98 On the other hand, there also existed fears of Ridge’s excessive 
influence that went beyond congressional accountability. These fears led Democratic 
senator Joe Lieberman to propose in May 2002 a full-scale reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy and a creation of a new department dealing with the questions of homeland 
security. Even though President Bush had previously rejected proposals for such full-
scale government reorganization, the need for this change became imminent. Therefore, 
in June 2002, President Bush introduced his own proposal that “sought to maximize 
presidential influence over any new cabinet-level department”.99  
In his speech to the nation on June 6, 2002,100 President Bush emphasized the 
need for essential reorganization of government by creating the Department of 
Homeland Security that would help the government to deal more effectively with the 
new threats of the 21st century. The new National Strategy for Homeland Security 
prepared by Ridge’s OHS team was also introduced by the President in this speech. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued on July 16 2002, 
introduced three main strategic objectives of combating terrorism on the domestic level: 
“(1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur.”101 The homeland security strategy was divided into six key mission areas 
within which the strategy was supposed to operate. The first three areas were focused on 
the first objective of prevention, other two focused on the second aim of reducing 
vulnerability and the last focused on damage minimization and recovery. The 
framework of six critical mission areas was established as follows: 
 
• Intelligence and Warning area, which included creation of an integrated 
federal approach to gathering, analysis, production, and sharing of 
information from both classified and open sources; 
• Border and Transportation Security area, which was aimed at preventing 
terrorists and terrorist materiel in entering the country by creating an 
interconnected system of border and transport infrastructure control that 
simultaneously secures the legitimate flow of people and goods; 
• Domestic Counterterrorism area, which was focused on support for old and 
evolution of new intelligence and law enforcement efforts to identify 
terrorists and their supporters, prevents them from carrying attacks, and to 
arrest and prosecute them; 
• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets area, which involved 
precise and complete identification and prioritization of the U.S. 
infrastructure, including virtual networks, and assessment of consequences 
and connections among the infrastructures; 
• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats area, which was primarily focused 
on detection, deterrence, prevention, and management of the consequences 
of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response area, which was aimed at 
minimizing the damage and rapid recovering from terrorist attacks which 
may occur. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security also identified the Department’s key role 
“as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions involved in homeland 
security”102 and its main challenge in developing “complementary systems that avoid 
duplication and ensure essential requirements are met”103. Moreover, it stressed that in 
order to meet the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination must be increased 
“in law enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy 
development and implementation so that public and private resources are better aligned 
to secure the homeland”.104  
According to Chris Hornbarger, “prior to 9/11, eleven of fourteen cabinet 
departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Veterans Affairs), plus a host of 
independent and subordinate agencies (for example, the CIA, and FEMA) bore 
substantial responsibility for key aspects of homeland security”.105 This situation has 
changed with the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the 
Homeland Security Act enactment on November 25, 2002.106 The new department 
combined twenty two agencies with approximately 180,000 employees including “such 
disparate organizations as: the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
(Transportation), the Secret Service (Treasury), FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FBI), and the Critical Infrastructures Assurance Office 
(Commerce)”.107 It became the fifteenth department in the history of U.S. government 
and a third biggest department of the Bush administration. 
One of the DHS’s four directorates, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate (IAIP) was intended to fulfill one of the most critical homeland 
security functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of 
information. It was tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information 
about terrorist threats to the United States, assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. 
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infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant 
federal, state, and local officials. It was to “fuse and analyze intelligence and other 
information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources – including the 
CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT and data gleaned from other 
organizations.”108 However, it had neither the power to collect intelligence nor any 
tasking authority over other agencies. Rather than integrating the CIA, FBI and other 
agencies, the IAIP had to beg to obtain information from them.109 Both the CIA and the 
FBI strongly resisted handing over significant power to the DHS. And both agencies 
increased, rather than decreased their homeland security functions. According to Seth 
Jones, “White House and congressional support for DHS faded quickly. Most 
policymakers believed either that DHS was unable to perform terrorist threat analysis 
adequately, or that other departments within the federal government could do it 
better.”110 
 
3.2.3. Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
In a rather surprising move, President Bush circumvented the newly established 
DHS’s intelligence directorate and proposed an establishment of a new Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in January 2003.111 The TTIC was created under the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the 
president and federal agencies on terrorist threats – the very task originally envisioned 
for the DHS. 
The TTIC was designed to integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information 
collected domestically and abroad and to design a database of known and suspected 
terrorists that could be accessed by federal, state, and local officials across the United 
States. It was also focused on examining regional threats, such as Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It 
was staffed by representatives from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the 
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Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, NGA, and Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Even though, it was legally not part of the CIA (officially it reported to the 
DCI), in practice the distinction was much less clear as the CIA effectively controlled 
its functions – it was placed under the CIA’s budget and was located at CIA 
headquarters.112 As with the case of the IAIP, its mandate was very vague, concentrating 
on analysis not on driving collection with no attempt to shift the intelligence community 
organizational paradigm. Thus, it had only added another fragment to the already 
disjointed intelligence community structure. 
Although created to improve coordination and sharing, the TTIC has caused 
confusion within the federal government about the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. Its creation duplicated functions of the IAIP and greatly undermined its mandate. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
President Bush and the U.S. Congress reacted to the shock of 9/11 events in a 
number of distinct ways that have had far reaching consequences for the intelligence 
community. First, Congress decided to study the intelligence failure through its Joint 
Inquiry, while simultaneously adopting legislation on improving enhancing domestic 
surveillance and removing limits on domestic and foreign information sharing 
embedded in the USA Patriot Act. In contrast, President Bush focused on promoting a 
new homeland security agenda, which originally contained an intelligence aspect but 
was weakened by the creation of the TTIC.  
One fundamental implication of all of these new security policies was that none 
of these initiatives presented a comprehensive plan of how to integrate the wide ranging 
activities of the intelligence community, change agencies’ incentives and cultures to 
enhance information sharing, match intelligence resources against priorities, reform the 
FBI or improve human intelligence. By the time the Joint Inquiry’s findings and 
recommendations which were published in 2002, the immediate momentum for 
substantial reform of the U.S. intelligence community was already gone. The 9/11 
Commission, backed by enormous media coverage and pressure from the 9/11 victims 
families, was more successful in pushing for implementation of its recommendations. 
However, as will be argued in the next chapter, its proposals for “sweeping” reforms 
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were mitigated during the congressional debate over the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act. 
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4. Implementation of the post-9/11 Recommendations: Bringing about 
the Reform? 
The debate over intelligence reform following the release of the 9/11 
Commission report presented an opportunity to make far-reaching changes to create a 
more effective and efficient U.S. intelligence community. However, due to pertaining 
rational self-interest decision making processes and inability to overrule heightened 
opposition in Congress, the potential for substantial reform was not materialized. 
Moreover, because the newly created position of the Director of National Intelligence 
was not given such authorities as was suggested in the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, it became difficult for him to promote policies, which would have 
effectively enabled him to overcome the internal resistance to reform within the 
intelligence organizations. 
This chapter will first focus on the process of adopting the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The legislative debate that 
accompanied its enactment and its major provisions will be introduced. Then, the actual 
impact of the IRTPA on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community 
will be evaluated, both in terms of the newly created institutions – the DNI and the 
NCTC, as well as from the point of view of the old institutions – the FBI and the CIA. 
The analysis and evaluation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations’ 
implementation and the consequent character of the intelligence community after the 
enactment of the IRTPA presented in this chapter can be interpreted as the output 
perspective of the input-output methodological model (see Figure 1.1) examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
 
4.1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
The 9/11 Commission final report was issued in July 2004 and was followed by 
an immediate congressional response. Throughout the course of its work, the 9/11 
Commission received extensive media coverage, which gave rise to public pressure on 
the Congress to act on the recommendations. Also, a significant lobby was set up 
around the 9/11 victim families pushing for the implementations of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. These forces speeded up the legislative process and 
both the Senate and the House began to draft implementing legislation. 
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4.1.1. Intelligence Reform Legislative Process Background 
Both versions of bill focused mainly on the two central recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission: the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The original DNI proposal 
suggested authorities for the individual to oversee all-source national intelligence 
centers, serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, manage the national 
intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence 
community. Included in his powers were supposed to be the responsibility for 
submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating fund to the intelligence agencies, 
and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community.113  
The NCTC recommendation was designed to address the intelligence 
community’s structural problems, particularly the lack of an appropriate entity for 
performing executive branch–wide counterterrorism operational planning. It was 
supposed to be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies. Its focus was envisaged to be on counterterrorism 
and it was supposed to have responsibility for integrating the intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities against terrorism. Its aim was to be the preeminent body for analyzing 
terrorism and assessing the terrorist threat.114 
The Senate bill followed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations more closely, 
while the House bill provided for a far less powerful director. The House bill covered a 
wide range of counterterrorism issues, including immigration and criminal penalties. 
Glenn Hastedt summed up the differences between the bills: “Under the Senate bill, the 
CIA director ‘shall’ be under the authority, direction, and control’ of the national 
intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only ‘report’ to the 
National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence 
Director the power to develop budgets and give ‘guidance’ to intelligence community 
members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would ‘determine’ the budget. The 
Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the 
Director’s high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil 
liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.”115 
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The main opposition against the bill came from the House Republicans led by 
the chair of House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Essentially, Hunter was 
a protégé of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in Congress. Similar to 
previous attempts to reform the intelligence community, Department of Defense 
officials, now led by Rumsfeld, strongly opposed any proposals changing the structure 
and streamlining the intelligence community. These changes were traditionally 
perceived by Pentagon as a threat to its control over defense intelligence agencies and 
over the vast share of the intelligence budget. Thus, the Defense Department leadership 
tried to discredit the reform by all means, both privately during classified hearings, and 
publicly when General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered 
a bombshell letter to the House Armed Services Committee. “In the letter, Meyers 
opposed giving the proposed director of national intelligence strong budgetary 
authorities over intelligence agencies housed in the Pentagon arguing that only a 
Pentagon-controlled budget would ensure sufficient ‘support to the warfighters’.”116 
Moreover, the presidential support to the Senate version of the bill remained 
lukewarm.117 At a time of ongoing War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the President did nothing to stop the Defense Department lobby. He simply avoided 
fighting his own Department of Defense over intelligence reform at war time. 
According to Michael Turner, “President Bush had to look like he was pushing the bill 
but would in fact prefer to see the proposal die”.118 And that is why he, at the end, 
recommended the passage of a bill that conformed to the House version, establishing a 
weak DNI and keeping the Defense Department in charge of its intelligence agencies. 
The final bill was adopted 89-2 in the Senate and 336-75 in the House.119 The president 
then signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 on 
December 17, 2004. 
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4.1.2. Major Provisions of the IRTPA 
The IRTPA was divided into eight titles:120 (I) Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; (II) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (III) Security Clearances; (IV) 
Transportation Security (V) Border Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters; (VI) 
Terrorism Prevention; (VII) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations; (VIII) Other Matters.  
Under Article I, the IRTPA created a Senate confirmed DNI separate from the 
CIA director, responsible for leading the intelligence community and for serving as 
principal adviser to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland 
Security Council. The DNI was given several important authorities and 
responsibilities.121 
Determining the Intelligence Budget122. The DNI has been tasked to determine 
the intelligence budget proposal submitted to the President for consideration and 
submission to Congress. With regards to the military portions of the budget, the 
legislation has stated that the DNI shall participate in the development by the Secretary 
of Defense of the annual budgets of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. However, the scope of the participation was 
not specified by the legislation. 
Managing the Execution of the Intelligence Appropriation. Contrary to the 9/11 
Commission recommendation, the IRTPA has kept the intelligence appropriation 
classified, thus keeping the intelligence funding hidden in other departments’ 
appropriations and being received straight through the departments’ budgets. However, 
the legislation has given the DNI control over the funds flowing through the 
departments to the intelligence agencies through exclusive direction to the Office of 
Management and Budget with respect to the apportionment of funds drawn on the U.S. 
Treasury. The legislation has also permitted the DNI to audit and monitor how 
departments are expending the funds.  
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Transferring Funds and Personnel. The DNI has not been given a full authority 
over the agencies funds and personnel. The DNI has only been allowed to move up to 
$150 million from agencies per fiscal year to meet emerging threats, provided that the 
funds moved are less than 5 percent of an agency’s intelligence funding and that the 
fund movement does not terminate an acquisition program. The DNI has been given 
authority to move personnel during the DNI’s start-up phase. The DNI might make 
additional personnel transfers pursuant to joint procedures agreed upon with department 
secretaries. The legislation thus deleted the provisions of prior law that a department 
secretary may veto the DCI’s transfer of intelligence funds and personnel and that FBI 
funds and personnel are exempt from any transfer.  
Hiring Senior Officials. The DNI has received strengthened authority to select 
senior officials. As under prior law, the Secretary of Defense must seek the DNI’s 
concurrence before submitting a recommendation to the president for the Directors of 
the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National 
Reconnaissance Office. However, the Secretary of Defense may not forward a 
recommendation to the president if the DNI objects. The same arrangement has been 
maintained for the selection of the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and 
research, the assistant secretary of homeland security for information analysis, and other 
senior officials across the intelligence community with the respective department heads. 
But importantly, the DNI has not received the authority to remove anyone from their 
position. 
Another important provision, which aimed to change the intelligence 
community’s strategic operational planning, was establishment of the statute of National 
Intelligence Centers (created based on geographic and transnational topics according to 
the DNI’s and NSC’s priorities). Under the IRTPA, the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) and the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) were formed.123  
The centers and other entities that the DNI might have wanted to create were to 
be housed in an administrative body called the Office of the DNI (ODNI). The ODNI is 
technically an independent agency because it is not located within any other executive 
branch department or entity. The DNI’s staff has also been located in the Office of the 
DNI.  
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The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been made responsible for 
integrating the intelligence agencies’ capabilities, designing preeminent 
counterterrorism analysis and proposing collection requirements to the DNI to guide the 
agencies’ collection activities. The NCTC’s other function established under the IRTPA 
was to engage in planning for counterterrorism operations across the executive branch. 
However, the actual description of the planning work has remained fairly vague in the 
IRTPA, because “it existed in a gray area between high-level strategy and detailed, 
tactical planning”.124 
Other provisions of the IRTPA focused on the problem of improving the 
domestic intelligence capabilities of the FBI (Title II). The IRTPA directed specific 
instructions for the FBI to change fundamentally the FBI’s orientation and culture. The 
Director of the FBI was ordered “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated 
national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance 
specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the 
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with 
substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.”125 
Moreover, the IRTPA paid vast attention to provisions concerning homeland 
security and improving the counterterrorism prevention as well as response. The 
provisions under Title VI (Terrorism Prevention) were aimed at enhancing the ability of 
the DHS to stop terrorists before they reach the U. S. borders, and to stop money-
laundering practices that support terrorism. Other sections and titles were also devoted 
to transportation security and border protection, thus stretching the overall reach of the 
IRTPA. 
 
In summary, the 9/11 Commission was one of the very few commissions to ever 
see its recommendations successfully codified into law. However, the IRTPA’s actual 
impact was mitigated by the ambiguity of its language. The vagueness of the legislation 
was a product of the congressional compromise and strong Defense Department lobby 
protecting its “turf”. Even thought the adoption of the IRTPA improved the situation of 
central management of the U.S. intelligence community, it did not vest enough 
authorities to the DNI to be able to overcome the obstructions to the intelligence 
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community reform from both the agencies themselves, as well as from the DOD 
leadership. Moreover, the fact that the IRTPA focused in most part on other fixes in 
homeland security also contributed to its ambiguous impact on the intelligence 
community reform. The actual development of the establishment and functions of the 
new agencies with the intelligence community, the DNI and the NCTC, as well as the 
impact of the IRTPA on the old agencies, the FBI and the CIA, will be examined and 
evaluated in the following subchapters. 
 
4.2. Intelligence Community after the Reform Act126 
This subchapter will focus on evaluation of the newly established institutions in 
the IRTPA, the DNI and the NCTC. The key question is whether their creation 
essentially led to better efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism mission. 
 
4.2.1. Director of National Intelligence 
According to Gordon Lederman, “the Executive Branch’s implementation of the 
2004 act began without the necessary vigor.”127 The first DNI, Ambassador John 
Negroponte, was an accomplished diplomat and policymaker, but he lacked working 
knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and substantial experience in leading and 
transforming large organizations. Negroponte decided to take on his role in the same 
fashion as his DCI predecessors and quickly absorbed two key intelligence functions – 
providing the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and overseeing the production of the 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Thus, 
Negroponte became, as was required by the law, the president’s chief intelligence 
briefer as well as chief analyst. However, giving a good substantive briefing takes time 
– according to some up to 60 percent.128 And as Arthur Hulnick points out, “if the DNI 
had nothing else to do, then serving as the government’s chief intelligence analyst might 
make sense. But he is supposed to be managing the intelligence system, including 
overseeing the budget process, arranging long-range planning, and other matters of 
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interagency concern.”129 It is possible to say that while Ambassador Negroponte 
solidified his position as the chief intelligence officer, he certainly failed to fulfill his 
position as the chief executive officer of the intelligence community. 
One of the major problems of implementing the IRTPA is that the legislation 
was giving the DNI considerable responsibility but not enough power and authority 
especially when faced with Defense Department resistance. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld successfully pushed for establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, “which was widely viewed as an attempt to block the DNI’s effort to gain 
effective authority over DOD intelligence functions.”130 All Defense Department 
intelligence agencies were made subordinate to this new Director of Military 
intelligence-like position. Thus, the DNI’s actual power over the DOD agencies has 
remained quite limited. 
Also the creation of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) proved problematic. Patrick 
Neary contends that the problem began with Negroponte’s inability to clearly articulate 
the ODNI’s mission. “Rather than the engine of change, the ODNI became the fulcrum 
of competing notions of reform.”131 On top of its unclear mission, the ODNI expanded 
into aggrandizing 1500 staff positions, even though originally it was supposed to be 
limited to about 500 people.132 Such growth of bureaucratic layering certainly was not 
something envisaged in the attempts for efficient reform. 
In 2006, Ambassador Negroponte resigned from the position of the DNI and was 
replaced by seemingly much better fit for the position, retired Admiral Mike 
McConnell. Former NSA director with decades of experience in U.S. intelligence was 
confirmed in January 2007. DNI McConnell began his tenure by issuing a 100-day plan, 
followed by a 500-day plan for the intelligence community. They were based on a 
number of initiatives such as: (1) Create a Culture of Collaboration; (2) Foster 
Collection and Analytic Transformation; (3) Build Acquisition Excellence and 
Technology Leadership; (4) Modernize Business Practices; (5) Accelerate Information 
                                                 
129
 Ibid. 
130
 Lederman, Gordon N. 2009, p. 26. 
131
 Neary, Patrick C. 2010. “The State of Intelligence Reform, 2009”. Studies in Intelligence 54 (1): 5. 
132
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p.183. 
- 59 - 
 
Sharing; (6) Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities.133 Both of the plans focused on better 
management and provided “an intellectual structure for considering intelligence reform 
more methodically.”134 Even though the change on the working level remained 
limited,135 the rhetoric and McConnell’s approach to the DNI’s position certainly led to 
a better sense of corporateness and leadership within the intelligence community. 
 In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was succeeded by Robert 
Gates, a former DCI in December 2006, which subsequently led to easing of tension and 
improved relationship between the DNI and the Defense Department during the final 
months of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, some other serious problems 
remained, especially on the level of coordination and oversight of the old agencies and 
within the newly created NCTC such as deficiencies regarding security clearances and 
personnel management. 
 
4.2.2. National Counterterrorism Center 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to give boost to 
information sharing and analysis. It has taken over and expanded the TTIC’s mission 
and became a hub for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence across the community. 
The NCTC was presented as the most successful improvement of the intelligence 
community – the grand jewel of intelligence reform. Different agency officials were 
supposed to sit in one room and draft collective analysis on terrorist threats. The IRTPA 
“in order to promote and facilitate rotations to the new center, required rotational 
assignments for promotion within the intelligence community, and created specific 
incentives for service in national intelligence centers.”136  
However, even if the rules allow it, organizational barriers still block 
information sharing. According to Amy Zegart, “because NCTC’s analysts have varying 
levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they still see different 
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pieces of information.”137 Arthur Hulnick also points out that “CIA security officials did 
not accept the clearances of officers from other agencies without doing their own 
security checks, and that even a CIA officer had to get a new clearance because he 
would be using a different computer system than the one for which he already had 
access.”138 This kind of bureaucratic pathology is very baffling given the amount of 
criticism and pressure for improvement was imposed on information sharing after 9/11. 
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project issued a report card 
assessing implementation of its recommendations. Information sharing efforts received 
a grade D.139 Two years later, one intelligence officer offered a similarly discouraging 
progress report and underscored that “most of the sharing issues we face are cultural and 
process rather than technology.”140 However, the technological problems should not be 
overlooked as the agencies’ intelligence databases use different software mostly 
incompatible with each other. 
Moreover, according to Zegart, “most U.S. intelligence agencies have no 
experience conducting all-source analysis, so the personnel they assign to the NCTC is 
learning on the job.”141 However, with inexperienced analyst and obstructions to their 
actual work, the quality of analysis is hampered. Also, within the respected agencies, 
rotational assignments are not promoted as they should be. They are still seen more as a 
necessary evil than as a prestigious mission to which the brightest analysts should be 
nominated. And once part of the NCTC the analysts continue their loyalty to their 
parent agencies rather than to the NCTC mission itself.142 
The idea of rotational assignments was one of the key initiatives in transforming 
the intelligence community into – in President Bush’s words – a single, unified 
enterprise.143 In order to accomplish this task creation of a notion of jointness was 
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required.144 However, the process of joint duty has been largely circumvented by 
intelligence professionals. But as Patrick Neary concludes, “joint duty is a means to an 
end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission 
accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur 
without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional 
workforce.”145 
 
To sum up, evaluating performance of the newly created agencies clearly shows 
that deficiencies pertain. The key problem is the inability of the DNI to overcome the 
cultural patterns embedded in the U.S. intelligence community’s institutional 
environment. These obstacles than make it difficult for the DNI, already weakened by 
some of the provisions of the IRTPA not granting him enough authority, to fully 
coordinate the intelligence community into a unified enterprise efficient and effective in 
countering the terrorist threats. While for the new institutions the problem lays in the 
inability to coordinate, for the old institutions, such as the FBI and the CIA, as will be 
shown in the last part of this chapter, the problem is to adapt. Nevertheless, the main 
obstacles to the reform for both are deeply rooted in the organizational structure, culture 
and practices. 
 
4.3. FBI’s and CIA’s Internal  Attempts to Implement Reform 
Due to the severe criticism for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11, the 
FBI has set forth ambitious changes in order to redefine itself from an agency that 
investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence 
before attacks occur. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its 
counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence. It is important to 
note that these actions were motivated in part by FBI’s desire to remain the lead 
counterterrorism agency for homeland threats as voices calling for creation of 
completely new domestic intelligence agency and or creating a domestic intelligence 
element within the DHS sprung during the post-9/11 discussions. 
According to Seth Jones, “FBI Director Robert Mueller tried to change the FBI’s 
traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the 
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hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and 
policymakers at headquarters. He implemented a major reorganization and increased 
resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were 
permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism.”146  
Moreover, an Operations Center was established to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information sharing and collaboration. Also 66 new Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 
the country were created, which included state and local law enforcement officers, and 
FBI agents. The FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive 
Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office was 
responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI 
investigations and overall strategies. It was the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating 
intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the 
U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state 
and local law enforcement, and the private sector. Each FBI field office was also put 
under a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s 
intelligence functions in that field office.147  
Despite these major changes, the law enforcement organizational culture largely 
prevails. Most problematic is the position of analysts within the FBI structure. 
According to Arthur Hulnick, “analysts were recruited or borrowed, primarily from 
other intelligence analytic units, but soon found that they were second-class citizens in a 
system that valued the Special Agents more than the analysts.”148 The FBI’s own 
guidelines divide its employees to only two groups Special Agents and “other support 
professionals”, thus putting analysts into a same group with cleaning people or truck 
drivers.149 Amy Zegart also refers to this problem contending that “the bureau rules still 
mandate that senior positions in the field, including the top spot in every U.S. field 
office, be staffed by FBI special agents.”150 These provisions essentially preclude any 
career moves for the FBI analysts. 
 Efforts to improve the FBI’s obsolete technology systems have also been 
unsuccessful and very costly. After two attempts to acquire a technology modernization 
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program, the FBI still does not have a modern and effective case management record 
system.151 
 Even though that the FBI has attempted the most ambitious changes, the results 
are disappointing and greatly inefficient given the amount of attention and resources 
allocated to consolidate its domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. It seems 
that most of the proposed changes have been unable to break the law enforcement way 
of thinking within the agency, despite the fact that its official mission has been restated 
to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats 
first, and to uphold and enforce the criminal laws second. 
The CIA has not adapted well to the post-9/11 changes either. For most of the 
time, it has been an agency in turmoil. Due to numerous scandals both of its foreign 
operations (the black sites scandal152) as well as its leadership (Porter J. Goss 
scandal153), the morale has been on a low. The IRTPA ordered the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency to rebuild CIA’s analytical capabilities, transform the clandestine 
services by building its human intelligence capabilities, develop a stronger language 
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives, emphasize recruiting 
diversity among operation officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities, and to 
ensure a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection 
at the operational level. It has also “instructed the CIA and the Department of Defense 
to work better together in coordinating their respective intelligence domains.”154  
The CIA has attempted to increase its domestic intelligence powers first through 
its Counterterrorist Center and then through the TTIC, which was placed under the 
CIA’s budget and headquarters. Even when the independent NCTC was created, the 
CIA provided its analysts but focused more on protecting its own turf by not sharing all 
of its information, which was explained by differences in clearances.  
With regards to improving HUMINT capabilities, obstacles also prevail. The 
recruitment process of new HUMINT agents is bounded by the old rules of secrecy and 
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fear of moles. According to Arthur Hulnick, the old “paranoia remains, but is now 
focused on the possibility that a jihadi will get on the inside. Thus, applicants who have 
the right languages and ethnic background are being kept out by the fear of penetration. 
Most damaging is the reluctance on the part of security officials to clear people who 
come from backgrounds abroad that they find questionable.”155 Moreover, completing 
security forms and waiting for the background checks and the polygraph exams that 
many agencies demand still takes months, and this selection process is discouraging 
potential recruits.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 clearly shows that even 
though attempts to substantially reform the U.S. intelligence community into a single 
united enterprise with the aim and strategy of fighting transnational terrorist threats 
were made, real change has not to date reached the standard that was originally 
envisaged. Such an outcome is surprising given the strong public reaction to the events 
of 9/11 and the enthusiasm the legislative and executive branches of government 
exhibited for improving intelligence gathering and coordination. The evidence presented 
in this chapter points to a number of reasons for the failure of reform of the intelligence 
community to match expectations.  
The legislative negotiations surrounding the IRTPA bill were strongly 
influenced by a robust Defense Department lobby and combined with only lukewarm 
attention from President Bush resulted in adoption of a very vague and ambiguous piece 
of legislation. On paper, the newly created DNI has many responsibilities as well as 
authorities. However, the actual powers are much less significant and have not enabled 
the DNI to overpower the Department of Defense or overcome resistance to reform 
within the old intelligence agencies. Thus, the DNI’s ability to coordinate the U.S. 
intelligence community has been impaired. Moreover, the burgeoning size of the Office 
of the DNI has raised questions about unnecessary levels of bureaucratic layering, 
which is not helping attempts to building a more efficient intelligence community.  
Another important factor in explaining the limited success of the reform agenda 
is the organizational culture of the old intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Their 
debilitating sense of agency parochialism, a belief in the overriding importance of 
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security, and the “need-to-know” principle of secrecy makes them extremely resistant to 
change even amid a crisis on the scale of 9/11.  
However, it can be argued that although the intelligence community is not 
working efficiently even after the reform, it is nonetheless effective in preventing 
terrorist attacks from happening. This is largely due to the fact that in the past nine 
years, U.S. intelligence spending has roughly doubled. The DNI publicly released the 
figure of $47.5 billion for the FY2008 National Intelligence program. An earlier release 
by the then DCI Tenet for FY1998 was a $26.7 billion aggregate budget for NFIP,156 
JMIP and TIARA.157 This growth in funds has undoubtedly helped to improve U.S. 
intelligence community functioning, i.e. its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of a 
9/11 type attack. However, it remains an open question as to whether these funds have 
been used as efficiently as they might have been given the aims of the intelligence 
reform agenda. At present, the answer to this ‘efficiency’ question appears to be 
negative. Because of the organizational obstacles, money was not efficiently spent on 
technological improvements, on the HUMINT recruitment, nor on information sharing 
or unifying security clearances.  
The result of the U.S. intelligence reform then is a system that is effective, that is 
able to prevent terrorist attacks, but is not efficient in doing so. The idea behind the 9/11 
Commission recommendations was to create a unified intelligence community, which 
would work both effectively and efficiently on its mission to counter terrorist threats. 
However, only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence 
community is still a work in progress. 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations were a building stone of U.S. 
intelligence reform. But given the relatively poor results of this reform agenda, voices 
criticizing the form and scope of this reform program have come from both academics 
and intelligence professionals. These questions have inquired about the right kind of 
intelligence reform, and what more could have been done to improve the intelligence 
community. The final chapter will initially examine alternative approaches proposed by 
critics of the intelligence reform program to date. Thereafter, possible solutions to the 
current intelligence reform dilemma will be presented. 
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5. The Right Kind of Reform for the Intelligence Community? 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations set forth a path for the U.S. intelligence 
community reform based on its centralization and enhanced information sharing. 
However, soon after the publication of the 9/11 Commission report, criticism from both 
academics as well as intelligence professionals began to scrutinize the report’s 
conclusions and recommendations as overlooking a number of important realities 
connected to both the U.S. intelligence community and its abilities to avoid intelligence 
failure (i.e. prevent surprise attacks). This chapter will analyze these alternative 
approaches to the U.S. intelligence reform. Then, proposals of possible future steps in 
order to improve the current state of U.S. intelligence community will be made. 
Also this chapter provides the evaluation and analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 from the output perspective 
of the methodological model (figure 1.1). 
 
5.1. Preventing Surprise Attacks 
Soon after the 9/11 Commission report was published, a number of scholars and 
former intelligence professionals criticized the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations as 
well as the 9/11 Commission’s overall approach to the U.S. intelligence community. 
The main objection against the report and the subsequent legislation was based on an 
argumentation that it is impossible to prevent surprise attacks. The very nature of 
surprise attacks is uncertainty caused by asymmetry of attacker and victim. As Richard 
Posner, one of the main proponents of this theory points out, “the attacker picks the 
time, place, and means of attack. Since without a great deal of luck his plan cannot be 
discovered in advance by the victim, the attacker has, by virtue of his having the 
initiative and of the victim’s being unable to be strong everywhere all the time, a built-
in advantage that assures a reasonable probability of a local successes.”158 Therefore, 
the character of the attacks makes it extremely difficult to prevent them. As Posner 
continues, “even the best intelligence service is bound to be surprised from time to time 
because the only way to ensure against ever being surprised is to ignore the cost of false 
alarm and as a result bombard action-level officials with dire warnings.”159 
Furthermore, preventing surprise attacks is virtually impossible either due to lack of 
information or an excess of data. Richard K. Betts warns that “in attack warning, there 
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is the problem of ‘noise’ and deception.”160 He points to an overload of high volume of 
analysis, reports, statistics, which are exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb them 
or scrutinize them.  
Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents: Living with the High Risk 
Technologies argues that some type of failure is simply inherent in the system.161 Even 
though Perrow’s work was focused mostly on early warning systems of nuclear attack 
during the Cold War, his conclusions are, according to the critics of post-9/11 
intelligence reform, valid also for the U.S. intelligence community. As Joshua Rovner 
and Austin Long conclude, “both tactical warning intelligence and nuclear power plants 
are best described as complex, tightly coupled systems. The amount of time available 
for analysts or operators to make correct decisions is often quite small, with almost no 
margin for error. Interactions in both a nuclear power plant and an enemy organization 
(be it a nation-state’s military or a terrorist group) are often unobservable. Certainly, 
enemy intentions, as opposed to dispositions, are nearly always unobservable.”162  
The 9/11 Commission was also criticized for its perspective of hindsight and 
assumptions that anything what was uncovered retrospectively should have been 
uncovered in real time by the intelligence community. Paul R. Pillar, a long term 
veteran of the CIA, condemns the 9/11 Commission’s references to the failure of 
‘connecting the dots’. As he puts it, “the dots the counterterrorist analyst faces, unlike 
those in children’s puzzles, have neither numbers nor a white background, and they can 
be connected in many different ways.”163 Richard Posner also disapproves of the 9/11 
Commission’s approach. He contends that “with the aid of hindsight it is easy to 
identify missed opportunities to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from 
that observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result not of 
bad luck, the enemy’s skill and ingenuity, the inevitability that some surprise attacks 
will succeed, the personal failures of individuals, or the difficulty of defending against 
suicide attacks or protecting a well-nigh infinite range of potential targets, but rather of 
systemic failures in the nations intelligence and security apparatus; failures that can be 
rectified, making us safe, by changing the apparatus.”164 
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All of these authors have come to a conclusion that the U.S. intelligence 
community had worked well before 9/11. Despite the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks, 
the overall counterterrorism performance of the U.S. intelligence community during the 
1990s was strong. Therefore, the proposals for major organizational reform of the 
intelligence community were not substantiated.   
Richard K. Betts argues that no intelligence reform could ever be permanent or 
complete for the simple reason that fixing specific problems often creates new ones and 
that no initiative occurs without opportunity costs. Reforms intended to increase flow of 
analysts, for example, can cause overload, leaving analysts without the time or tools 
needed to separate critical signals from noise. Reforms intended to help analysts 
connect the dots might cause them to be too creative, prompting them to issue 
unnecessary alarms. In a sense, intelligence reform is a zero-sum game: removing some 
weaknesses creates new ones, and these new weaknesses are a likely source of 
intelligence failure.165 Elsewhere, he also points out that “no one ever stays satisfied 
with reorganization because it never seems to do the trick – if the trick is to prevent 
intelligence failure.”166 Thus, the 9/11 Commission could not find a fix to the problem 
of the U.S. intelligence community because the problem is essentially unfixable. 
This criticism, however, overlooks a number of important realities. As chapter 3 
of this thesis has shown, the U.S. intelligence community did not perform well before 
9/11. The intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the threats of transnational terrorism 
even though there were voices both from within and from outside of the intelligence 
community. Moreover, it can be argued that not all of intelligence failures and surprise 
attacks can be prevented, but in the case of 9/11 there were many opportunities that 
could have grasped the danger of terrorist attacks if the system was better organized and 
better adapted to the threat. Better allocation of personnel, better incentives for analysts 
and removing obstacles to information sharing could have led to at least higher chance 
of thwarting the attacks in preparation if not to preventing them at all. 
Moreover, it is true that the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission did examine 
the events preceding the 9/11 attacks from hindsight, however, as was also discussed in 
chapter 3, there were twelve commission, think tank and presidential initiative reports, 
which had made the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission already throughout the 
1990s. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission cannot be accused of picking the most obvious 
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problems of the intelligence community after the attacks happened, because all of the 
problems addressed by the 9/11 Commission were already recognized before 9/11.  
Thus, it is possible to argue that if there had been a substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on the discussed pre-9/11 
recommendations, the intelligence community’s efficiency and effectiveness would 
have been enhanced and the chance to prevent the terrorist attacks would have been 
much larger. 
 
5.2. Is There a Need for the DNI? 
Questions also arose whether a centralized structure of the intelligence 
community is the right one. Again, Rovner and Long are against. They argue that 
“decentralized intelligence offers several potential benefits. Greater autonomy for field 
operators would allow them to recruit unsavory informants – even terrorists – without 
fear of reprimand from the home office. Loosening centralized standards would also 
favor entrepreneurial analysts who prefer to freely communicate with their peers and 
policy counterparts instead of having to follow strict guidelines on communication.”167 
They also point out that increased centralization through the DNI would hamper 
informal interaction between analysts. 
Richard Posner also calls for more decentralization. In his 2006 book Uncertain 
Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in the Throes of Reform, he praises the value 
of complementarity and competition in intelligence, prevention of groupthink and 
motivation of employees by their belonging to only a part of the intelligence community 
and not the whole system as such.168 
However, it is important to clarify that centralization and decentralization of the 
U.S. intelligence community are not mutually exclusive organizing principles. There are 
many companies and organizations where organization is based on both strong central 
authority and decentralized management. Nevertheless, the right balance between 
centralization and decentralization is crucial. Too much centralization can slow down 
innovation, hamper swift and nimble action and have negative influence on employees’ 
morale. On the other hand, too much decentralization can impede coordination and 
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information sharing, evokes distrust, and creates centers of power which refuse reform. 
Thus, the key question is not whether to centralize, but how much and what. 
Therefore, to answer the question asked in the subheading, the U.S. intelligence 
community needs the DNI, however, with much stronger authority than it currently 
posses in order to be able to coordinate the U.S. intelligence community as a unified 
entity but also in order to have enough power to oversee and promote enough 
decentralization which would allow for healthy amount of competition and innovation. 
Suggestions of how to achieve this equilibrium in the U.S. intelligence community 
organization will be made in the last subchapter. 
 
5.3. What to Do Next: Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyzed some of the main obstacles and problematic 
aspects of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform. Two main problems were 
characterized: first, the inability of the newly established institutions such as the DNI 
and the NCTC to properly coordinate and incorporate the intelligence community and 
its agencies, and second the inability and also unwillingness of the old agencies such as 
the CIA and the FBI to adapt to the changed environment and to implement the 
provisions of the intelligence reform legislation. Reasons for these problems were 
identified as being mostly of organizational character based on bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry and institutional inertia. They include poor management, lack of 
incentives for personnel and recruits, inefficient clearance system hampering 
information sharing, and technical deficiencies. 
Therefore, it is important to identify possible solutions to improve the efficiency 
of the U.S. intelligence community. That is to promote such measures, which would 
overcome the organizational obstacles to the intelligence reform and enhanced the 
ability of the U.S. intelligence community to prevent terrorist attacks, i.e. to support its 
effectiveness. It is possible to recognize four main steps leading to more efficient U.S. 
intelligence community. 
First, powers and authorities vested in the newly created position of the Director 
of National Intelligence must be strengthened. However, rather than issuing new 
legislation, the DNI should fully exploit the authorities he currently has under the 
IRTPA and insist on his budgetary authorities in order to promote greater efficiency 
within the U.S. intelligence community. Even though the DNI’s powers are limited, he 
should use them in full scope. If he fails to exercise them, it will create a precedent for 
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weak or only virtual authorities of the DNI and discredit the position of the DNI as 
such. As Gordon Lederman suggests, “the DNI should thoroughly review the budget of 
each intelligence entity and refuse to include any programs in the next year’s budget 
proposal that fail to correspond to the DNI’s vision for integration. The DNI should also 
use his apportionment authority to hold entities’ feet to the fire, authorizing the release 
of selected appropriated funds only once the DNI is satisfied with the pace of 
integration.”169 This would allow the DNI to establish himself as the chief executive 
officer and to build up the unified intelligence enterprise, as was envisioned by the 9/11 
Commission. 
Second, in order to act efficiently as a chief coordinator, the DNI should leave 
some of the responsibilities connected with the preparation for the Presidential Daily 
Briefs to designated mission managers. This would allow the DNI to focus more on the 
organizational transition and management of the intelligence community. Moreover, 
orienting the U.S. intelligence community towards specified missions such as 
counterterrorism (here the mission manager is the Director of the NCTC), counter 
proliferation or by region, i.e. Iran, North Korea would help to break the stovepipes and 
enhance interagency cooperation.170 Also, the mission of the Office of the DNI must be 
clarified in order to prevent creating just another bureaucratic layer to the intelligence 
community organization and to support the DNI’s chief managerial role in a proper 
manner. Thus the ODNI’s roles, responsibilities and lines of authority have to be clearly 
declared.  
Third, culture of a single, unified enterprise needs to be created to promote 
better organizational incentives and to motivate intelligence personnel. The Joint Duty 
Program has to be endorsed by creating incentives for both managers to send their 
qualified personnel and also for the intelligence personnel themselves to produce quality 
outcomes while on their duty. In order to evaluate performance, as well as the post-
rotational career moves a rating system of a kind should be developed. Common 
organizational culture could be also enhanced by integrated training. Arthur S. Hulnick 
argues that “a centralized basic course would not only save money, but also build the 
kinds of relationships that would enhance information sharing and cross-agency 
assignments.”171 After the basic course a specialized courses within the respected 
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agencies would follow but the first training under the auspices of the intelligence 
community “brand” would help in establishing an integrated institutional culture. This 
common institutional culture, if promoted with the right incentives, would help prevent 
turf wars among agencies and improve cooperation. On the other hand, incentives for 
healthy competition in analysis should be supported and a certain amount of 
decentralization should be encouraged in order to avoid the problem of groupthink. 
Fourth, removing the overly complicated system of security clearances is 
essential for improving efficiency of the intelligence community. So far, each agency 
has its own system of providing security clearances and background checks and the 
agencies mostly do not recognize each others clearances, which seriously hampers 
information sharing. A unified system created under the supervision of the DNI would 
remove this obstacle. 
If done right, these proposals would help lessen the identified organizational 
obstacles to the intelligence community change. Improving managerial capabilities can 
help to, at least partially, overcome bounded rationality; establishment of integrated 
institutional culture can mitigate institutional inertia within the individual agencies; and 
incentives for information sharing can moderate structural secrecy. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that for all these suggestions to be 
successfully implemented a support of senior officials, beginning with the president, as 
well as of the legislators is crucial. Thus, the trade-off between decision makers’ 
incentives and capabilities has to create enough interest, as well as actual capabilities to 
seriously invest into substantial intelligence reform in order to improve intelligence 
community’s abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Much of the evidence presented in this chapter and previous one highlight that 
reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11 is still a work in progress. 
However, adopting the suggested proposals would not only improve the efficiency of 
the intelligence community but would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. The 
interconnectedness of the effectiveness and efficiency criteria illustrated earlier in 
Figure 1.1 is clearly evident. Continuous organizational problems hampering the 
efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community have had a negative impact on 
effectiveness; that is on its abilities to prevent terrorist attacks. A case in point is the 
failed attempt to detonate a bomb on an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. 
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This incident was preceded by a number of systemic mistakes caused by the lack of 
efficiency within the intelligence community.172 Such recent evidence demonstrates that 
current initiatives to overcome organizational obstacles within the U.S. intelligence 
community have had limited success. If such security lapses are to be avoided in the 
future the United States government must address the question of what policies will 
ensure the most effective and efficient means of countering terrorist threats. 
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Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored the vulnerability and 
unpreparedness of the United States for such an attack. Most importantly, 9/11 
highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and operational capabilities to 
counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community could not operate in an 
integrated manner because its structure was a Cold War relic with no single actor with 
ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch lacked an effective coordinated 
planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
Soon after 9/11 critical voices sprung up calling for substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community in order to improve its abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
The purpose of this diploma thesis has been to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 
intelligence community reform on the basis on its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Throughout this research, the criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been conceptualized as the 
ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, whereas ‘efficiency’ 
has been operationalised as measures undertaken at the organizational level within the 
intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist attacks.  
At the beginning of this thesis, two key questions were raised. The first of these 
questions inquired into whether the U.S. intelligence community became more effective 
and efficient following the attacks of September 11, 2001? The evidence presented in 
the chapters 2 through 5 suggests that the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 is 
mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist attack). However, it is 
not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack of leadership, inability 
or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right incentives 
for current personnel and potential recruits to the intelligence community. These 
institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the intelligence community, which 
consequently endanger the intelligence community’s effectiveness in countering 
terrorist threats.  
The second question asked in the introduction of this thesis delved into why in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 intelligence failure, has a thorough 
reform of the intelligence community not materialized? The hypothesis that the 
adoption of substantial intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) 
was obstructed by a number of factors proves to be correct. First, the nature of U.S. 
intelligence organizations hindered extensive reform. Second, the rational choices of the 
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U.S. leadership (i.e. the executive and legislative branches of government) did not 
facilitate a process of significant change. Third, the American public’s democratic 
principles were sometimes in conflict with proposals that were seen to undermine civil 
liberties. Out of these three obstacles to substantial reform of U.S. intelligence, the 
organizational obstacles have been identified as the most significant factor in the 
resistance to reform. Therefore, most attention has been paid to the analysis of the 
organizational processes within the intelligence community’s institutions. 
The main argument presented throughout this diploma thesis has been that the 
original aim of reform was to transform the U.S. intelligence community into a single, 
unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks and 
efficient in doing so. This goal has not been realized. Instead, although the post-9/11 
intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain. 
In order to analyze and evaluate reform of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence system 
an organizational model has been adopted. In this model, it has been argued that 
institutional reform is very difficult due to the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within U.S. intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within intelligence agencies’ culture. 
Moreover, the intelligence institutions operate in a political and societal 
environment that creates additional constraints on their ability to adapt and reform. 
These external processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by 
American political leaders who often act in a manner that might be reasonably described 
as being motivated by rational self-interest. In addition, American public opinion and its 
adherence to democratic values based on protection of civil liberties has also been an 
important contextual variable. In general, intelligence community reform is a very 
difficult and long term process and this situation is not helped by public fears about any 
measures that might undermine civil liberties. As a result, the lack of popular support 
for strengthening of the U.S. intelligence community’s powers have often provided 
insufficient incentives for decision makers to embark on root-and-branch reform of the 
intelligence services. 
Chapter 2 has revealed this was the situation that permeated repeated attempts to 
reform the US intelligence community before 9/11. Throughout the 1990s a number of 
attempts were made to adapt the U.S. intelligence community to the changing nature of 
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threats that arose after the end of the Cold War. The transnational and asymmetric 
threats (especially terrorism) superseded the single danger posed by the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. The spectrum of present and potential targets was broadening and the 
intelligence community had to deal with an overwhelming amount of information 
stemming from these threats.  
Twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task 
forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
during the 1990s; and together these bodies made 340 recommendations to reform the 
intelligence community. Many of these proposals suggested improvement in the 
intelligence community’s sense of corporate identity; enhancing human intelligence; 
encouraging information sharing and improving personnel issues; and creating a better 
system of setting intelligence priorities. All of these suggestions were proposed by the 
Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission after the 9/11 as well. It is important to note that 
before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, there were not enough incentives 
for policy makers or intelligence community leaders to embark on a substantial reform 
agenda.  
The assumption introduced in this thesis has been that the shock of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks would create such incentives; however, chapter 3 presented evidence 
that tends to contradict this hypothesis. The immediate reaction of the Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress to events of 9/11 was focused on (a) quick fixes 
such as the enactment of the USA Patriot Act removing many barriers for domestic 
surveillance, or (b) wide governmental changes promoted through a new homeland 
security agenda. None of these initiatives represented what might be reasonably called a 
comprehensive approach towards reforming and integrating the intelligence community. 
Thus, the momentum for change generated by the tragic events of 9/11 vanished.  
Another opportunity to enforce far-reaching changes to create a more effective 
and efficient U.S. intelligence community occurred with publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report. Chapter 4 examined the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations embedded in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) enacted in 2004. A number of problems have been identified regarding the 
IRTPA. First, the impact of this law was diluted during the legislative debate in the U.S. 
Congress where the Defense Department lobby successfully obstructed many changes 
that would have endangered its exclusive position within the intelligence community. 
The DOD’s dominant position is evident from the fact that it secures 80 percent of the 
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intelligence community’s overall budget. Second, the IRTPA created new intelligence 
institutions such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National 
Counterterrorist Center (NCTC). However, the act does not vest enough power in them 
to allow them to attain a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. This limitation 
appears to be especially true in the case of the DNI where its position has been impaired 
and its coordination and managerial powers have been hampered. Therefore, the DNI is 
unable to overcome the organizational obstacles embedded in the intelligence 
community’s organizational culture. Third, the organizational obstacles outlined in this 
study refer primarily to the old intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, and 
their resistance to adapt to the new security environment and to implement properly the 
IRTPA provisions.  
The argument presented in this study of the organizational features of U.S. 
intelligence has been pointing to its lack of efficiency. Such inefficiency is particularly 
evident in the inability of the newly created institutions to properly manage and 
coordinate their activities and the unwillingness of the older established agencies to 
adapt and to embrace the new provisions. 
In order to improve efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community, a number of 
proposals have been suggested. These were outlined and discussed in chapter 5. A 
central feature of these proposals is the agency charged with the management of reform 
– the DNI. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a central and 
persistent failing of the U.S. intelligence community in the post Cold War period has 
been the inability to develop more effective and efficient channels of coordination. Here 
the institutional focus of this research has demonstrated why the logic of organizations 
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. With regard to the DNI, four concrete proposals for 
reform are pertinent.  
First, enhancing the power of the DNI through uncompromising exploitation of 
all authorities vested in it under the IRTPA. Second, the DNI’s focus should be on 
organizational transition rather than the time consuming task of preparing the daily 
presidential briefings. Third, this change would facilitate creating an organizational 
culture that pursues a single mission providing the motivation and incentives for 
enhanced cooperation. Fourth, such reform would reduce the extremely complicated 
system of security clearances which debilitates information sharing. If these steps for 
increasing the efficiency of the intelligence community are implemented, then the 
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effectiveness of the intelligence community in preventing surprise attacks is also likely 
to improve. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this study highlights an important 
general point: reform of the U.S. intelligence community is essentially a work in 
progress. This has important consequences not only for stakeholders’ (i.e. citizens, 
policy makers, intelligence providers and scholars) understanding of how the U.S. 
intelligence community operates, but also the most appropriate means of evaluating its 
strengths and weaknesses. In this diploma thesis, U.S. intelligence has been modeled 
using an input-output approach developed within systems theory where intelligence 
outputs have been evaluated on the basis of two criteria, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Such an approach has the merits of reducing a very complex set of organizational 
relationships to a small number of core features that facilitate generalization. However, 
this approach is limited as it adopts a static structural perspective and cannot deal 
effectively with the essentially strategic nature of institutional change. 
For this reason future research on reform of the U.S. intelligence community 
should focus on the operations of the DNI. Such research would deal not only with 
institutional structures but also with the strategic interactions that are a defining feature 
of the DNIs work. In this respect, the New Institutionalism literature and insights 
derived from formal modeling such as Game Theory would provide the foundations for 
a more detailed account of why the U.S. intelligence community has experienced such 
difficulty in improving coordination.  
Such a theoretical approach would facilitate identifying and constructing 
empirical indicators, or benchmarks, that would allow both scholars and practitioners to 
evaluate the success of different reform plans. Such a theoretical approach and 
methodology has the important advantage of reflecting the evolutionary nature of 
intelligence community change. The research presented in this diploma thesis represents 
an important and necessary first step in such a research agenda by mapping out the 
context and key players and providing a concise evaluation of the main institutional 
problem – coordination.  
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Summary 
The argument presented in this thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research question addressed in this thesis and the 
research model based on effectiveness and efficiency is introduced. 
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological background for this 
research thesis. This work commences with a definition of intelligence and a brief 
discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence 
community reform are introduced. The organization theory approach to study 
intelligence community is recognized as the most appropriate. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It examines 
the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the repeated 
attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of transnational threats. 
This is followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these reform attempts. The evidence 
presented in chapter 2 suggests that the post-Cold War change of threat environment did 
not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s intelligence 
services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence community 
was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was unprepared to 
prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as to 
why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from happening 
again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations are 
examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President Bush, undertaken 
simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, and their impact 
on the intelligence community reform are discussed. These new security policies 
include enactment of the USA Patriot Act, promoting the homeland security agenda and 
establishing the Terrorist Threat Information Center. The analysis presented in this 
chapter leads to a conclusion that none of these initiatives presented a comprehensive 
plan of reform of the U.S. intelligence community. 
Chapter 4 delves into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions is 
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evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. The idea behind the 9/11 Commission recommendations was to create a 
unified intelligence community, which would work both effectively and efficiently on 
its mission to counter terrorist threats. The evidence presented in chapter suggests that 
only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community 
is still a work in progress. 
Chapter 5 provides some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient are proposed. It is argued that adopting the suggested 
proposals would not only improve the efficiency of the intelligence community but 
would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. 
In the concluding chapter the two research questions are answered and the main 
arguments of this diploma thesis summarized. Suggestion on future research on reform 
of the U.S. intelligence community focusing on the operations of the DNI using the 
New Institutionalism theory and Game Theory approaches are made.  
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DOE  Department of Energy 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FISA  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FY  Fiscal Year 
HSC  Homeland Security Council 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
IAIP  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
IC21  Intelligence Community in the 21st Century Committee 
IMINT  Imagery Intelligence 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
NCPC  National Counter Proliferation Center 
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center 
NFIP  National Foreign Intelligence Program 
NGA  National Geospatial Agency 
NIC  National Intelligence Council 
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate 
NIP  National Intelligence Program 
NRO  National Reconnaissance Office  
NSA  National Security Agency 
IRTPA  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
JMIP  Joint Military Intelligence Program 
JTTF  Joint Terrorism Task Force 
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OHS  Office of Homeland Security 
PDB  Presidential Daily Brief 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence  
TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
TSA  Transport Security Administration 
TTIC  Terrorism Threat Information Center 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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Diplomová práce „Reforma zpravodajských složek Spojených států amerických 
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obranu před teroristickými hrozbami. 
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the equilibrium of U.S. 
perceptions of terrorist threats. This form of violence was not new in American 
historical experience, the threat and use of psychological and physical force by 
individuals, sub-national groups, and state actors aimed at attaining political, social and 
economic objectives in violation of domestic and international law have challenged the 
United States many times in the past. However, this unprecedented (in its extent and 
brutality) action against ordinary citizens of the United States carried out on American 
soil, underscored the vulnerability and unpreparedness of the country for such an attack. 
Most importantly, it highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and 
operational capabilities to counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community 
found it difficult to operate in an integrated manner because its structure was a Cold 
War relic with no single actor with ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch 
lacked an effective planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
The first problem is that the U.S. intelligence community during the 1990s was 
still operating on a structure designed to counter one single enemy – the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. Therefore, a number of cold war legacies were disabling the 
intelligence community to adapt and to react to the rapid growth of transnational threats, 
especially international terrorism. These legacies were all based on divisions and 
boundaries. On the organizational side, the collection of intelligence was divided into 
“stovepipes” by source: human intelligence (HUMINT) under the CIA, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) under the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) under the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The analysis part 
was also organized primarily by agency and not by issue or problem. The CIA was 
responsible for “all-source” analysis, but other agencies had their analysis units as well, 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The second division was, thus, on the CIA/DOD line. The CIA was an 
independent entity, while agencies performing signals and imagery intelligence were 
located within the DOD. Focusing on one target supported competition between the 
agencies, which proved generally beneficial during the Cold War. But the competition 
also led to many turf wars between the agencies and had a negative effect on 
cooperation, which became crucial for countering the transnational threats. The last 
divide was on the domestic-foreign intelligence axis. Out of concern for civil liberties, 
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the CIA was prohibited from performing internal security functions. These powers were 
vested in the FBI, which, however, was first and foremost a law enforcement agency, 
and therefore oriented mostly reactively not preventively. Moreover, the barrier between 
domestic and foreign intelligence had negative effects on information sharing and 
cooperation as well.  
The second problem was that of determining priorities. Transnational threats 
were not new for U.S. intelligence community, but they were treated as marginal within 
the Cold War context. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the growing 
importance of transnational threats, led by terrorism, were recognized both by 
intelligence officials as well as the decision makers. However, the transition from 
focusing on one single target, which is essentially bounded by borders and hierarchical 
in structure to targets which are asymmetric and, by definition, transnational, was not 
realized in a swift enough fashion in order to prevent the attacks from happening. 
All of these problems were addressed already before 9/11. Twelve bipartisan 
blue-ribbon commissions, independent think tank task forces and presidential initiatives 
recognized the post-Cold War deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community and 
made hundreds of recommendations to improve it. However, they were largely ignored 
by both the decision makers, as well as intelligence officials. The changed post-Cold 
War environment was not a sufficient impetus for making a substantial reform of how 
intelligence institutions operated. It seemed that only a catastrophe of 9/11 scope would 
provide the right momentum for change.  
 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two interconnected questions. The first 
question is whether the U.S. intelligence community has become more effective and 
efficient since 9/11? Throughout this research, effectiveness is understood as the ability 
to prevent surprise attacks, whereas efficiency means measures undertaken on 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those attacks. 
Close examination of the governmental actions carried out in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, as well as of the proposed reform embedded in the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act and its subsequent implementation into practice shows 
that the U.S. intelligence community is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any 
successful terrorist attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, 
which in return adversely affect the effectiveness of the intelligence community in 
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countering terrorist threats. These organizational problems include lack of leadership, 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right 
incentives for personnel and potential recruits. These organizational deficiencies reduce 
the intelligence community’s efficiency, which thereafter endanger its effectiveness. 
The second question explores why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by 
the 9/11 intelligence failure, a comprehensive reform of the intelligence community has 
not materialized. In this thesis it is hypothesized that the adoption of substantial 
intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) was obstructed by 
three main factors. First, reform was obstructed by the nature of the intelligence 
organizations themselves. Second, reform was hindered by the rational choices of the 
U.S. leadership (both the president and the legislators). Third, the reform agenda was 
strongly shaped by American citizens’ democratic principles and their core beliefs 
regarding civil liberties. However, among these three obstacles to intelligence reform, 
the institutional aspect is perhaps the most important as institutions are the means by 
which public preferences are transformed into concrete policies. In other words, 
organization matters.1 Organizational structure, culture and management all influence 
how effective and efficient the system will be. Furthermore, in order to keep this thesis 
within a reasonable range, most attention will be paid to the organizational obstacles to 
intelligence reform. 
The two main categories for evaluating the U.S intelligence community before 
and after 9/11 are its effectiveness and efficiency and the relationship between these two 
criteria (independent variables) are summarized in Figure 1. The level of effectiveness 
is defined as ability to prevent the terrorist attacks from happening. Even though it is, as 
many authors conclude, impossible to prevent all surprise attacks the effectiveness of 
intelligence community may be evaluated on the basis of how many attacks were 
successfully prevented.2 The record of successful terrorist attacks on American targets 
before 9/11 is thus zero, whereas given that no terrorist attack of 9/11 scope was 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, terms organization and institution and their derivatives are treated as 
equal. 
2
 See for example: Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable”. World Politics 31 (1): 61-89 or more recently: Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of 
Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Colombia University 
Press. or Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the Wake of 9/11. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. or Pillar, Paul R. 2006. “Good Literature and Bad 
History: The 9/11 Commission’s Tale of Strategic Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 21 
(6): 1022-1044 or most recently Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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committed since 9/11 this fact may be reasonably interpreted as showing the 
effectiveness of U.S. intelligence community.3 
 
Figure 1. Effectiveness and Efficiency of U.S. Intelligence Community before and 
after 9/11 
 
Note: Effectiveness is understood in this study as the ability to prevent surprise attacks. Efficiency means 
measures undertaken on organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those 
attacks. Figure 1. shows that the pre-9/11 intelligence community was neither effective nor efficient. The 
intent of the post-9/11 reform was to create both an effective and efficient intelligence community 
indicated by the dotted arrow. The actual implementation of the intelligence reform legislation and 
executive actions did lead to enhanced effectiveness, but not to increased efficiency (as shown by the 
large clear arrow). 
 
The efficiency criterion is understood here as the number of actions undertaken in order 
to achieve a certain level of effectiveness. These include adapting and prioritizing 
among threats, cooperation and information sharing among agencies, creating a strong 
centralized leadership recognized by everyone, and creating the right incentives for 
personnel working in the intelligence services. Before 9/11 none of these actions was 
accomplished to a degree that was in hindsight considered acceptable (i.e. preventing 
the 9/11 attacks). But what is more surprising is that even after 9/11, the intelligence 
reforms have still not managed to create efficient intelligence community.  
Thus, the original aim of transforming the U.S. intelligence community into a 
single, unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks 
as well as efficient in doing so has not been realized.4 Although, the post-9/11 
                                                 
3
 There are opinions suggesting that there in fact was a number of terrorist attacks on American targets 
since 9/11, such as the Virginia snipers case (see e.g. Gruen, Madeleine, Hyland Frank. 2008. “No Attack 
in the U.S. since 9/11? available at:< 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/no_attack_in_the_us_since_911.php> [accessed 28.4. 2010]), 
however compared to the scope of successful Al Qaeda attacks during the 1990s such as the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing and the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy attacks and the 9/11, the post-9/11 
incidents are not of an equal importance. 
4
 Reform of the U.S. intelligence community as a centralized and unified enterprise was proposed by the 
9/11 Commission and accepted by the subsequent legislative and presidential action. 
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intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain unresolved. 
 
Roadmap of the Research 
The argument presented in this diploma thesis will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 will provide the theoretical and methodological background for this research 
thesis. This work will commence with a definition of intelligence and a brief discussion 
of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical approaches to the 
study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence community reform will be 
introduced. Lastly, the Eastonian input/output methodology employed in this research 
study will be presented. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It will 
examine the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the 
repeated attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of 
transnational threats. This will be followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these 
reform attempts.  
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as 
to why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from 
happening again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and 
recommendations will be examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President 
Bush, undertaken simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, 
and their impact on the intelligence community reform will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 will delve into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions will be 
evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. 
Chapter 5 will provide some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient will be proposed. 
 
The original research proposal for this thesis submitted and accepted in June 2009 
intended to study the change in U.S. homeland security after 9/11 with an aspect of 
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intelligence reform as a part of the research. However, throughout the preparation and 
study period of the thesis, the whole topic of homeland security and intelligence reform 
appeared to be too broad for the range of the diploma thesis. Therefore, the author in 
consultation with her advisor reduced the focus of the research to the U.S. intelligence 
reform only. This approach will enable this thesis to delve in more depth into the 
problem of U.S. intelligence reform. The homeland security aspect is mentioned in part 
3.2.2, but it serves only as additional factor in the intelligence reform analysis. 
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1. Studying Intelligence and its Reform: An Academically Forgotten 
Field 
The subject of intelligence and especially of intelligence reform has been 
generally overlooked by both political scientists and organization theorists. This is 
because the study of intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is difficult 
because much of the evidence and data is secret. More will be said on this point in 
section 1.2. In addition, there is at present no widely accepted definition of intelligence 
and this lack of conceptual clarity also makes the study of intelligence difficult. 
Notwithstanding, the problems associated with secrecy surrounding intelligence work it 
is essential from the outset to develop an explicit working definition of what is meant by 
the term “intelligence”, what can be understood as intelligence, and also its relationship 
to national security and foreign policy making. These issues will be dealt with in the 
first section of this chapter. 
In the second section different academic approaches to the study of intelligence 
will be introduced. These contrasting approaches may be interpreted as different facets 
of the study of intelligence. They include topics such as relationship of intelligence to 
policy making, to democratic principles and the ethics of intelligence or the study of 
intelligence failure in general. However, the question of intelligence community reform 
has not been discussed in great depth so far within the political science or organizational 
literatures.  
For this reason, there is at present no “ready-made” theory, which could be used 
and applied to U.S. intelligence community reform post 9/11. Thus, in order to explain 
the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community to both the pre- and post-9/11 efforts a 
combined approach of organization and bureaucracy theory with aspects from political 
science and decision making must be developed. Lastly, this chapter will present the 
research method used in this thesis. 
 
1.1. What Is Intelligence and Why Is It Important for National Security? 
According to Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading expert in intelligence studies, there 
are several ways to think about intelligence:5 
                                                 
5
 There has been a rich ongoing discussion about what intelligence is, which due to space constraints 
cannot be delved into here, and thus Mark Lowenthal’s approach was chosen. For more information on 
definitions of intelligence, see e.g. Davis, Jack. 1992. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949”. Studies in 
Intelligence 36 (5): 91-104. 
- 15 - 
 
• Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which 
certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, 
and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are 
conceived and conducted. 
• Intelligence as a product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of 
these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operation 
themselves. 
• Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that 
carry out its various functions.6 
 
Throughout this thesis, the third type of intelligence perception will be mostly used 
because it addresses the key aspect of intelligence analyzed in this thesis – intelligence 
community as an institutional body and its parts. 
Another way of thinking about intelligence is to see it in terms of the craft of 
intelligence, which has two basic components. The first is collection – that is gathering 
of particular information about intelligence targets. Collection is done through different 
methods, such as human intelligence – spies and informants; signals intelligence – 
intercepted communications; imagery intelligence – maps, pictures, etc.; and open 
source intelligence – information derived from publicly available sources. The second 
component is analysis – that is studying collected information and deriving conclusions, 
judgments, or predictions.  
According to one intelligence scholar, “in general, analysis should drive 
collection so that collection focuses on obtaining the information that analysts need in 
order to render their conclusions, judgments, or predictions. ‘All-source analysis’ refers 
to analysis of an intelligence topic using information collected by all relevant 
methods.”7 This process of tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating 
intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. Special functions outside of the intelligence 
cycle are covert actions and counterintelligence, which is focused on protecting the 
country, as well as intelligence agencies, from the activities of other foreign intelligence 
services8. 
                                                 
6
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 8. 
7
 Lederman, Gordon N. 2005. “Restructuring the Intelligence Community”. p. 89 in Peter Berkowitz 
(ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution. 
8
 Turner, Michael A. 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield., p. 41. 
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Intelligence, in the meaning of a finalized product, is an essential part of national 
security policy making. It can provide crucial information about the potential enemy or 
support (or provide evidence against) a certain national security policy action. As 
Robert Jervis contends, “the purpose of intelligence is to provide an understanding of 
the world on which foreign policy can be based and to support instruments to influence 
and possibly deceive others.”9 Policymakers generally accept the intelligence as an 
important part of their decision and policymaking. However, the role and importance of 
intelligence varies in each administration. Again using in words of Robert Jervis, 
“policy makers say they need and want very good intelligence. They do indeed need it, 
but often do not want it.”10 This means that sometimes the view of intelligence analysts 
is not the same as that of the decision makers. This is because it is not always the case 
that intelligence submitted to decision makers is supportive of a government’s preferred 
policy goals. Thus, the relationship between decision makers and intelligence is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
1.2. Academic Approaches to the Study of Intelligence 
The essence of intelligence, both in the meaning of the information provided as 
well as the process, is secrecy. According to Michael Warner, “even the accidental 
disclosure of some analytical, informational, or operational advantage over a rival or an 
enemy is presumed to be tantamount to the loss of that advantage while it is still 
potentially useful.”11 The fact that intelligence is conducted with some level of secrecy 
makes it very hard for the scholars of intelligence to undertake comprehensive analyses. 
As Warner concludes, “intelligence studies have been conducted one way on the 
‘outside’ with no official access to original records, and another way on the ‘inside’, 
where a few scholars have intermittently enjoy sanctioned (if not always complete) 
access to the extant documentation.”12 Thus, an imbalance is created where studying 
intelligence from the outside is extremely difficult and in a sense incomplete, and on the 
other hand the internal sources and studies are difficult to verify. 
                                                 
9
 Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception, and Deception”. p. 70 in Jennifer E. 
Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
10
 Jervis, Robert. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform”. The 
Forum 4 (1): 1. 
11
 Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence”. p. 17 in Loch K. Johnson 
(ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Due to the element of secrecy and also due to the various meanings of 
intelligence, there is little published material on how to study intelligence. Thomas 
Bruneau and Steven Boraz point to the striking fact that “whereas intelligence officers 
and the organizations within which they function in the intelligence community are 
extremely rigorous methodologically in concluding their work, when we turn to the 
study of intelligence structures and processes by outsiders and retired intelligence 
professionals, there is little rigor and virtually no consensus on how to research and 
analyze the intelligence community.”13  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the failure of intelligence community to 
prevent them, attention of scholars as well as former intelligence officials to study 
intelligence heightened, however there is only little available analysis on the 
organization of intelligence and its reform. Even the aforementioned Bruneau and Boraz 
focus in their volume Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness, on the question of relationship between democracy and intelligence. Thus 
they analyze topics such as democratic control of intelligence, the legislative and 
judicial oversight, the problem of civil rights protection with connection to intelligence, 
and the transformation of intelligence from a tool of state oppression in transitional 
countries.14 Many other authors have also focused on the question of ethics and 
intelligence, such as Michael Herman15, or on intelligence oversight in the United 
States, for example L. Britt Snider16 or Jennifer Kibbe.17 
Other authors envisage the U.S. intelligence community reform after 9/11 
through the lenses of changes in intelligence analysis, technology, and intelligence 
collection methods and practices. Here the volume Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, 
Obstacles, and Innovations edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce18 stands out 
                                                 
13
 Bruneau, Thomas C., Boraz, Steven C. 2007. “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness”. P.1 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to 
Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”. Intelligence and National 
Security 19 (2): 342-358. 
16
 Snider, L Britt. 2005. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 11”. Pp. 239-258 in 
Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
17
 Kibbe, Jennifer. 2010. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: In the Solution Part of the Problem?” 
Intelligence and National Security 25(1): 24-49. 
18
 George, Roger Z., Bruce James B. (eds.). 2008. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and 
Innovations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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for its comprehensive treatment of this subject matter. Among other scholars focusing 
on these topics are Stephen Marrin19 and Deborah G. Barger20. 
Third group of authors, who touch upon the problem of intelligence reform, 
focuses on the question of intelligence failure and its prevention. Their approach 
explains that intelligence failures are inevitable and impossible to prevent. Therefore, 
there is no need for substantial reform intelligence community because it in general 
works well. Moreover, reforms of the whole intelligence community would negatively 
affect those parts of the system that produce good results. Main proponents of this 
approach are mostly former intelligence professionals, for example Richard K. Betts21, 
Richard Posner22, and Paul R. Pillar.23 
All of these approaches to the study of intelligence address a certain type of 
change or reform of intelligence, in all three of its meanings. However, none of them 
analyze the organization of intelligence and its importance. Neither do they present a 
suitable theoretical framework for evaluating the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after 9/11 in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. Only three authors 
tackle the question of intelligence community reform from an organizational point of 
view. The first is Amy Zegart, who in her book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11,24 creates a combined theoretical approach to study adaptation failure of 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on both organization theory and political 
science theory of rational choice decision making. Even though this scholar applies her 
framework to an explanation of U.S. intelligence community failure before 9/11, her 
combined framework proves useful even for evaluating the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community reform. The second is a couple of authors, Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas 
Skelley, who in their chapter Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory25 provide an insight of organization theory on the organizational 
structure, culture and management of the intelligence community. The next part of this 
                                                 
19
 Marrin, Stephen. 2007. “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic 
Responsibilities”. Intelligence and National Security 22 (6): 821-846. 
20
 Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation. Available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf> 
[accessed 20.3. 2010]. 
21
 Betts, Richard K. 2007. 
22
 Posner, Richard A. 2005 and 2006. 
23
 Pillar, Paul R. 2006. 
24
 Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
25
 Hastedt Glenn P., Skelley, Douglas B. 2009. “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory”. Pp. 112-130 in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.). Intelligence 
Theory: Key Questions and Debate. New York: Routledge. 
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chapter will present the main arguments for an organizational approach to the topic of 
U.S. intelligence community reform.  
 
1.3. Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform 
In order to build a model of the U.S. intelligence community reform, which 
would allow its proper evaluation and explanation, both organization theory as well as 
the theory of new institutionalism and rational choice decision making will be used. 
Even though, the main focus is on the organizational side of the intelligence 
community, its internal structures, cultures and management, attention also has to be 
paid to processes outside of the U.S. intelligence community. These explain the 
influence of leadership decision-making as well as the institutional design of the 
American democratic principles on the final outcome of the intelligence reform. 
Organization theory consists of a system of competing ideas some of which are 
useful for explaining the failure of the intelligence reform to create a more efficient 
intelligence community. Classical organization theory is focused mostly on private 
corporations and businesses, thus it is necessary to adopt a bureaucratic perspective 
from organization theory. Here the logic may be summarized as follows. First, internal 
change is difficult for private companies26 and even more for governmental 
organizations.27 Second, internal resistance to change is powerful because it is based on 
both the organizational structure and also on an entrenched culture of values, norms, 
ideas and identities.28 Three reasons why organizations resist change can be 
characterized in the following manner.  
First, there is the bounded rationality of organizational leaders, who settle for 
options to internal change that seem to them to be good, but which in fact might not be. 
However, because the leaders have usually incomplete information, cannot predict the 
future and are bound by cognitive constraints, it can lead them to adopt changes which 
might be poorly identified, while the real problems are not addressed and deficiencies 
prevail.29 
                                                 
26
 Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. The Limits of Organizational Change. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Egeberg, Morton. 2003. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective”. Pp. 
116-126 in B. Guy Peters, John Pierre (eds.). Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage 
Publications. 
29
 Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press. 
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The second reason is structural secrecy. In order to be efficient, organizations 
specialize and divide to proficient subunits focusing on specific tasks. However, this 
kind of specialization prevents the efficient movement of knowledge and information 
within an organization. The resulting outcome is that “people in one part of the 
organization often lack the expertise to understand the work of people in other parts of 
the organization.”30 Structural secrecy makes it hard for managers to understand what 
exactly are the subunits doing and what needs to be changed. “The very structures, 
rules, and technologies designed to improve efficiency sabotage the organizations 
ability to learn and change.”31 
Finally, the liability of time or institutional inertia is the third factor limiting the 
organizational change. All organizations become more resistant to change as routines, 
norms, and relationships get established over time. Here, the problem is multifaceted. 
Organizational management supports standardization in operating procedures, 
motivation of employees, etc. But the very measures that create stability and reliability 
reduce the probability of change.32 In addition, the growing homogeneity of 
organizational culture – i.e. norms, relationships, and behaviors – leads employees to be 
naturally resistant to change of the way things have been done because they have 
become comfortable and used to the old procedures.33 
These three obstacles to change apply to all organizations. However, change is 
even harder for government agencies. This is because governmental institutions are 
generally designed to be both stable and durable and hence resistant to change. 
Government institutions place a high value on reliability, predictability and consistency 
in performing their tasks.34 Moreover, it is much easier for government agencies to 
resist change because they are not operating in a competitive market environment, 
which motivates private companies to adapt in order to survive.  
Also, the political environment in which government institutions work makes it 
difficult for them to change. The political backing for the creation or reform of a 
governmental agency relies on compromising political coalitions. Political opposition in 
                                                 
30
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 52 
31
 Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 110. 
32
 Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John. 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”. American 
Sociological Review 49: 149-164. 
33
 Kaufman, Herbert. 1976. Are Governmental Organizations Immortal? Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press or Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown. 
34
 Meyer, Marshall W., Zucker, Lynne G. 1989. Permanently Failing Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
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the American democratic political system has various means to limit or hamper the 
reform or creation of a new agency.35  
Another obstacle to governmental agency change in comparison with the private 
sector is that managers of governmental organizations are restricted by many more 
rules, conflicting goals and bureaucratic red tape. The process of managerial decisions 
such as hiring and firing employees, or acquiring more funds is required to move 
through a complicated system of bureaucratic layers, which ultimately makes it difficult 
for the governmental agencies to change. 
Another way of changing agencies that do not manage internally is an imposed 
change from the outside, through executive or legislative action. These processes are not 
at the core of the argument of this thesis, but have a certain effect on the final outcome 
of the U.S. intelligence community reform and therefore need to be mentioned. 
Especially important is the fact that even here obstacles to organizational change 
emerge. These consist of the rational self-interest decision making of both the president 
as well as the legislators.  
For presidents the incentives to improve organizational effectiveness exist and 
presidents are expected to promote it. However, presidents must prioritize among issues 
on their packed agendas. With limited election terms, presidents focus mostly on issues 
that directly concern voters, rather then on changing the complicated organizational 
design of governmental agencies. As Zegart concludes, “presidents are especially 
reluctant to push for agency reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of 
anticipated resistance.”36 Also for legislators the topic of agency reform is mostly not 
attractive enough to delve into. Especially the intelligence reform has weak connection 
to voters in their electoral districts.  
A second external barrier to intelligence reform stems from some key principles 
of American democracy, its decentralized system of federal government and stress on 
civil liberties. The federal system of government, as was already mentioned, enables 
political opposition to mitigate the final outcomes of proposed reforms. Also, the 
emphasis on civil liberties usually complicates any attempts to reform and centralize the 
intelligence community out of the fear of civil rights violations if more power was 
vested in the intelligence community. 
                                                 
35
 Moe, Terry. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure”.  Pp. 267-322 in John E. Chubb, Paul E. 
Peterson (eds.). Can the Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
36
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 57. 
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This overview of the intelligence and organizational literatures highlights a 
number of key themes relevant to reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
All organizations by their very nature are resistant to substantial change and are 
constrained by rational self-interest of key decision makers. In addition, public 
institutions must take into account their political environment. In the case, of 
intelligence organizations strong popular support for liberal democratic principles is a 
central consideration. Each of these three themes provides the building blocks for the 
research methodology used in this thesis. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
Given the complex theoretical framework applied to the study of the U.S. 
intelligence community reform, the research methodology requires a comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the actual research method used in this thesis may be summarized as an 
analytical and evaluative organizational narrative. The research methodology used in 
this thesis is based on an Eastonian37 input/output perspective on intelligence reform. 
The basic features of this methodological approach are presented schematically in 
Figure 1.1. 
Within this Figure 1.1 the development of the U.S. intelligence community 
before 9/11 as well as actions undertaken in order to promote intelligence reform post 
9/11 are considered to be inputs into the original institutional design of the intelligence 
community. Thereafter, the impact of the pre-9/11 situation and post-9/11 reform 
proposals will be evaluated using an organizational and rational-decision making 
framework. Lastly, the output or actual implementation of the legislation reforming the 
U.S. intelligence community will be evaluated based on the criteria of effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
The intelligence institutions depicted by the box in the centre of Figure 1.1 
consists of the internal organizational processes present within the U.S. intelligence 
community. These internal processes include the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within the intelligence agencies culture. 
The internal organizational processes are influenced by external processes entrenched in 
                                                 
37
 David Easton, a renowned political scientist, created a model of political system based on input and 
output factors which are influenced by external environment. For more on Easton’s application of systems 
theory of political science, see e.g. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
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the political and societal environment. The external environment processes consist of 
executive and legislative decisions made by the self-interest rationale of political 
leaders, as well as of the democratic societal values of citizens on the basis of deeply 
held beliefs regarding civil liberties. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the research methodology 
 
Note: This systems theory approach to intelligence provision, based on the work of Easton,38 views the 
work of intelligence institutions as being a product of the inputs into these institutions and the 
environment within which intelligence institutions operate. This model does not deal directly with the 
internal operations of intelligence institutions but suggests that institutional factors play an important 
role in mediating policy inputs and outputs. 
 
The pre-9/11 socio-political context will be discussed in chapter 2. This context is 
viewed in Figure 1.1 as providing a key input to the development of the U.S. 
intelligence community before 9/11. Within the approaches to the study of intelligence 
presented in section 2.2 of chapter 2, all of the previously mentioned themes such as 
limits of intelligence oversight, methods and practice of intelligence agencies 
influencing institutions decisions and actions, and the advocacy of the status quo by 
former intelligence professionals add to the pre-9/11 input will be discussed. Each of 
these themes has influenced the internal organizational design and culture of the U.S. 
intelligence community. 
Later in chapter 3 the focus will shift to an examination of the input provided by 
reactions to the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on governmental and legislative initiatives to 
reform the U.S. intelligence community. These actions have also had an impact on the 
internal institutional processes within the intelligence community. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
                                                 
38
 Ibid., p. 32. 
Environment Environment 
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thereafter evaluate all the interconnected input processes influencing the final output of 
the post-reform intelligence community in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. 
The evidence for the analysis and evaluation of the U.S. intelligence community 
reform presented in following chapters is drawn from a wide range of unclassified and 
declassified policy documents. This type of evidence is composed of various 
commission recommendations, official reports and working papers analyzing the pre-
9/11 and post-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence community, internal agency evaluation 
documents of the progress of implementing the intelligence reform propositions, various 
official strategies, and miscellaneous pieces of legislation related to the intelligence 
community reform. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical and methodological framework for this research 
thesis has been presented. The theoretical approach adopted draws inspiration from 
insights derived from the literatures on intelligence and organizations. These insights 
have been used in conjunction with an Eastonian systems model to construct a 
methodological approach exploring the two main influences, or inputs, on intelligence 
institutional reform and the enhanced security provision provided by intelligence 
organizations collectively. This policy output will be evaluated in terms of two central 
criteria: effectiveness and efficiency. Given the relative underdevelopment of the 
scholarly study of intelligence community reform such a methodological approach 
seems a reasonable approach to adopt when dealing a large volume of detailed evidence. 
In the next chapter, the process of applying the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives developed in the foregoing pages will be “put to the test” and used to 
marshal the evidence to address the two key questions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. 
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2. U.S. Intelligence Community before 9/11: Searching for Direction 
For about forty years the United States intelligence community focused on one 
overriding target: the Soviet Union, and its satellites. Attention and resources were 
mostly directed against Soviet nuclear forces and its conventional forces threatening 
Western Europe.39 However, with the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community, 
as well as the whole direction of the U.S. foreign policy, faced a dilemma of finding its 
purpose in a new unipolar world.40 The old adversary had disappeared and a new one 
was coming in many different forms and shapes. The intelligence community was 
expected to adapt to these new threats and to focus on a changed set of targets. The 
ability (or inability) to adapt to these changes forms part of the pre-9/11 input to the 
intelligence community reform agenda outlined earlier in the systems theory model 
presented in Figure 1.1. 
This chapter will first focus on the change of the intelligence environment after 
the end of the Cold War and the challenges posed by transnational threats. Although 
these threats were not new to the U.S. intelligence community, they were never in the 
forefront of its attention. In the second section, various attempts to reform the 
intelligence community before 9/11, based on the changing threats and targets, will be 
presented. These were set forth in recommendations of a number of bipartisan blue-
ribbon commissions, nonpartisan think tank reports and governmental initiatives 
undertaken during the 1990s. The final part of this chapter will examine the main 
obstacles to implementing these proposals and recommendations for a reform. 
 
2.1. Post-Cold War Environment: Adapting to New Threats 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
communist threat had diminished and there was no apparent threat from any foreign 
military power or any hostile ideology of comparable reach to that of the Soviet 
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Union.41 However, different types of threats to U.S. national security emerged. These 
threats were known to U.S. policy makers and intelligence analysts during the Cold 
War, but they were mostly understood as being peripheral to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its communist counterparts.  
The main characteristic of these threats is their asymmetric and transnational 
nature. The asymmetry is postulated by the non-state character of their actors, which 
can be mostly described as armed groups. According to Richard H. Schultz, a leading 
expert on the topic of asymmetric threats and armed groups, there are four categories of 
armed groups: terrorists, insurgents, militias, and organized crime. “All armed groups, 
to varying degrees, challenge the state’s authority, power, and legitimacy. Some do so 
by seeking to overthrow the government and replace it, while others attempt to weaken, 
manipulate, or co-opt the state.”42 This is achieved through the use violence and force in 
unconventional and asymmetric ways. The transnational aspect of these threats can be 
characterized by their disrespect for national boundaries and cross border operational 
mode. These threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.43 
Transnational threats and the actors responsible for them were not new for U.S. 
intelligence; the intelligence community had been active against organized crime and 
drug traffickers even during the Cold War. Similarly, terrorism was a re-occurring issue 
with recognized threats of Middle East terrorism since the 1970s and state-sponsored 
terrorism of the 1980s. But as Gregory Treverton points out, the novelty was: (1) in the 
growing importance of transnational threats, especially of terrorism, and (2) in the range 
of concern for transnational threats, which (again most notably terrorism) became the 
primary activity for intelligence.44 
Also, the spectrum of present and potential transnational threats has been 
broadening, thus creating the need for the intelligence community to adapt in order to be 
able to follow this growing number of targets. Whereas during the Cold War the 
problem was a general lack of information, the post-Cold War environment presented 
the opposite challenge for the intelligence community – too much information 
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stemming from the vast range of transnational threats. Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading 
scholar of intelligence studies, contends that “deciding what to focus on in the absence 
of the overwhelming Soviet threat and in the midst of nearly a decade of severe budget 
cuts was a daunting managerial challenge”.45 
The terrorist threats did, indeed, stand out among the many other transnational 
threats identified after the end of the Cold War. Some intelligence officials argued that 
intelligence agencies did recognize the importance of the terrorist threats and allocated 
its resources and launched new programs to combat terrorism well before 9/11. As 
former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates stated in 1994, the U.S. 
intelligence community started to readjust its priorities and shifted its resources away 
from the Soviet and other communist-related targets and missions soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, 58 percent of the whole intelligence 
community’s budget were devoted to following the Soviet-related threats, while by 
1993 this figure had dropped to just 13 percent.46 Even though specific budget figures 
for the intelligence community are classified, it appears resources were reallocated to 
fight terrorism. As the conclusions of the Joint Inquiry suggest, despite the time of tight 
budgets during the 1990s, direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.47 
Moreover, both within the CIA and the FBI incentives to transform and to 
address the terrorist threats evolved. According to the testimony of former Director of 
the FBI (1993-2001) Louis J. Freeh before the 9/11 Commission, the FBI had more than 
tripled its counterterrorism budget by 1999; it had also doubled the number of agents 
working on counterterrorism cases and expanded the number of its Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF) to improve coordination with local law enforcement.48 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2003, stated in 
his testimony before the Joint Inquiry that both the CIA as well as the intelligence 
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community as a whole had focused on the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other 
Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or Egyptian Islamist Jihad. An 
interagency approach was adopted through the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), under 
the auspices of the DCI. Among other CIA initiatives were: a new comprehensive 
strategy against al Qaeda called “The Plan”, a nationwide program for hiring qualified 
personnel for counterterrorism tasks, a counterterrorism educational programs, and 
measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI such as exchange of senior 
officials.49 
However, as Gregory Treverton, a renowned intelligence expert, points out, the 
U.S. intelligence community faced a number of Cold War legacies, which were 
mismatched to the changed threats. First, it was the boundaries between intelligence and 
law enforcement, foreign and domestic, and between public and private, which were 
created out of concern for civil liberties. These boundaries were then reinforced by the 
institutional legacy, which organized intelligence by source based on “stovepipes”50 on 
the collection side, and by agency not by issue or problem on the analysis side. During 
the Cold War, this division enhanced competition between analysts and provided 
different perspectives on the same issue, while the agencies could tailor their analysis to 
the needs of their consumers. The final Cold War legacy was a product of the 
boundaries. Domestic intelligence performed by the FBI was twice circumscribed. The 
FBI was first and foremost law enforcement organization, thus focused on reaction and 
prosecution, rather than on prevention. Moreover, “the domestic-intelligence function 
was limited by the boundary between intelligence and law enforcement, a ‘wall’ that 
extended inside the FBI and inhibited cooperation among intelligence and law 
enforcement officials working on similar issues.”51 
The intelligence community pre-9/11 attempted to transform itself amid the new 
terrorist threats by reallocating resources and creating new initiatives. However, the 
pace of the transformation was not efficient enough given the limited resources as well 
as the obstacles within the organizations stemming from the Cold War legacy of the 
institutional design of the intelligence community. As a result, the events of 9/11 
highlighted the unpreparedness and ineffectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community 
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to prevent a terrorist attack. Most of the deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community 
and the importance of adaptation of the intelligence community organization to the 
transnational threats were identified by various commissions and initiatives throughout 
the 1990’s. Their main ideas and recommendations will be examined in the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
2.2. Pre-9/11 Attempts to Reform the U.S. Intelligence Community52 
The end of the Cold War brought on a debate not only about the role of the 
United States in the international system, it has also stirred up a discussion about the 
importance of intelligence for the U.S. national security and foreign policies53 as well as 
about the best way the intelligence community should be organized in order to face the 
changed threats. Amy Zegart, a leading expert on U.S. intelligence reform and national 
security, created an intelligence reform catalogue consisting of twelve major bipartisan 
commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces. This catalogue 
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts between 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
this respect, Zegart contends that “All of their reports urged reform within intelligence 
agencies, across the Intelligence Community and other parts of the U.S. government.”54 
Using Zegart’s approach to analyzing the pre-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence 
community has the advantage of eliminating the problem of hindsight, instead it allows 
us to focus on what the intelligence officials and policymakers really knew before 9/11. 
Table 2.1 presents the twelve initiatives, out of which six were high profile 
bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions chaired by Congressional leaders and top 
governmental officials such as former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, former 
Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and Harold Brown, William Webster former director of 
both the CIA and FBI and Ambassador Paul Bremer. Three studies were developed by 
leading nonpartisan think tanks: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Institute 
for Public Policy, and the 20th Century Fund. The remaining three reports stemmed from 
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governmental initiatives: President Clinton’s interagency National Performance Review, 
the FBI’s 1998 Strategic Plan, and a House Intelligence Committee staff study.55  
 
Table 2.1. Intelligence Reform Catalogue of Unclassified U.S. Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism Studies, 1991-2001 
 
Year 
Issued 
Study Name Number of 
Recommendations 
1993, 
1995 
National Performance Review (Phases I and II) 35 
1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) 
39 
1996 Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force 29 
1996 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study 
(IC21) 
75 
1996 20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence 18 
1997 National Institute on Public Policy Report on Modernizing 
Intelligence (Odom Report) 
34 
1998 FBI Strategic Plan 1998–2003  60 
1999 Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Deutch Commission) 
57 
1999, 
2000 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore 
Commission), Reports 1 and 2 
60 
 
2000 Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement 
(Webster Commission) 
21 
 
2000 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) 36 
2001 U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-
Rudman Commission), Phase III Report 
50 
 Total 514 
Source: Adapted from Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 29. 
 
Together the studies proposed 514 recommendations on wide range of issues. Only six 
of the studies focused specifically on intelligence issues; the other six dealt with topics 
ranging from counterterrorism (The Gilmore and Bremer Commissions), proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (The Deutch Commission), federal law enforcement (The 
Webster Commission), to emerging 21st century threats to the U.S. national security in 
general (The Hart-Rudman Commission). Out of the 514 recommendations, 
approximately two-thirds of them, or 340, focused exclusively on improving and fixing 
the U.S. intelligence community. It should be noted that even the law enforcement and 
counterterrorism studies paid a great amount of attention to the problems of the 
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Intelligence Community. “Tellingly, every study during the period included discussion 
of major intelligence deficiencies and every study issued recommendations to fix them. 
Together, the counterterrorism and law enforcement studies contributed one-third of all 
intelligence reform recommendations.”56 
Zegart has identified four categories of major organizational problems on which 
the studies mostly agreed: (1) the intelligence community’s lack of coherence or 
“corporateness”; (2) insufficient human intelligence; (3) personnel systems that failed to 
align intelligence needs with personnel skills or encourage information sharing; and (4) 
weaknesses in setting intelligence priorities.57 It is important to note that each of these 
four categories were later identified by both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 
9/11 Commission as the ultimate blunders leading to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. 
The lack of “corporateness” can be best understood through the structural 
shortages in organization and lack of leadership in the U.S. intelligence community. As 
the Council on Foreign Relations report pointed out, “the intelligence community was 
less a community than a collection of more than a dozen largely autonomous 
components spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the world” with no one in 
charge of them.58 Despite the official role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
as the main leader of the intelligence community being responsible for proposing 
strategies and coordinating efforts across the intelligence agencies, the DCI was in 
reality overpowered by the Secretary of Defense which controlled over 80 percent of the 
intelligence budget. In this sense, the 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study 
criticized what it saw as “the glaring gap” between the DCI’s responsibilities and its 
authorities.59 
Inadequate human intelligence capabilities were criticized by a majority of the 
reports. In this respect, it was recommended that the recruitment process requiring prior 
approval from the CIA before individuals suspected of civil rights violations could be 
recruited60 be re-evaluated or abolished. The Bremer Commission recommended the 
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DCI to issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines would no longer apply to recruiting 
terrorist informants and identified aggressive recruitment of human intelligence sources 
on terrorism as one of the intelligence community’s highest priorities.61 A similar 
suggestion was made by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which also warned against the 
steep decline of intelligence budgets and its impact on human intelligence.62 
The problems of personnel systems and information sharing were addressed by 
nearly one-third of the recommendations. The House Intelligence Committee staff study 
concluded that the intelligence community “continues to face major personnel crises 
that it has, thus far not addressed in any coherent way”.63 Hand in hand with the 
personnel issues, the importance of information sharing was stressed. The Aspin-Brown 
Commission as well as the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Council on Foreign 
Relations Task Force recommended improvements in information sharing between the 
intelligence agencies and better cooperation with law enforcement agencies on domestic 
intelligence issues.64 
Many of the recommendations proposed during the 1990s also focused on the 
lack of attention of both the intelligence officials as well as policymakers to setting 
intelligence priorities. The emergence of transnational threats at the end of the Cold War 
resulted with more issues to be covered by the intelligence agencies with less sources 
and little guidance about how to prioritize among them. The 1996 House Intelligence 
Committee called the requirements process “one of the most vexing aspects of 
intelligence management” and called for creation of “an overarching concept for 
coordinating intelligence requirements, especially when faced with declining resources, 
a growing customer base, and increasingly diverse requirements”.65 The lack of 
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effective prioritizing process was criticized even five years later by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission, which was concerned with the “dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of 
important countries, regions, and functional challenges”.66 
As Zegart contends, of the 340 recommendations for changes of the U.S. 
intelligence community, only 35 were successfully implemented, and 268 – or 79 
percent of the total – resulted in no action at all.67 There was only one legislative 
initiative that attempted to implement the various commissions’ recommendations and 
one initiative that served as a starting point for all of the studies included in the 
Intelligence Reform Catalogue. This first attempt to reflect the changed situation of the 
post-Cold War world was made by Senator David Boren and Representative Dave 
McCurdy in 1992.68 Both of these legislators introduced two nearly identical proposals 
to reshape the structure of U.S. intelligence community including the replacement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence with a Director of National Intelligence, who was 
supposed to preside over four separate agencies – one for each category of intelligence 
collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) and the fourth for newly created agency 
responsible for analysis.69 Moreover, the DNI was supposed to have budget authority 
over all kinds of intelligence, including military. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was 
not adopted, and as Richard A. Best notes, “observers credited strong opposition from 
the Defense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with 
inhibiting passage of the legislation”.70 
The other main legislative initiative was the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
the 1997 Fiscal Year (FY1997), which attempted to act upon the recommendations of 
the Aspin-Brown Commission and the IC21 Study. Two deputy DCI positions were 
established, one for Deputy DCI and the other for a Deputy DCI for Community 
Management, both Senate-confirmed positions. Moreover, the act gave the DCI 
authority to develop and present to the President an annual budget for the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program and to participate in the development of a military 
intelligence budget. Despite the effort that went into the FY1997 legislation, attempts 
intended to enhance the DCI’s community-wide role were not fully implemented. The 
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FY1997 Act established four new Senate-confirmed positions having responsibilities 
that extended across all intelligence agencies. From its enactment until it was 
superseded by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Senate 
confirmed only two individuals to these positions, who both left office in 2003 and were 
never replaced. In addition, the DCI’s authorities in the preparation of budgets for all 
intelligence agencies had not been fully exercised.71 
Analysis of the intelligence reform catalogue data on various attempts to reform 
the U.S. intelligence community amid the growing threats of transnational terrorism 
indicates that intelligence officials as well as policymakers recognized the importance 
of these threats and the necessity to adapt to them. However, both legislators and 
intelligence specialists failed to achieve the necessary reforms to eliminate the 
deficiencies identified. Even after legislation implementing the recommendations was 
adopted, proponents of reform failed to oversee its full realization. The FY1997 Act is 
one example of such failures. There are a number of reasons why these attempts were 
thwarted. These reasons will be examined in the final section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Obstacles to Reform pre-9/11 
Answering the question why were the pre-9/11 recommendations largely 
ignored by intelligence officials as well as the policymakers requires a multifaceted 
perspective. The first and largest obstacle was the general aversion of organizations 
toward reform. Such resistance opposed both internal initiatives espousing change and 
external attempts imposed through legislation or executive action. The second obstacle 
is embedded in the very principles of American democracy, which are based on 
protection of civil liberties, as well as on the fragmentation and decentralization of the 
U.S. system of government. The third obstacle is based on the rational interests of the 
U.S. leaders, i.e. the tradeoffs between incentives for change and the actual capabilities 
to make the change, which largely effect the decision making of the U.S. leaders. This 
three level approach facilitates creating an explanatory model of resistance to reform of 
the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 despite the widespread recognition of the 
threat posed by terrorism during the 1990s. 
 
2.3.1. Organizational Obstacles 
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As noted in chapter 2, organizations in general do not change easily72, for 
government agencies change is even harder73, and for the intelligence community it is 
particularly so.74 All organizations have to overcome three types of problems when 
attempting to change: (1) bounded rationality75 – cognitive limits of individuals 
affecting the decision-making and management of organizations; (2) structural secrecy 
or information asymmetry76 – specialization of subunits preventing knowledge sharing; 
and (3) liability of time or institutional inertia77– growing resistance to change as 
routines, norms and relationships become established. As Amy Zegart contends, for 
government agencies these problems are heightened, because they lack three key 
advantages that the business organizations enjoy.78 
The first is the lack of market competition, which in private sector creates the 
incentives for reform to promote better efficiency and effectiveness if they want to 
survive. Government agencies do not face this immediate threat of diminishing or 
replacement due to poor performance. The Congress does have oversight capabilities. 
However, its powers to dissolve an intelligence agency are limited. 
The second advantage that government agencies lack is that the owners and 
employees of private companies generally want them to succeed and therefore create 
and support the incentives for change. On the contrary, government agencies’ reform is 
often thwarted by political opponents who obstruct the legislative process and thus limit 
the likelihood for success of reform. In the case of the U.S. intelligence community, the 
role of the Department of Defense lobby proved crucial as it effectively blocked many 
of the initiatives attempting to reorganize the community that would reduced its 
authority in any way.79 
The third disadvantage when comparing the government agencies to the private 
sector are the limits imposed on the actual managerial work of public sector officials, 
who are bound with bureaucratic red tape and have much less freedom in their decision-
making as opposed to managers of private companies. Intelligence officials serve many 
different consumers from the president, his advisors and members of the Congress, who 
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all have different and often conflicting preferences. This makes it very difficult to make 
internal adjustments.80 
 
2.3.2. Democratic Principles 
American democratic principles limited external intelligence reform in two 
ways. First, as was already mentioned above, there is the fragmented and decentralized 
political system based on separation of powers, congressional committee system, and 
majority rule. Within this system it is possible for political opponents to hinder the 
enactment of new legislation and thus curb or thwart any reform process altogether.81 
Another way in which the democratic process negatively influenced the 
intelligence reform attempts was its emphasis on civil liberties. Any change of the U.S. 
intelligence community, which would led to heightened domestic intelligence or 
cooperation of CIA on domestic affairs was immediately criticized. Such opposition 
was based on fears of limiting civil liberties and creating a “big brother” kind of 
institution – something highly unpopular with the American public.82 
 
2.3.3. Rational Decision-making 
The last obstacle is a result of the differing capabilities and incentives of 
decision-makers. Both the president and legislators are well-aware of the difficulty of 
enforcing a major intelligence reform. The general unpopularity of the topic among 
voters as well as the community itself lowers the decision-makers incentives even more. 
Moreover, national security bureaucrats promote their own interests. These are mostly 
adhering to the status quo as no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to any 
other ‘rival’ organization.83 
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2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. More 
specifically, this chapter has explored the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community 
to various reform initiatives during the 1990s. A variety of explanations have been used 
to account for such institutional resistance to comprehensive reform. One influential 
approach based on historical experience, suggests that real reform or change is only 
possible amid a catastrophe or crisis. Pearl Harbor and entrance into WWII were the 
impetus leading to the creation of the CIA and a subsequent restructuring of the whole 
system of the U.S. national security.  
Since the immediate post-war era, no major attempt to reorganize and reform the 
U.S. intelligence community had been successful until the enactment of the Intelligence 
and Prevention Terrorism Act. It seems that the post-Cold War change of threat 
environment did not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s 
intelligence services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence 
community was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was 
unprepared to prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Only after the events of 9/11 and from the perspective of hindsight did the 
deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community become widely visible and hence 
impossible to ignore. The question of whether the worst terrorist attack in the history of 
the United States was a catalyst strong enough to promote effective and efficient 
intelligence reform will be examined in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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3. 9/11 and its Aftermath: Searching for Answers and Solutions 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in American 
history. Their extent and brutality combined with the fact that they were carried out on 
the American soil provided unique opportunity not only for the reform of the U.S. 
intelligence community, but also for the biggest transformation of the U.S. government 
since 1947. Suddenly, the shocked American public was willing to sacrifice some of its 
civil liberties in exchange for protection. Also, the rational self-interests of the President 
as well as the legislators shifted towards support for the intelligence reform.  
After the first shock from 9/11 passed over, a wide-ranging debate was 
prompted over the role of intelligence in failing to recognize the threat and prevent the 
terrorist attacks. Two commissions were established to investigate the failure. First was 
the Joint Inquiry conducted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees and second was the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). The conclusions and 
recommendations of these committees pointed out some of the essential weaknesses 
within the intelligence community and became an important starting point for 
subsequent intelligence community reform.  
Moreover, in the immediate reaction to 9/11, President Bush and the U.S. 
Congress promoted other initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. These initiatives affected also the U.S. intelligence 
community. The first one, enactment of the USA Patriot Act had a positive impact as it 
removed the barriers of information sharing between the law enforcement and 
intelligence. The second initiative, the homeland security agenda, turned out to have a 
more ambiguous impact. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
responsible among other functions for domestic intelligence gathering and analysis 
created another level in the already fragmented intelligence community. Also, the 
creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) produced more confusion 
about the roles of intelligence community and the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. 
This chapter will present the main findings and recommendations of the Joint 
Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission. Thereafter, there will be an examination of the 
initiatives that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, such as the USA 
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Patriot Act, the development of homeland security agenda, and the creation of the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center and their implications for intelligence reform.   
As was the case with the pre-9/11 context of the U.S. intelligence community, 
these initiatives also serve as an input factor to the evaluation of the final outcome of the 
U.S. intelligence community reform, its efficiency and effectiveness (see Figure 1.1). 
 
3.1. Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations 
Shortly after 9/11, questions concerning the failure of intelligence to avert the 
terrorist attacks were raised. There was pressure to find out what had led to the attacks 
and who was responsible. Was the U.S. intelligence community properly organized for 
the transnational, non-state actor threats? Had policymakers known about the threat and 
failed to act? These were the types of questions that were asked both by the U.S. public 
as well as by the legislators themselves. It is apparent from the previous chapter that the 
threats were known and that there were many hints pointing to the insufficient 
organization of the intelligence community, however, only after 9/11, for the first time 
since the end of the Cold War, people actually seemed to pay attention. 
First, the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Intelligence Committees established a Joint Inquiry with three principal goals: (1) to 
conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have 
known prior to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the 
United States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist 
attacks against the United States and its interests; (2) identify and examine any systemic 
problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or 
preventing these attacks in advance; and (3) to make recommendations to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist 
attacks.84 
Among the main findings of the Joint Inquiry was that “prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was neither well-organized, nor well-equipped, and did not 
adequately adapt to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets 
within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage 
provided by U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities.”85 Put simply, as the 
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Joint Inquiry recognized, the intelligence community was not properly organized for a 
transnational threat such as al Qaeda. 
Other findings included: (1) the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy both on governmental as well as intelligence level; (2) inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources and problematic intelligence community budgeting practices and 
procedures; (3) inefficient use of new technology and reliance on outdated technologies, 
thus having a negative impact on collaboration between the intelligence community 
agencies as well as their adaption to the nature of the terrorist threats; (4)  lack of 
incentives for analytical positions, which were seen as dead-end jobs in the community 
and which led to analytic deficiencies, thus seriously undercutting the ability of U.S. 
policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat; (5) lack of information sharing 
not only between intelligence community agencies, but also within individual agencies, 
and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, and also between 
intelligence community and relevant non-intelligence community agencies, such as law 
enforcement and border protection; (6) lack of reliable and knowledgeable human 
sources; (7) lengthy and perilous application process for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance leading to a diminished level of FBI coverage of 
suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States; (8) lack of strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.86 
 In its final report, the Joint Inquiry proposed nineteen recommendations, which 
included establishing a powerful new director of national intelligence, revamping the 
intelligence priority process, and considering whether new domestic intelligence agency 
should replace the FBI. However, as M. Kent Bolton contends, the Joint Inquiry’s 
thorough work – it studied some one million documents and interviewed some 500 
persons – “raised more questions than it answered; it thereby provided an impetus for 
subsequent postmortems.”87 This succeeding task was undergone by the 9/11 
Commission, the mother of all postmortems. 
 The 9/11 Commission built on the findings of the Joint Inquiry and added some 
more insights stemming from 1200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of various 
documents. The 9/11 Commission took the reshaping of the U.S. intelligence into a new 
level. Gregory Treverton points out that “its report was dramatic and made several 
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recommendations – primarily to reshape the organization of U.S. intelligence but also to 
begin to change the way it does business.”88 
 Regarding intelligence, the 9/11 Commission identified six problems, which 
created the need to restructure intelligence: (1) structural barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work – the problem of organizing national intelligence around collection 
disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission; (2) lack of common standards 
and practices across the foreign-domestic divide that created the inability to pool 
information gathered abroad with information gathered in the United States; (3) divided 
management of national intelligence capabilities, which limited influence of the DCI 
over the three intelligence agencies housed within the Department of Defense (the NSA, 
the NGA, and the NRO); (4) weak capacity of the DCI to set priorities and move 
resources; (5) too many tasks carried out by the DCI – the fact that DCI had three jobs 
as head of the community, principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters, and 
head of the CIA combined with his weak authorities even limited his managerial 
abilities; (6) too complex and secret nature of intelligence community, which made 
public comprehension of the intelligence agencies and the rules surrounding them 
impossible.89 
 Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission recognized the fact that even though the 
DCI was responsible for community performance, it lacked three authorities critical for 
any agency head or chief executive officer: control over purse strings, the ability to hire 
or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure 
and personnel.90 In order to address these problems the 9/11 Commission made six 
broad proposals, which underscored the need not only to create the technical 
infrastructure to better share intelligence but also to rethink the perspective of “need-to-
know” and other security requirements that frustrated sharing. The 9/11 principal 
recommendations were to91: 
 
• Create the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), located in 
the White House and possessing real authority over the budgets of the fifteen 
U.S. intelligence agencies 
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• Institute a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reporting to the DNI, 
responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence 
• Establish national intelligence centers, organized around discrete issues on 
the model of the NCTC, under the authority of the DNI 
• Make the CIA director a position separate from the DNI and charge him 
primarily with building better espionage capacity for the nation 
• Rethink the web of “need-to know” and other security procedures that 
frustrate not just sharing but also intelligence work as whole 
• Not to create a separate domestic-intelligence service, instead to encourage 
the FBI to move forward with changing its mission from pure law 
enforcement to terrorism prevention  
 
The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations fit to each of the 
four categories (lack of “corporateness”, personnel/information sharing, strategic 
mission and priorities, and human intelligence) of the twelve pre-9/11 commissions and 
task forces’ proposals for reform. Therefore, it is possible to see some consistency in the 
pre- and post-9/11 attempts to reform the U.S. intelligence community. As chapter 2 
showed, the pre-9/11 attempts were generally ignored by the decision-makers and 
resisted by the intelligence agencies themselves. The general idea behind the 9/11 
Commission reform proposal was that after 9/11 the incentives for adoption of the 
reform have changed and it was therefore possible to usher in a sweeping reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community. The next chapter will address this assumption.  
But before we move to an interpretation of the implementation of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, it is important to pay attention to other developments, 
which happened simultaneously with the work of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 
Commission.  
 
3.2. Immediate Reaction and its Implications for Intelligence Reform 
The surprise of the 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in sweeping response of the 
Bush administration and the U.S. Congress in order to boost domestic counterterrorist 
policies. This immediate reaction included enactment of the USA Patriot Act, 
development of a homeland security agenda and subsequently the establishment of the 
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Department of Homeland Security. Both of the initiatives had implications for the 
intelligence community reform. 
 
3.2.1. USA Patriot Act 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration presented Congress 
with proposals to expand police and prosecutorial powers to enhance the fight against 
terrorism”.92 Six weeks later, these proposals culminated in the adoption of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA Patriot Act93. It passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by wide margins – 375 to 66 and 98 to 1 respectively.94 
As a result of the speedy manner in which Congress presented (Oct. 23), debated, and 
implemented this policy (voting in the House was held on Oct. 24 and in the Senate on 
Oct. 25) there was little controversy surrounding its inception.95 
The main aim of the USA Patriot Act was to strengthen the abilities of the U.S. 
government agencies to collect and share information regarding ongoing investigations 
of terror plots. And also to enable the U.S. government to be better equipped to identify, 
investigate, follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists. Among the most 
important provisions included in the act were:96 
 
• It allowed for federal warrants to be effective nationwide and no longer 
limited to special districts; 
• It enabled law enforcement to obtain subpoena power for alleged terrorists’ 
communications, including fixed and wireless telephones, e-mail, web 
surfing, as well as unopened voice mail and e-mail; 
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• It attached roving wiretaps to alleged terrorists and thereby eliminated the 
need for the government to request wiretaps for specific telephone numbers 
as previously required; 
• It improved coordination and cooperation, such as information gathering 
between US intelligence and law enforcement investigators, with respect to 
terrorist organizations; 
• It allowed law enforcement to use new subpoena power to obtain payment 
information such as credit card or bank account numbers, of suspected 
terrorists who are utilizing the Internet; 
• It created rules to counter terrorists’ access to, and use of illicit funds as well 
as to prevent or impede other improper terrorist activities; 
• To punish those who aid or harbor terrorists. 
 
The importance of the USA Patriot Act with regards to the U.S. intelligence was 
embedded in the provisions which enhanced domestic surveillance as an amendment of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Also, the Act provided for possible 
sharing of information on criminal probes between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government. Thus, eliminating one of the main 
deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence criticized even before 9/11. 
However, from the point of promoting substantial intelligence reform, the USA 
Patriot Act was only a quick fix, which did not (and was not intended to) address the 
structural deficiencies of the intelligence community. 
 
3.2.2. Homeland Security 
The U.S. government also moved in another direction, as President Bush started 
to focus more on creating a broad concept of a unified approach to protecting the 
homeland against future terrorist threats. This strategy also had an intelligence element, 
however there were many problems connected with the homeland security agenda. 
The first steps taken in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken already less than one month after the attacks. On October 8, 
2001 Tom Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and the Director of the newly established Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS). The Office’s mission was to “develop and coordinate the 
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implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks. The Office’s objective was to coordinate the executive branch’s 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”97 
At the end of October 2002, the Homeland Security Council was created by the 
President. Again, Tom Ridge was put in charge of this council. Among the members of 
the HSC were: the President and the Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
and Health Care, the Attorney General, the Director of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Director of FBI, and the Director of CIA. The HSC’s role was to 
ensure the coordination of all homeland security related activities across the whole 
spectrum of federal, state and local offices and agencies. 
However, this model of so called “presidential advisor” proved insufficient. “In 
particular, critical voices in Congress pointed to inherent weaknesses in Ridge’s post. 
Without any budget authority, they argued, the Homeland Security czar lacked 
sufficient human and financial resources, had no way to enforce decisions, and relied 
primarily on the power of persuasion, albeit as a trusted advisor with unfettered access 
to President Bush.”98 On the other hand, there also existed fears of Ridge’s excessive 
influence that went beyond congressional accountability. These fears led Democratic 
senator Joe Lieberman to propose in May 2002 a full-scale reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy and a creation of a new department dealing with the questions of homeland 
security. Even though President Bush had previously rejected proposals for such full-
scale government reorganization, the need for this change became imminent. Therefore, 
in June 2002, President Bush introduced his own proposal that “sought to maximize 
presidential influence over any new cabinet-level department”.99  
In his speech to the nation on June 6, 2002,100 President Bush emphasized the 
need for essential reorganization of government by creating the Department of 
Homeland Security that would help the government to deal more effectively with the 
new threats of the 21st century. The new National Strategy for Homeland Security 
prepared by Ridge’s OHS team was also introduced by the President in this speech. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued on July 16 2002, 
introduced three main strategic objectives of combating terrorism on the domestic level: 
“(1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur.”101 The homeland security strategy was divided into six key mission areas 
within which the strategy was supposed to operate. The first three areas were focused on 
the first objective of prevention, other two focused on the second aim of reducing 
vulnerability and the last focused on damage minimization and recovery. The 
framework of six critical mission areas was established as follows: 
 
• Intelligence and Warning area, which included creation of an integrated 
federal approach to gathering, analysis, production, and sharing of 
information from both classified and open sources; 
• Border and Transportation Security area, which was aimed at preventing 
terrorists and terrorist materiel in entering the country by creating an 
interconnected system of border and transport infrastructure control that 
simultaneously secures the legitimate flow of people and goods; 
• Domestic Counterterrorism area, which was focused on support for old and 
evolution of new intelligence and law enforcement efforts to identify 
terrorists and their supporters, prevents them from carrying attacks, and to 
arrest and prosecute them; 
• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets area, which involved 
precise and complete identification and prioritization of the U.S. 
infrastructure, including virtual networks, and assessment of consequences 
and connections among the infrastructures; 
• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats area, which was primarily focused 
on detection, deterrence, prevention, and management of the consequences 
of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response area, which was aimed at 
minimizing the damage and rapid recovering from terrorist attacks which 
may occur. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security also identified the Department’s key role 
“as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions involved in homeland 
security”102 and its main challenge in developing “complementary systems that avoid 
duplication and ensure essential requirements are met”103. Moreover, it stressed that in 
order to meet the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination must be increased 
“in law enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy 
development and implementation so that public and private resources are better aligned 
to secure the homeland”.104  
According to Chris Hornbarger, “prior to 9/11, eleven of fourteen cabinet 
departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Veterans Affairs), plus a host of 
independent and subordinate agencies (for example, the CIA, and FEMA) bore 
substantial responsibility for key aspects of homeland security”.105 This situation has 
changed with the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the 
Homeland Security Act enactment on November 25, 2002.106 The new department 
combined twenty two agencies with approximately 180,000 employees including “such 
disparate organizations as: the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
(Transportation), the Secret Service (Treasury), FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FBI), and the Critical Infrastructures Assurance Office 
(Commerce)”.107 It became the fifteenth department in the history of U.S. government 
and a third biggest department of the Bush administration. 
One of the DHS’s four directorates, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate (IAIP) was intended to fulfill one of the most critical homeland 
security functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of 
information. It was tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information 
about terrorist threats to the United States, assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. 
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infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant 
federal, state, and local officials. It was to “fuse and analyze intelligence and other 
information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources – including the 
CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT and data gleaned from other 
organizations.”108 However, it had neither the power to collect intelligence nor any 
tasking authority over other agencies. Rather than integrating the CIA, FBI and other 
agencies, the IAIP had to beg to obtain information from them.109 Both the CIA and the 
FBI strongly resisted handing over significant power to the DHS. And both agencies 
increased, rather than decreased their homeland security functions. According to Seth 
Jones, “White House and congressional support for DHS faded quickly. Most 
policymakers believed either that DHS was unable to perform terrorist threat analysis 
adequately, or that other departments within the federal government could do it 
better.”110 
 
3.2.3. Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
In a rather surprising move, President Bush circumvented the newly established 
DHS’s intelligence directorate and proposed an establishment of a new Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in January 2003.111 The TTIC was created under the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the 
president and federal agencies on terrorist threats – the very task originally envisioned 
for the DHS. 
The TTIC was designed to integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information 
collected domestically and abroad and to design a database of known and suspected 
terrorists that could be accessed by federal, state, and local officials across the United 
States. It was also focused on examining regional threats, such as Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It 
was staffed by representatives from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the 
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Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, NGA, and Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Even though, it was legally not part of the CIA (officially it reported to the 
DCI), in practice the distinction was much less clear as the CIA effectively controlled 
its functions – it was placed under the CIA’s budget and was located at CIA 
headquarters.112 As with the case of the IAIP, its mandate was very vague, concentrating 
on analysis not on driving collection with no attempt to shift the intelligence community 
organizational paradigm. Thus, it had only added another fragment to the already 
disjointed intelligence community structure. 
Although created to improve coordination and sharing, the TTIC has caused 
confusion within the federal government about the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. Its creation duplicated functions of the IAIP and greatly undermined its mandate. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
President Bush and the U.S. Congress reacted to the shock of 9/11 events in a 
number of distinct ways that have had far reaching consequences for the intelligence 
community. First, Congress decided to study the intelligence failure through its Joint 
Inquiry, while simultaneously adopting legislation on improving enhancing domestic 
surveillance and removing limits on domestic and foreign information sharing 
embedded in the USA Patriot Act. In contrast, President Bush focused on promoting a 
new homeland security agenda, which originally contained an intelligence aspect but 
was weakened by the creation of the TTIC.  
One fundamental implication of all of these new security policies was that none 
of these initiatives presented a comprehensive plan of how to integrate the wide ranging 
activities of the intelligence community, change agencies’ incentives and cultures to 
enhance information sharing, match intelligence resources against priorities, reform the 
FBI or improve human intelligence. By the time the Joint Inquiry’s findings and 
recommendations which were published in 2002, the immediate momentum for 
substantial reform of the U.S. intelligence community was already gone. The 9/11 
Commission, backed by enormous media coverage and pressure from the 9/11 victims 
families, was more successful in pushing for implementation of its recommendations. 
However, as will be argued in the next chapter, its proposals for “sweeping” reforms 
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were mitigated during the congressional debate over the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act. 
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4. Implementation of the post-9/11 Recommendations: Bringing about 
the Reform? 
The debate over intelligence reform following the release of the 9/11 
Commission report presented an opportunity to make far-reaching changes to create a 
more effective and efficient U.S. intelligence community. However, due to pertaining 
rational self-interest decision making processes and inability to overrule heightened 
opposition in Congress, the potential for substantial reform was not materialized. 
Moreover, because the newly created position of the Director of National Intelligence 
was not given such authorities as was suggested in the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, it became difficult for him to promote policies, which would have 
effectively enabled him to overcome the internal resistance to reform within the 
intelligence organizations. 
This chapter will first focus on the process of adopting the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The legislative debate that 
accompanied its enactment and its major provisions will be introduced. Then, the actual 
impact of the IRTPA on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community 
will be evaluated, both in terms of the newly created institutions – the DNI and the 
NCTC, as well as from the point of view of the old institutions – the FBI and the CIA. 
The analysis and evaluation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations’ 
implementation and the consequent character of the intelligence community after the 
enactment of the IRTPA presented in this chapter can be interpreted as the output 
perspective of the input-output methodological model (see Figure 1.1) examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
 
4.1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
The 9/11 Commission final report was issued in July 2004 and was followed by 
an immediate congressional response. Throughout the course of its work, the 9/11 
Commission received extensive media coverage, which gave rise to public pressure on 
the Congress to act on the recommendations. Also, a significant lobby was set up 
around the 9/11 victim families pushing for the implementations of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. These forces speeded up the legislative process and 
both the Senate and the House began to draft implementing legislation. 
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4.1.1. Intelligence Reform Legislative Process Background 
Both versions of bill focused mainly on the two central recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission: the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The original DNI proposal 
suggested authorities for the individual to oversee all-source national intelligence 
centers, serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, manage the national 
intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence 
community. Included in his powers were supposed to be the responsibility for 
submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating fund to the intelligence agencies, 
and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community.113  
The NCTC recommendation was designed to address the intelligence 
community’s structural problems, particularly the lack of an appropriate entity for 
performing executive branch–wide counterterrorism operational planning. It was 
supposed to be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies. Its focus was envisaged to be on counterterrorism 
and it was supposed to have responsibility for integrating the intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities against terrorism. Its aim was to be the preeminent body for analyzing 
terrorism and assessing the terrorist threat.114 
The Senate bill followed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations more closely, 
while the House bill provided for a far less powerful director. The House bill covered a 
wide range of counterterrorism issues, including immigration and criminal penalties. 
Glenn Hastedt summed up the differences between the bills: “Under the Senate bill, the 
CIA director ‘shall’ be under the authority, direction, and control’ of the national 
intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only ‘report’ to the 
National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence 
Director the power to develop budgets and give ‘guidance’ to intelligence community 
members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would ‘determine’ the budget. The 
Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the 
Director’s high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil 
liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.”115 
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The main opposition against the bill came from the House Republicans led by 
the chair of House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Essentially, Hunter was 
a protégé of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in Congress. Similar to 
previous attempts to reform the intelligence community, Department of Defense 
officials, now led by Rumsfeld, strongly opposed any proposals changing the structure 
and streamlining the intelligence community. These changes were traditionally 
perceived by Pentagon as a threat to its control over defense intelligence agencies and 
over the vast share of the intelligence budget. Thus, the Defense Department leadership 
tried to discredit the reform by all means, both privately during classified hearings, and 
publicly when General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered 
a bombshell letter to the House Armed Services Committee. “In the letter, Meyers 
opposed giving the proposed director of national intelligence strong budgetary 
authorities over intelligence agencies housed in the Pentagon arguing that only a 
Pentagon-controlled budget would ensure sufficient ‘support to the warfighters’.”116 
Moreover, the presidential support to the Senate version of the bill remained 
lukewarm.117 At a time of ongoing War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the President did nothing to stop the Defense Department lobby. He simply avoided 
fighting his own Department of Defense over intelligence reform at war time. 
According to Michael Turner, “President Bush had to look like he was pushing the bill 
but would in fact prefer to see the proposal die”.118 And that is why he, at the end, 
recommended the passage of a bill that conformed to the House version, establishing a 
weak DNI and keeping the Defense Department in charge of its intelligence agencies. 
The final bill was adopted 89-2 in the Senate and 336-75 in the House.119 The president 
then signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 on 
December 17, 2004. 
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4.1.2. Major Provisions of the IRTPA 
The IRTPA was divided into eight titles:120 (I) Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; (II) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (III) Security Clearances; (IV) 
Transportation Security (V) Border Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters; (VI) 
Terrorism Prevention; (VII) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations; (VIII) Other Matters.  
Under Article I, the IRTPA created a Senate confirmed DNI separate from the 
CIA director, responsible for leading the intelligence community and for serving as 
principal adviser to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland 
Security Council. The DNI was given several important authorities and 
responsibilities.121 
Determining the Intelligence Budget122. The DNI has been tasked to determine 
the intelligence budget proposal submitted to the President for consideration and 
submission to Congress. With regards to the military portions of the budget, the 
legislation has stated that the DNI shall participate in the development by the Secretary 
of Defense of the annual budgets of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. However, the scope of the participation was 
not specified by the legislation. 
Managing the Execution of the Intelligence Appropriation. Contrary to the 9/11 
Commission recommendation, the IRTPA has kept the intelligence appropriation 
classified, thus keeping the intelligence funding hidden in other departments’ 
appropriations and being received straight through the departments’ budgets. However, 
the legislation has given the DNI control over the funds flowing through the 
departments to the intelligence agencies through exclusive direction to the Office of 
Management and Budget with respect to the apportionment of funds drawn on the U.S. 
Treasury. The legislation has also permitted the DNI to audit and monitor how 
departments are expending the funds.  
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Transferring Funds and Personnel. The DNI has not been given a full authority 
over the agencies funds and personnel. The DNI has only been allowed to move up to 
$150 million from agencies per fiscal year to meet emerging threats, provided that the 
funds moved are less than 5 percent of an agency’s intelligence funding and that the 
fund movement does not terminate an acquisition program. The DNI has been given 
authority to move personnel during the DNI’s start-up phase. The DNI might make 
additional personnel transfers pursuant to joint procedures agreed upon with department 
secretaries. The legislation thus deleted the provisions of prior law that a department 
secretary may veto the DCI’s transfer of intelligence funds and personnel and that FBI 
funds and personnel are exempt from any transfer.  
Hiring Senior Officials. The DNI has received strengthened authority to select 
senior officials. As under prior law, the Secretary of Defense must seek the DNI’s 
concurrence before submitting a recommendation to the president for the Directors of 
the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National 
Reconnaissance Office. However, the Secretary of Defense may not forward a 
recommendation to the president if the DNI objects. The same arrangement has been 
maintained for the selection of the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and 
research, the assistant secretary of homeland security for information analysis, and other 
senior officials across the intelligence community with the respective department heads. 
But importantly, the DNI has not received the authority to remove anyone from their 
position. 
Another important provision, which aimed to change the intelligence 
community’s strategic operational planning, was establishment of the statute of National 
Intelligence Centers (created based on geographic and transnational topics according to 
the DNI’s and NSC’s priorities). Under the IRTPA, the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) and the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) were formed.123  
The centers and other entities that the DNI might have wanted to create were to 
be housed in an administrative body called the Office of the DNI (ODNI). The ODNI is 
technically an independent agency because it is not located within any other executive 
branch department or entity. The DNI’s staff has also been located in the Office of the 
DNI.  
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The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been made responsible for 
integrating the intelligence agencies’ capabilities, designing preeminent 
counterterrorism analysis and proposing collection requirements to the DNI to guide the 
agencies’ collection activities. The NCTC’s other function established under the IRTPA 
was to engage in planning for counterterrorism operations across the executive branch. 
However, the actual description of the planning work has remained fairly vague in the 
IRTPA, because “it existed in a gray area between high-level strategy and detailed, 
tactical planning”.124 
Other provisions of the IRTPA focused on the problem of improving the 
domestic intelligence capabilities of the FBI (Title II). The IRTPA directed specific 
instructions for the FBI to change fundamentally the FBI’s orientation and culture. The 
Director of the FBI was ordered “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated 
national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance 
specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the 
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with 
substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.”125 
Moreover, the IRTPA paid vast attention to provisions concerning homeland 
security and improving the counterterrorism prevention as well as response. The 
provisions under Title VI (Terrorism Prevention) were aimed at enhancing the ability of 
the DHS to stop terrorists before they reach the U. S. borders, and to stop money-
laundering practices that support terrorism. Other sections and titles were also devoted 
to transportation security and border protection, thus stretching the overall reach of the 
IRTPA. 
 
In summary, the 9/11 Commission was one of the very few commissions to ever 
see its recommendations successfully codified into law. However, the IRTPA’s actual 
impact was mitigated by the ambiguity of its language. The vagueness of the legislation 
was a product of the congressional compromise and strong Defense Department lobby 
protecting its “turf”. Even thought the adoption of the IRTPA improved the situation of 
central management of the U.S. intelligence community, it did not vest enough 
authorities to the DNI to be able to overcome the obstructions to the intelligence 
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community reform from both the agencies themselves, as well as from the DOD 
leadership. Moreover, the fact that the IRTPA focused in most part on other fixes in 
homeland security also contributed to its ambiguous impact on the intelligence 
community reform. The actual development of the establishment and functions of the 
new agencies with the intelligence community, the DNI and the NCTC, as well as the 
impact of the IRTPA on the old agencies, the FBI and the CIA, will be examined and 
evaluated in the following subchapters. 
 
4.2. Intelligence Community after the Reform Act126 
This subchapter will focus on evaluation of the newly established institutions in 
the IRTPA, the DNI and the NCTC. The key question is whether their creation 
essentially led to better efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism mission. 
 
4.2.1. Director of National Intelligence 
According to Gordon Lederman, “the Executive Branch’s implementation of the 
2004 act began without the necessary vigor.”127 The first DNI, Ambassador John 
Negroponte, was an accomplished diplomat and policymaker, but he lacked working 
knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and substantial experience in leading and 
transforming large organizations. Negroponte decided to take on his role in the same 
fashion as his DCI predecessors and quickly absorbed two key intelligence functions – 
providing the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and overseeing the production of the 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Thus, 
Negroponte became, as was required by the law, the president’s chief intelligence 
briefer as well as chief analyst. However, giving a good substantive briefing takes time 
– according to some up to 60 percent.128 And as Arthur Hulnick points out, “if the DNI 
had nothing else to do, then serving as the government’s chief intelligence analyst might 
make sense. But he is supposed to be managing the intelligence system, including 
overseeing the budget process, arranging long-range planning, and other matters of 
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interagency concern.”129 It is possible to say that while Ambassador Negroponte 
solidified his position as the chief intelligence officer, he certainly failed to fulfill his 
position as the chief executive officer of the intelligence community. 
One of the major problems of implementing the IRTPA is that the legislation 
was giving the DNI considerable responsibility but not enough power and authority 
especially when faced with Defense Department resistance. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld successfully pushed for establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, “which was widely viewed as an attempt to block the DNI’s effort to gain 
effective authority over DOD intelligence functions.”130 All Defense Department 
intelligence agencies were made subordinate to this new Director of Military 
intelligence-like position. Thus, the DNI’s actual power over the DOD agencies has 
remained quite limited. 
Also the creation of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) proved problematic. Patrick 
Neary contends that the problem began with Negroponte’s inability to clearly articulate 
the ODNI’s mission. “Rather than the engine of change, the ODNI became the fulcrum 
of competing notions of reform.”131 On top of its unclear mission, the ODNI expanded 
into aggrandizing 1500 staff positions, even though originally it was supposed to be 
limited to about 500 people.132 Such growth of bureaucratic layering certainly was not 
something envisaged in the attempts for efficient reform. 
In 2006, Ambassador Negroponte resigned from the position of the DNI and was 
replaced by seemingly much better fit for the position, retired Admiral Mike 
McConnell. Former NSA director with decades of experience in U.S. intelligence was 
confirmed in January 2007. DNI McConnell began his tenure by issuing a 100-day plan, 
followed by a 500-day plan for the intelligence community. They were based on a 
number of initiatives such as: (1) Create a Culture of Collaboration; (2) Foster 
Collection and Analytic Transformation; (3) Build Acquisition Excellence and 
Technology Leadership; (4) Modernize Business Practices; (5) Accelerate Information 
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Sharing; (6) Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities.133 Both of the plans focused on better 
management and provided “an intellectual structure for considering intelligence reform 
more methodically.”134 Even though the change on the working level remained 
limited,135 the rhetoric and McConnell’s approach to the DNI’s position certainly led to 
a better sense of corporateness and leadership within the intelligence community. 
 In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was succeeded by Robert 
Gates, a former DCI in December 2006, which subsequently led to easing of tension and 
improved relationship between the DNI and the Defense Department during the final 
months of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, some other serious problems 
remained, especially on the level of coordination and oversight of the old agencies and 
within the newly created NCTC such as deficiencies regarding security clearances and 
personnel management. 
 
4.2.2. National Counterterrorism Center 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to give boost to 
information sharing and analysis. It has taken over and expanded the TTIC’s mission 
and became a hub for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence across the community. 
The NCTC was presented as the most successful improvement of the intelligence 
community – the grand jewel of intelligence reform. Different agency officials were 
supposed to sit in one room and draft collective analysis on terrorist threats. The IRTPA 
“in order to promote and facilitate rotations to the new center, required rotational 
assignments for promotion within the intelligence community, and created specific 
incentives for service in national intelligence centers.”136  
However, even if the rules allow it, organizational barriers still block 
information sharing. According to Amy Zegart, “because NCTC’s analysts have varying 
levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they still see different 
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pieces of information.”137 Arthur Hulnick also points out that “CIA security officials did 
not accept the clearances of officers from other agencies without doing their own 
security checks, and that even a CIA officer had to get a new clearance because he 
would be using a different computer system than the one for which he already had 
access.”138 This kind of bureaucratic pathology is very baffling given the amount of 
criticism and pressure for improvement was imposed on information sharing after 9/11. 
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project issued a report card 
assessing implementation of its recommendations. Information sharing efforts received 
a grade D.139 Two years later, one intelligence officer offered a similarly discouraging 
progress report and underscored that “most of the sharing issues we face are cultural and 
process rather than technology.”140 However, the technological problems should not be 
overlooked as the agencies’ intelligence databases use different software mostly 
incompatible with each other. 
Moreover, according to Zegart, “most U.S. intelligence agencies have no 
experience conducting all-source analysis, so the personnel they assign to the NCTC is 
learning on the job.”141 However, with inexperienced analyst and obstructions to their 
actual work, the quality of analysis is hampered. Also, within the respected agencies, 
rotational assignments are not promoted as they should be. They are still seen more as a 
necessary evil than as a prestigious mission to which the brightest analysts should be 
nominated. And once part of the NCTC the analysts continue their loyalty to their 
parent agencies rather than to the NCTC mission itself.142 
The idea of rotational assignments was one of the key initiatives in transforming 
the intelligence community into – in President Bush’s words – a single, unified 
enterprise.143 In order to accomplish this task creation of a notion of jointness was 
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required.144 However, the process of joint duty has been largely circumvented by 
intelligence professionals. But as Patrick Neary concludes, “joint duty is a means to an 
end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission 
accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur 
without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional 
workforce.”145 
 
To sum up, evaluating performance of the newly created agencies clearly shows 
that deficiencies pertain. The key problem is the inability of the DNI to overcome the 
cultural patterns embedded in the U.S. intelligence community’s institutional 
environment. These obstacles than make it difficult for the DNI, already weakened by 
some of the provisions of the IRTPA not granting him enough authority, to fully 
coordinate the intelligence community into a unified enterprise efficient and effective in 
countering the terrorist threats. While for the new institutions the problem lays in the 
inability to coordinate, for the old institutions, such as the FBI and the CIA, as will be 
shown in the last part of this chapter, the problem is to adapt. Nevertheless, the main 
obstacles to the reform for both are deeply rooted in the organizational structure, culture 
and practices. 
 
4.3. FBI’s and CIA’s Internal  Attempts to Implement Reform 
Due to the severe criticism for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11, the 
FBI has set forth ambitious changes in order to redefine itself from an agency that 
investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence 
before attacks occur. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its 
counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence. It is important to 
note that these actions were motivated in part by FBI’s desire to remain the lead 
counterterrorism agency for homeland threats as voices calling for creation of 
completely new domestic intelligence agency and or creating a domestic intelligence 
element within the DHS sprung during the post-9/11 discussions. 
According to Seth Jones, “FBI Director Robert Mueller tried to change the FBI’s 
traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the 
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hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and 
policymakers at headquarters. He implemented a major reorganization and increased 
resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were 
permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism.”146  
Moreover, an Operations Center was established to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information sharing and collaboration. Also 66 new Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 
the country were created, which included state and local law enforcement officers, and 
FBI agents. The FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive 
Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office was 
responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI 
investigations and overall strategies. It was the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating 
intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the 
U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state 
and local law enforcement, and the private sector. Each FBI field office was also put 
under a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s 
intelligence functions in that field office.147  
Despite these major changes, the law enforcement organizational culture largely 
prevails. Most problematic is the position of analysts within the FBI structure. 
According to Arthur Hulnick, “analysts were recruited or borrowed, primarily from 
other intelligence analytic units, but soon found that they were second-class citizens in a 
system that valued the Special Agents more than the analysts.”148 The FBI’s own 
guidelines divide its employees to only two groups Special Agents and “other support 
professionals”, thus putting analysts into a same group with cleaning people or truck 
drivers.149 Amy Zegart also refers to this problem contending that “the bureau rules still 
mandate that senior positions in the field, including the top spot in every U.S. field 
office, be staffed by FBI special agents.”150 These provisions essentially preclude any 
career moves for the FBI analysts. 
 Efforts to improve the FBI’s obsolete technology systems have also been 
unsuccessful and very costly. After two attempts to acquire a technology modernization 
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program, the FBI still does not have a modern and effective case management record 
system.151 
 Even though that the FBI has attempted the most ambitious changes, the results 
are disappointing and greatly inefficient given the amount of attention and resources 
allocated to consolidate its domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. It seems 
that most of the proposed changes have been unable to break the law enforcement way 
of thinking within the agency, despite the fact that its official mission has been restated 
to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats 
first, and to uphold and enforce the criminal laws second. 
The CIA has not adapted well to the post-9/11 changes either. For most of the 
time, it has been an agency in turmoil. Due to numerous scandals both of its foreign 
operations (the black sites scandal152) as well as its leadership (Porter J. Goss 
scandal153), the morale has been on a low. The IRTPA ordered the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency to rebuild CIA’s analytical capabilities, transform the clandestine 
services by building its human intelligence capabilities, develop a stronger language 
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives, emphasize recruiting 
diversity among operation officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities, and to 
ensure a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection 
at the operational level. It has also “instructed the CIA and the Department of Defense 
to work better together in coordinating their respective intelligence domains.”154  
The CIA has attempted to increase its domestic intelligence powers first through 
its Counterterrorist Center and then through the TTIC, which was placed under the 
CIA’s budget and headquarters. Even when the independent NCTC was created, the 
CIA provided its analysts but focused more on protecting its own turf by not sharing all 
of its information, which was explained by differences in clearances.  
With regards to improving HUMINT capabilities, obstacles also prevail. The 
recruitment process of new HUMINT agents is bounded by the old rules of secrecy and 
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fear of moles. According to Arthur Hulnick, the old “paranoia remains, but is now 
focused on the possibility that a jihadi will get on the inside. Thus, applicants who have 
the right languages and ethnic background are being kept out by the fear of penetration. 
Most damaging is the reluctance on the part of security officials to clear people who 
come from backgrounds abroad that they find questionable.”155 Moreover, completing 
security forms and waiting for the background checks and the polygraph exams that 
many agencies demand still takes months, and this selection process is discouraging 
potential recruits.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 clearly shows that even 
though attempts to substantially reform the U.S. intelligence community into a single 
united enterprise with the aim and strategy of fighting transnational terrorist threats 
were made, real change has not to date reached the standard that was originally 
envisaged. Such an outcome is surprising given the strong public reaction to the events 
of 9/11 and the enthusiasm the legislative and executive branches of government 
exhibited for improving intelligence gathering and coordination. The evidence presented 
in this chapter points to a number of reasons for the failure of reform of the intelligence 
community to match expectations.  
The legislative negotiations surrounding the IRTPA bill were strongly 
influenced by a robust Defense Department lobby and combined with only lukewarm 
attention from President Bush resulted in adoption of a very vague and ambiguous piece 
of legislation. On paper, the newly created DNI has many responsibilities as well as 
authorities. However, the actual powers are much less significant and have not enabled 
the DNI to overpower the Department of Defense or overcome resistance to reform 
within the old intelligence agencies. Thus, the DNI’s ability to coordinate the U.S. 
intelligence community has been impaired. Moreover, the burgeoning size of the Office 
of the DNI has raised questions about unnecessary levels of bureaucratic layering, 
which is not helping attempts to building a more efficient intelligence community.  
Another important factor in explaining the limited success of the reform agenda 
is the organizational culture of the old intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Their 
debilitating sense of agency parochialism, a belief in the overriding importance of 
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security, and the “need-to-know” principle of secrecy makes them extremely resistant to 
change even amid a crisis on the scale of 9/11.  
However, it can be argued that although the intelligence community is not 
working efficiently even after the reform, it is nonetheless effective in preventing 
terrorist attacks from happening. This is largely due to the fact that in the past nine 
years, U.S. intelligence spending has roughly doubled. The DNI publicly released the 
figure of $47.5 billion for the FY2008 National Intelligence program. An earlier release 
by the then DCI Tenet for FY1998 was a $26.7 billion aggregate budget for NFIP,156 
JMIP and TIARA.157 This growth in funds has undoubtedly helped to improve U.S. 
intelligence community functioning, i.e. its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of a 
9/11 type attack. However, it remains an open question as to whether these funds have 
been used as efficiently as they might have been given the aims of the intelligence 
reform agenda. At present, the answer to this ‘efficiency’ question appears to be 
negative. Because of the organizational obstacles, money was not efficiently spent on 
technological improvements, on the HUMINT recruitment, nor on information sharing 
or unifying security clearances.  
The result of the U.S. intelligence reform then is a system that is effective, that is 
able to prevent terrorist attacks, but is not efficient in doing so. The idea behind the 9/11 
Commission recommendations was to create a unified intelligence community, which 
would work both effectively and efficiently on its mission to counter terrorist threats. 
However, only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence 
community is still a work in progress. 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations were a building stone of U.S. 
intelligence reform. But given the relatively poor results of this reform agenda, voices 
criticizing the form and scope of this reform program have come from both academics 
and intelligence professionals. These questions have inquired about the right kind of 
intelligence reform, and what more could have been done to improve the intelligence 
community. The final chapter will initially examine alternative approaches proposed by 
critics of the intelligence reform program to date. Thereafter, possible solutions to the 
current intelligence reform dilemma will be presented. 
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5. The Right Kind of Reform for the Intelligence Community? 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations set forth a path for the U.S. intelligence 
community reform based on its centralization and enhanced information sharing. 
However, soon after the publication of the 9/11 Commission report, criticism from both 
academics as well as intelligence professionals began to scrutinize the report’s 
conclusions and recommendations as overlooking a number of important realities 
connected to both the U.S. intelligence community and its abilities to avoid intelligence 
failure (i.e. prevent surprise attacks). This chapter will analyze these alternative 
approaches to the U.S. intelligence reform. Then, proposals of possible future steps in 
order to improve the current state of U.S. intelligence community will be made. 
Also this chapter provides the evaluation and analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 from the output perspective 
of the methodological model (figure 1.1). 
 
5.1. Preventing Surprise Attacks 
Soon after the 9/11 Commission report was published, a number of scholars and 
former intelligence professionals criticized the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations as 
well as the 9/11 Commission’s overall approach to the U.S. intelligence community. 
The main objection against the report and the subsequent legislation was based on an 
argumentation that it is impossible to prevent surprise attacks. The very nature of 
surprise attacks is uncertainty caused by asymmetry of attacker and victim. As Richard 
Posner, one of the main proponents of this theory points out, “the attacker picks the 
time, place, and means of attack. Since without a great deal of luck his plan cannot be 
discovered in advance by the victim, the attacker has, by virtue of his having the 
initiative and of the victim’s being unable to be strong everywhere all the time, a built-
in advantage that assures a reasonable probability of a local successes.”158 Therefore, 
the character of the attacks makes it extremely difficult to prevent them. As Posner 
continues, “even the best intelligence service is bound to be surprised from time to time 
because the only way to ensure against ever being surprised is to ignore the cost of false 
alarm and as a result bombard action-level officials with dire warnings.”159 
Furthermore, preventing surprise attacks is virtually impossible either due to lack of 
information or an excess of data. Richard K. Betts warns that “in attack warning, there 
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is the problem of ‘noise’ and deception.”160 He points to an overload of high volume of 
analysis, reports, statistics, which are exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb them 
or scrutinize them.  
Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents: Living with the High Risk 
Technologies argues that some type of failure is simply inherent in the system.161 Even 
though Perrow’s work was focused mostly on early warning systems of nuclear attack 
during the Cold War, his conclusions are, according to the critics of post-9/11 
intelligence reform, valid also for the U.S. intelligence community. As Joshua Rovner 
and Austin Long conclude, “both tactical warning intelligence and nuclear power plants 
are best described as complex, tightly coupled systems. The amount of time available 
for analysts or operators to make correct decisions is often quite small, with almost no 
margin for error. Interactions in both a nuclear power plant and an enemy organization 
(be it a nation-state’s military or a terrorist group) are often unobservable. Certainly, 
enemy intentions, as opposed to dispositions, are nearly always unobservable.”162  
The 9/11 Commission was also criticized for its perspective of hindsight and 
assumptions that anything what was uncovered retrospectively should have been 
uncovered in real time by the intelligence community. Paul R. Pillar, a long term 
veteran of the CIA, condemns the 9/11 Commission’s references to the failure of 
‘connecting the dots’. As he puts it, “the dots the counterterrorist analyst faces, unlike 
those in children’s puzzles, have neither numbers nor a white background, and they can 
be connected in many different ways.”163 Richard Posner also disapproves of the 9/11 
Commission’s approach. He contends that “with the aid of hindsight it is easy to 
identify missed opportunities to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from 
that observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result not of 
bad luck, the enemy’s skill and ingenuity, the inevitability that some surprise attacks 
will succeed, the personal failures of individuals, or the difficulty of defending against 
suicide attacks or protecting a well-nigh infinite range of potential targets, but rather of 
systemic failures in the nations intelligence and security apparatus; failures that can be 
rectified, making us safe, by changing the apparatus.”164 
                                                 
160
 Betts, Richard K. 1978, p. 75. 
161
 Perrow, Charles. 1984. Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. New York: Basic 
Books. 
162
 Rovner Joshua, Long Austin. 2005. “The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 
Commission”. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18 (4): 627. 
163
 Pillar, Paul R. 2006, p. 1024. 
164
 Posner, Richard A. 2005, pp. 19-20. 
- 68 - 
 
All of these authors have come to a conclusion that the U.S. intelligence 
community had worked well before 9/11. Despite the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks, 
the overall counterterrorism performance of the U.S. intelligence community during the 
1990s was strong. Therefore, the proposals for major organizational reform of the 
intelligence community were not substantiated.   
Richard K. Betts argues that no intelligence reform could ever be permanent or 
complete for the simple reason that fixing specific problems often creates new ones and 
that no initiative occurs without opportunity costs. Reforms intended to increase flow of 
analysts, for example, can cause overload, leaving analysts without the time or tools 
needed to separate critical signals from noise. Reforms intended to help analysts 
connect the dots might cause them to be too creative, prompting them to issue 
unnecessary alarms. In a sense, intelligence reform is a zero-sum game: removing some 
weaknesses creates new ones, and these new weaknesses are a likely source of 
intelligence failure.165 Elsewhere, he also points out that “no one ever stays satisfied 
with reorganization because it never seems to do the trick – if the trick is to prevent 
intelligence failure.”166 Thus, the 9/11 Commission could not find a fix to the problem 
of the U.S. intelligence community because the problem is essentially unfixable. 
This criticism, however, overlooks a number of important realities. As chapter 3 
of this thesis has shown, the U.S. intelligence community did not perform well before 
9/11. The intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the threats of transnational terrorism 
even though there were voices both from within and from outside of the intelligence 
community. Moreover, it can be argued that not all of intelligence failures and surprise 
attacks can be prevented, but in the case of 9/11 there were many opportunities that 
could have grasped the danger of terrorist attacks if the system was better organized and 
better adapted to the threat. Better allocation of personnel, better incentives for analysts 
and removing obstacles to information sharing could have led to at least higher chance 
of thwarting the attacks in preparation if not to preventing them at all. 
Moreover, it is true that the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission did examine 
the events preceding the 9/11 attacks from hindsight, however, as was also discussed in 
chapter 3, there were twelve commission, think tank and presidential initiative reports, 
which had made the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission already throughout the 
1990s. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission cannot be accused of picking the most obvious 
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problems of the intelligence community after the attacks happened, because all of the 
problems addressed by the 9/11 Commission were already recognized before 9/11.  
Thus, it is possible to argue that if there had been a substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on the discussed pre-9/11 
recommendations, the intelligence community’s efficiency and effectiveness would 
have been enhanced and the chance to prevent the terrorist attacks would have been 
much larger. 
 
5.2. Is There a Need for the DNI? 
Questions also arose whether a centralized structure of the intelligence 
community is the right one. Again, Rovner and Long are against. They argue that 
“decentralized intelligence offers several potential benefits. Greater autonomy for field 
operators would allow them to recruit unsavory informants – even terrorists – without 
fear of reprimand from the home office. Loosening centralized standards would also 
favor entrepreneurial analysts who prefer to freely communicate with their peers and 
policy counterparts instead of having to follow strict guidelines on communication.”167 
They also point out that increased centralization through the DNI would hamper 
informal interaction between analysts. 
Richard Posner also calls for more decentralization. In his 2006 book Uncertain 
Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in the Throes of Reform, he praises the value 
of complementarity and competition in intelligence, prevention of groupthink and 
motivation of employees by their belonging to only a part of the intelligence community 
and not the whole system as such.168 
However, it is important to clarify that centralization and decentralization of the 
U.S. intelligence community are not mutually exclusive organizing principles. There are 
many companies and organizations where organization is based on both strong central 
authority and decentralized management. Nevertheless, the right balance between 
centralization and decentralization is crucial. Too much centralization can slow down 
innovation, hamper swift and nimble action and have negative influence on employees’ 
morale. On the other hand, too much decentralization can impede coordination and 
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information sharing, evokes distrust, and creates centers of power which refuse reform. 
Thus, the key question is not whether to centralize, but how much and what. 
Therefore, to answer the question asked in the subheading, the U.S. intelligence 
community needs the DNI, however, with much stronger authority than it currently 
posses in order to be able to coordinate the U.S. intelligence community as a unified 
entity but also in order to have enough power to oversee and promote enough 
decentralization which would allow for healthy amount of competition and innovation. 
Suggestions of how to achieve this equilibrium in the U.S. intelligence community 
organization will be made in the last subchapter. 
 
5.3. What to Do Next: Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyzed some of the main obstacles and problematic 
aspects of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform. Two main problems were 
characterized: first, the inability of the newly established institutions such as the DNI 
and the NCTC to properly coordinate and incorporate the intelligence community and 
its agencies, and second the inability and also unwillingness of the old agencies such as 
the CIA and the FBI to adapt to the changed environment and to implement the 
provisions of the intelligence reform legislation. Reasons for these problems were 
identified as being mostly of organizational character based on bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry and institutional inertia. They include poor management, lack of 
incentives for personnel and recruits, inefficient clearance system hampering 
information sharing, and technical deficiencies. 
Therefore, it is important to identify possible solutions to improve the efficiency 
of the U.S. intelligence community. That is to promote such measures, which would 
overcome the organizational obstacles to the intelligence reform and enhanced the 
ability of the U.S. intelligence community to prevent terrorist attacks, i.e. to support its 
effectiveness. It is possible to recognize four main steps leading to more efficient U.S. 
intelligence community. 
First, powers and authorities vested in the newly created position of the Director 
of National Intelligence must be strengthened. However, rather than issuing new 
legislation, the DNI should fully exploit the authorities he currently has under the 
IRTPA and insist on his budgetary authorities in order to promote greater efficiency 
within the U.S. intelligence community. Even though the DNI’s powers are limited, he 
should use them in full scope. If he fails to exercise them, it will create a precedent for 
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weak or only virtual authorities of the DNI and discredit the position of the DNI as 
such. As Gordon Lederman suggests, “the DNI should thoroughly review the budget of 
each intelligence entity and refuse to include any programs in the next year’s budget 
proposal that fail to correspond to the DNI’s vision for integration. The DNI should also 
use his apportionment authority to hold entities’ feet to the fire, authorizing the release 
of selected appropriated funds only once the DNI is satisfied with the pace of 
integration.”169 This would allow the DNI to establish himself as the chief executive 
officer and to build up the unified intelligence enterprise, as was envisioned by the 9/11 
Commission. 
Second, in order to act efficiently as a chief coordinator, the DNI should leave 
some of the responsibilities connected with the preparation for the Presidential Daily 
Briefs to designated mission managers. This would allow the DNI to focus more on the 
organizational transition and management of the intelligence community. Moreover, 
orienting the U.S. intelligence community towards specified missions such as 
counterterrorism (here the mission manager is the Director of the NCTC), counter 
proliferation or by region, i.e. Iran, North Korea would help to break the stovepipes and 
enhance interagency cooperation.170 Also, the mission of the Office of the DNI must be 
clarified in order to prevent creating just another bureaucratic layer to the intelligence 
community organization and to support the DNI’s chief managerial role in a proper 
manner. Thus the ODNI’s roles, responsibilities and lines of authority have to be clearly 
declared.  
Third, culture of a single, unified enterprise needs to be created to promote 
better organizational incentives and to motivate intelligence personnel. The Joint Duty 
Program has to be endorsed by creating incentives for both managers to send their 
qualified personnel and also for the intelligence personnel themselves to produce quality 
outcomes while on their duty. In order to evaluate performance, as well as the post-
rotational career moves a rating system of a kind should be developed. Common 
organizational culture could be also enhanced by integrated training. Arthur S. Hulnick 
argues that “a centralized basic course would not only save money, but also build the 
kinds of relationships that would enhance information sharing and cross-agency 
assignments.”171 After the basic course a specialized courses within the respected 
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agencies would follow but the first training under the auspices of the intelligence 
community “brand” would help in establishing an integrated institutional culture. This 
common institutional culture, if promoted with the right incentives, would help prevent 
turf wars among agencies and improve cooperation. On the other hand, incentives for 
healthy competition in analysis should be supported and a certain amount of 
decentralization should be encouraged in order to avoid the problem of groupthink. 
Fourth, removing the overly complicated system of security clearances is 
essential for improving efficiency of the intelligence community. So far, each agency 
has its own system of providing security clearances and background checks and the 
agencies mostly do not recognize each others clearances, which seriously hampers 
information sharing. A unified system created under the supervision of the DNI would 
remove this obstacle. 
If done right, these proposals would help lessen the identified organizational 
obstacles to the intelligence community change. Improving managerial capabilities can 
help to, at least partially, overcome bounded rationality; establishment of integrated 
institutional culture can mitigate institutional inertia within the individual agencies; and 
incentives for information sharing can moderate structural secrecy. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that for all these suggestions to be 
successfully implemented a support of senior officials, beginning with the president, as 
well as of the legislators is crucial. Thus, the trade-off between decision makers’ 
incentives and capabilities has to create enough interest, as well as actual capabilities to 
seriously invest into substantial intelligence reform in order to improve intelligence 
community’s abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Much of the evidence presented in this chapter and previous one highlight that 
reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11 is still a work in progress. 
However, adopting the suggested proposals would not only improve the efficiency of 
the intelligence community but would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. The 
interconnectedness of the effectiveness and efficiency criteria illustrated earlier in 
Figure 1.1 is clearly evident. Continuous organizational problems hampering the 
efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community have had a negative impact on 
effectiveness; that is on its abilities to prevent terrorist attacks. A case in point is the 
failed attempt to detonate a bomb on an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. 
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This incident was preceded by a number of systemic mistakes caused by the lack of 
efficiency within the intelligence community.172 Such recent evidence demonstrates that 
current initiatives to overcome organizational obstacles within the U.S. intelligence 
community have had limited success. If such security lapses are to be avoided in the 
future the United States government must address the question of what policies will 
ensure the most effective and efficient means of countering terrorist threats. 
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Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored the vulnerability and 
unpreparedness of the United States for such an attack. Most importantly, 9/11 
highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and operational capabilities to 
counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community could not operate in an 
integrated manner because its structure was a Cold War relic with no single actor with 
ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch lacked an effective coordinated 
planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
Soon after 9/11 critical voices sprung up calling for substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community in order to improve its abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
The purpose of this diploma thesis has been to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 
intelligence community reform on the basis on its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Throughout this research, the criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been conceptualized as the 
ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, whereas ‘efficiency’ 
has been operationalised as measures undertaken at the organizational level within the 
intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist attacks.  
At the beginning of this thesis, two key questions were raised. The first of these 
questions inquired into whether the U.S. intelligence community became more effective 
and efficient following the attacks of September 11, 2001? The evidence presented in 
the chapters 2 through 5 suggests that the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 is 
mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist attack). However, it is 
not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack of leadership, inability 
or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right incentives 
for current personnel and potential recruits to the intelligence community. These 
institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the intelligence community, which 
consequently endanger the intelligence community’s effectiveness in countering 
terrorist threats.  
The second question asked in the introduction of this thesis delved into why in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 intelligence failure, has a thorough 
reform of the intelligence community not materialized? The hypothesis that the 
adoption of substantial intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) 
was obstructed by a number of factors proves to be correct. First, the nature of U.S. 
intelligence organizations hindered extensive reform. Second, the rational choices of the 
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U.S. leadership (i.e. the executive and legislative branches of government) did not 
facilitate a process of significant change. Third, the American public’s democratic 
principles were sometimes in conflict with proposals that were seen to undermine civil 
liberties. Out of these three obstacles to substantial reform of U.S. intelligence, the 
organizational obstacles have been identified as the most significant factor in the 
resistance to reform. Therefore, most attention has been paid to the analysis of the 
organizational processes within the intelligence community’s institutions. 
The main argument presented throughout this diploma thesis has been that the 
original aim of reform was to transform the U.S. intelligence community into a single, 
unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks and 
efficient in doing so. This goal has not been realized. Instead, although the post-9/11 
intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain. 
In order to analyze and evaluate reform of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence system 
an organizational model has been adopted. In this model, it has been argued that 
institutional reform is very difficult due to the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within U.S. intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within intelligence agencies’ culture. 
Moreover, the intelligence institutions operate in a political and societal 
environment that creates additional constraints on their ability to adapt and reform. 
These external processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by 
American political leaders who often act in a manner that might be reasonably described 
as being motivated by rational self-interest. In addition, American public opinion and its 
adherence to democratic values based on protection of civil liberties has also been an 
important contextual variable. In general, intelligence community reform is a very 
difficult and long term process and this situation is not helped by public fears about any 
measures that might undermine civil liberties. As a result, the lack of popular support 
for strengthening of the U.S. intelligence community’s powers have often provided 
insufficient incentives for decision makers to embark on root-and-branch reform of the 
intelligence services. 
Chapter 2 has revealed this was the situation that permeated repeated attempts to 
reform the US intelligence community before 9/11. Throughout the 1990s a number of 
attempts were made to adapt the U.S. intelligence community to the changing nature of 
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threats that arose after the end of the Cold War. The transnational and asymmetric 
threats (especially terrorism) superseded the single danger posed by the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. The spectrum of present and potential targets was broadening and the 
intelligence community had to deal with an overwhelming amount of information 
stemming from these threats.  
Twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task 
forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
during the 1990s; and together these bodies made 340 recommendations to reform the 
intelligence community. Many of these proposals suggested improvement in the 
intelligence community’s sense of corporate identity; enhancing human intelligence; 
encouraging information sharing and improving personnel issues; and creating a better 
system of setting intelligence priorities. All of these suggestions were proposed by the 
Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission after the 9/11 as well. It is important to note that 
before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, there were not enough incentives 
for policy makers or intelligence community leaders to embark on a substantial reform 
agenda.  
The assumption introduced in this thesis has been that the shock of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks would create such incentives; however, chapter 3 presented evidence 
that tends to contradict this hypothesis. The immediate reaction of the Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress to events of 9/11 was focused on (a) quick fixes 
such as the enactment of the USA Patriot Act removing many barriers for domestic 
surveillance, or (b) wide governmental changes promoted through a new homeland 
security agenda. None of these initiatives represented what might be reasonably called a 
comprehensive approach towards reforming and integrating the intelligence community. 
Thus, the momentum for change generated by the tragic events of 9/11 vanished.  
Another opportunity to enforce far-reaching changes to create a more effective 
and efficient U.S. intelligence community occurred with publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report. Chapter 4 examined the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations embedded in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) enacted in 2004. A number of problems have been identified regarding the 
IRTPA. First, the impact of this law was diluted during the legislative debate in the U.S. 
Congress where the Defense Department lobby successfully obstructed many changes 
that would have endangered its exclusive position within the intelligence community. 
The DOD’s dominant position is evident from the fact that it secures 80 percent of the 
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intelligence community’s overall budget. Second, the IRTPA created new intelligence 
institutions such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National 
Counterterrorist Center (NCTC). However, the act does not vest enough power in them 
to allow them to attain a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. This limitation 
appears to be especially true in the case of the DNI where its position has been impaired 
and its coordination and managerial powers have been hampered. Therefore, the DNI is 
unable to overcome the organizational obstacles embedded in the intelligence 
community’s organizational culture. Third, the organizational obstacles outlined in this 
study refer primarily to the old intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, and 
their resistance to adapt to the new security environment and to implement properly the 
IRTPA provisions.  
The argument presented in this study of the organizational features of U.S. 
intelligence has been pointing to its lack of efficiency. Such inefficiency is particularly 
evident in the inability of the newly created institutions to properly manage and 
coordinate their activities and the unwillingness of the older established agencies to 
adapt and to embrace the new provisions. 
In order to improve efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community, a number of 
proposals have been suggested. These were outlined and discussed in chapter 5. A 
central feature of these proposals is the agency charged with the management of reform 
– the DNI. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a central and 
persistent failing of the U.S. intelligence community in the post Cold War period has 
been the inability to develop more effective and efficient channels of coordination. Here 
the institutional focus of this research has demonstrated why the logic of organizations 
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. With regard to the DNI, four concrete proposals for 
reform are pertinent.  
First, enhancing the power of the DNI through uncompromising exploitation of 
all authorities vested in it under the IRTPA. Second, the DNI’s focus should be on 
organizational transition rather than the time consuming task of preparing the daily 
presidential briefings. Third, this change would facilitate creating an organizational 
culture that pursues a single mission providing the motivation and incentives for 
enhanced cooperation. Fourth, such reform would reduce the extremely complicated 
system of security clearances which debilitates information sharing. If these steps for 
increasing the efficiency of the intelligence community are implemented, then the 
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effectiveness of the intelligence community in preventing surprise attacks is also likely 
to improve. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this study highlights an important 
general point: reform of the U.S. intelligence community is essentially a work in 
progress. This has important consequences not only for stakeholders’ (i.e. citizens, 
policy makers, intelligence providers and scholars) understanding of how the U.S. 
intelligence community operates, but also the most appropriate means of evaluating its 
strengths and weaknesses. In this diploma thesis, U.S. intelligence has been modeled 
using an input-output approach developed within systems theory where intelligence 
outputs have been evaluated on the basis of two criteria, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Such an approach has the merits of reducing a very complex set of organizational 
relationships to a small number of core features that facilitate generalization. However, 
this approach is limited as it adopts a static structural perspective and cannot deal 
effectively with the essentially strategic nature of institutional change. 
For this reason future research on reform of the U.S. intelligence community 
should focus on the operations of the DNI. Such research would deal not only with 
institutional structures but also with the strategic interactions that are a defining feature 
of the DNIs work. In this respect, the New Institutionalism literature and insights 
derived from formal modeling such as Game Theory would provide the foundations for 
a more detailed account of why the U.S. intelligence community has experienced such 
difficulty in improving coordination.  
Such a theoretical approach would facilitate identifying and constructing 
empirical indicators, or benchmarks, that would allow both scholars and practitioners to 
evaluate the success of different reform plans. Such a theoretical approach and 
methodology has the important advantage of reflecting the evolutionary nature of 
intelligence community change. The research presented in this diploma thesis represents 
an important and necessary first step in such a research agenda by mapping out the 
context and key players and providing a concise evaluation of the main institutional 
problem – coordination.  
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Summary 
The argument presented in this thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research question addressed in this thesis and the 
research model based on effectiveness and efficiency is introduced. 
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological background for this 
research thesis. This work commences with a definition of intelligence and a brief 
discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence 
community reform are introduced. The organization theory approach to study 
intelligence community is recognized as the most appropriate. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It examines 
the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the repeated 
attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of transnational threats. 
This is followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these reform attempts. The evidence 
presented in chapter 2 suggests that the post-Cold War change of threat environment did 
not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s intelligence 
services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence community 
was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was unprepared to 
prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as to 
why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from happening 
again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations are 
examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President Bush, undertaken 
simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, and their impact 
on the intelligence community reform are discussed. These new security policies 
include enactment of the USA Patriot Act, promoting the homeland security agenda and 
establishing the Terrorist Threat Information Center. The analysis presented in this 
chapter leads to a conclusion that none of these initiatives presented a comprehensive 
plan of reform of the U.S. intelligence community. 
Chapter 4 delves into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions is 
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evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. The idea behind the 9/11 Commission recommendations was to create a 
unified intelligence community, which would work both effectively and efficiently on 
its mission to counter terrorist threats. The evidence presented in chapter suggests that 
only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community 
is still a work in progress. 
Chapter 5 provides some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient are proposed. It is argued that adopting the suggested 
proposals would not only improve the efficiency of the intelligence community but 
would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. 
In the concluding chapter the two research questions are answered and the main 
arguments of this diploma thesis summarized. Suggestion on future research on reform 
of the U.S. intelligence community focusing on the operations of the DNI using the 
New Institutionalism theory and Game Theory approaches are made.  
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Anotace 
Diplomová práce „Reforma zpravodajských složek Spojených států amerických 
po 11. září 2001: Posílení schopností Spojených států v boji proti terorismu?” zkoumá 
reformu zpravodajských složek USA přijatou po teroristických útocích z 11. září 2001 
s cílem zlepšení protiteroristických schopností Spojených států. Jednoduchý model 
vstupu-výstupu vycházející ze systémové teorie byl vytvořen k evaluaci výstupů 
reformy zpravodajských služeb USA po 11. září na základě efektivity (effectiveness) a  
výkonnosti (efficiency). Kritérium efektivity (effectiveness) je chápáno jako schopnost 
zpravodajských složek zabránit teroristickým útokům, zatímco pod výkonností 
(efficiency) jsou rozuměny opatření a procesy podniknuté na organizační úrovni v rámci 
zpravodajských složek za účelem zabránění teroristickým útokům. Z představené 
analýzy vyplývá , že zpravodajské složky Spojených států amerických po 11. září jsou 
převážně efektivní (tj. od 11. září nedošlo k žádnému teroristickému útoku na USA 
v takovém rozsahu jako útoky z 11. září). Avšak nejsou výkonné (efficient) z důvodu 
organizačních problémů, které zahrnují nedostatečný management, neschopnost nebo 
neochotu jednotlivých zpravodajských agentur spolupracovat a sdílet informace, a 
nedostatečnou motivaci zaměstnanců i případných zájemců o práci ve zpravodajských 
službách. Tyto institucionální nedostatky pak vedou k nevýkonnosti (inefficiency) 
zpravodajských složek, která následně ohrožuje efektivní (effective) zpravodajskou 
obranu před teroristickými hrozbami. 
 
Annotation 
Diploma thesis “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Post-9/11: Strengthening 
the U.S.’s Ability to Fight Terrorism?” examines the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 implemented in order to improve ability of 
 the United States to counter terrorist threats. A simple input-output model developed 
within systems theory is used to evaluate the post-9/11 intelligence reform outputs on 
the basis of effectiveness and efficiency. The criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been 
conceptualized as the ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, 
whereas ‘efficiency’ has been operationalized as measures undertaken at the 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist 
attacks. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the U.S. intelligence 
community since 9/11 is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist 
attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack 
of leadership, inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to 
provide the right incentives for current personnel and potential recruits to the 
intelligence community. These institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the 
intelligence community, which consequently endanger the intelligence community’s 
effectiveness in countering terrorist threats.  
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the equilibrium of U.S. 
perceptions of terrorist threats. This form of violence was not new in American 
historical experience, the threat and use of psychological and physical force by 
individuals, sub-national groups, and state actors aimed at attaining political, social and 
economic objectives in violation of domestic and international law have challenged the 
United States many times in the past. However, this unprecedented (in its extent and 
brutality) action against ordinary citizens of the United States carried out on American 
soil, underscored the vulnerability and unpreparedness of the country for such an attack. 
Most importantly, it highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and 
operational capabilities to counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community 
found it difficult to operate in an integrated manner because its structure was a Cold 
War relic with no single actor with ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch 
lacked an effective planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
The first problem is that the U.S. intelligence community during the 1990s was 
still operating on a structure designed to counter one single enemy – the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. Therefore, a number of cold war legacies were disabling the 
intelligence community to adapt and to react to the rapid growth of transnational threats, 
especially international terrorism. These legacies were all based on divisions and 
boundaries. On the organizational side, the collection of intelligence was divided into 
“stovepipes” by source: human intelligence (HUMINT) under the CIA, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) under the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) under the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The analysis part 
was also organized primarily by agency and not by issue or problem. The CIA was 
responsible for “all-source” analysis, but other agencies had their analysis units as well, 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The second division was, thus, on the CIA/DOD line. The CIA was an 
independent entity, while agencies performing signals and imagery intelligence were 
located within the DOD. Focusing on one target supported competition between the 
agencies, which proved generally beneficial during the Cold War. But the competition 
also led to many turf wars between the agencies and had a negative effect on 
cooperation, which became crucial for countering the transnational threats. The last 
divide was on the domestic-foreign intelligence axis. Out of concern for civil liberties, 
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the CIA was prohibited from performing internal security functions. These powers were 
vested in the FBI, which, however, was first and foremost a law enforcement agency, 
and therefore oriented mostly reactively not preventively. Moreover, the barrier between 
domestic and foreign intelligence had negative effects on information sharing and 
cooperation as well.  
The second problem was that of determining priorities. Transnational threats 
were not new for U.S. intelligence community, but they were treated as marginal within 
the Cold War context. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the growing 
importance of transnational threats, led by terrorism, were recognized both by 
intelligence officials as well as the decision makers. However, the transition from 
focusing on one single target, which is essentially bounded by borders and hierarchical 
in structure to targets which are asymmetric and, by definition, transnational, was not 
realized in a swift enough fashion in order to prevent the attacks from happening. 
All of these problems were addressed already before 9/11. Twelve bipartisan 
blue-ribbon commissions, independent think tank task forces and presidential initiatives 
recognized the post-Cold War deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community and 
made hundreds of recommendations to improve it. However, they were largely ignored 
by both the decision makers, as well as intelligence officials. The changed post-Cold 
War environment was not a sufficient impetus for making a substantial reform of how 
intelligence institutions operated. It seemed that only a catastrophe of 9/11 scope would 
provide the right momentum for change.  
 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two interconnected questions. The first 
question is whether the U.S. intelligence community has become more effective and 
efficient since 9/11? Throughout this research, effectiveness is understood as the ability 
to prevent surprise attacks, whereas efficiency means measures undertaken on 
organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those attacks. 
Close examination of the governmental actions carried out in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, as well as of the proposed reform embedded in the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act and its subsequent implementation into practice shows 
that the U.S. intelligence community is mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any 
successful terrorist attack). However, it is not efficient due to organizational problems, 
which in return adversely affect the effectiveness of the intelligence community in 
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countering terrorist threats. These organizational problems include lack of leadership, 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right 
incentives for personnel and potential recruits. These organizational deficiencies reduce 
the intelligence community’s efficiency, which thereafter endanger its effectiveness. 
The second question explores why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by 
the 9/11 intelligence failure, a comprehensive reform of the intelligence community has 
not materialized. In this thesis it is hypothesized that the adoption of substantial 
intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) was obstructed by 
three main factors. First, reform was obstructed by the nature of the intelligence 
organizations themselves. Second, reform was hindered by the rational choices of the 
U.S. leadership (both the president and the legislators). Third, the reform agenda was 
strongly shaped by American citizens’ democratic principles and their core beliefs 
regarding civil liberties. However, among these three obstacles to intelligence reform, 
the institutional aspect is perhaps the most important as institutions are the means by 
which public preferences are transformed into concrete policies. In other words, 
organization matters.1 Organizational structure, culture and management all influence 
how effective and efficient the system will be. Furthermore, in order to keep this thesis 
within a reasonable range, most attention will be paid to the organizational obstacles to 
intelligence reform. 
The two main categories for evaluating the U.S intelligence community before 
and after 9/11 are its effectiveness and efficiency and the relationship between these two 
criteria (independent variables) are summarized in Figure 1. The level of effectiveness 
is defined as ability to prevent the terrorist attacks from happening. Even though it is, as 
many authors conclude, impossible to prevent all surprise attacks the effectiveness of 
intelligence community may be evaluated on the basis of how many attacks were 
successfully prevented.2 The record of successful terrorist attacks on American targets 
before 9/11 is thus zero, whereas given that no terrorist attack of 9/11 scope was 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, terms organization and institution and their derivatives are treated as 
equal. 
2
 See for example: Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable”. World Politics 31 (1): 61-89 or more recently: Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of 
Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Colombia University 
Press. or Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the Wake of 9/11. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. or Pillar, Paul R. 2006. “Good Literature and Bad 
History: The 9/11 Commission’s Tale of Strategic Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 21 
(6): 1022-1044 or most recently Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
- 11 - 
 
committed since 9/11 this fact may be reasonably interpreted as showing the 
effectiveness of U.S. intelligence community.3 
 
Figure 1. Effectiveness and Efficiency of U.S. Intelligence Community before and 
after 9/11 
 
Note: Effectiveness is understood in this study as the ability to prevent surprise attacks. Efficiency means 
measures undertaken on organizational level within the intelligence community in order to prevent those 
attacks. Figure 1. shows that the pre-9/11 intelligence community was neither effective nor efficient. The 
intent of the post-9/11 reform was to create both an effective and efficient intelligence community 
indicated by the dotted arrow. The actual implementation of the intelligence reform legislation and 
executive actions did lead to enhanced effectiveness, but not to increased efficiency (as shown by the 
large clear arrow). 
 
The efficiency criterion is understood here as the number of actions undertaken in order 
to achieve a certain level of effectiveness. These include adapting and prioritizing 
among threats, cooperation and information sharing among agencies, creating a strong 
centralized leadership recognized by everyone, and creating the right incentives for 
personnel working in the intelligence services. Before 9/11 none of these actions was 
accomplished to a degree that was in hindsight considered acceptable (i.e. preventing 
the 9/11 attacks). But what is more surprising is that even after 9/11, the intelligence 
reforms have still not managed to create efficient intelligence community.  
Thus, the original aim of transforming the U.S. intelligence community into a 
single, unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks 
as well as efficient in doing so has not been realized.4 Although, the post-9/11 
                                                 
3
 There are opinions suggesting that there in fact was a number of terrorist attacks on American targets 
since 9/11, such as the Virginia snipers case (see e.g. Gruen, Madeleine, Hyland Frank. 2008. “No Attack 
in the U.S. since 9/11? available at:< 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/no_attack_in_the_us_since_911.php> [accessed 28.4. 2010]), 
however compared to the scope of successful Al Qaeda attacks during the 1990s such as the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing and the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy attacks and the 9/11, the post-9/11 
incidents are not of an equal importance. 
4
 Reform of the U.S. intelligence community as a centralized and unified enterprise was proposed by the 
9/11 Commission and accepted by the subsequent legislative and presidential action. 
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intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain unresolved. 
 
Roadmap of the Research 
The argument presented in this diploma thesis will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 will provide the theoretical and methodological background for this research 
thesis. This work will commence with a definition of intelligence and a brief discussion 
of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical approaches to the 
study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence community reform will be 
introduced. Lastly, the Eastonian input/output methodology employed in this research 
study will be presented. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It will 
examine the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the 
repeated attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of 
transnational threats. This will be followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these 
reform attempts.  
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as 
to why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from 
happening again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and 
recommendations will be examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President 
Bush, undertaken simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, 
and their impact on the intelligence community reform will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 will delve into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions will be 
evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. 
Chapter 5 will provide some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient will be proposed. 
 
The original research proposal for this thesis submitted and accepted in June 2009 
intended to study the change in U.S. homeland security after 9/11 with an aspect of 
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intelligence reform as a part of the research. However, throughout the preparation and 
study period of the thesis, the whole topic of homeland security and intelligence reform 
appeared to be too broad for the range of the diploma thesis. Therefore, the author in 
consultation with her advisor reduced the focus of the research to the U.S. intelligence 
reform only. This approach will enable this thesis to delve in more depth into the 
problem of U.S. intelligence reform. The homeland security aspect is mentioned in part 
3.2.2, but it serves only as additional factor in the intelligence reform analysis. 
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1. Studying Intelligence and its Reform: An Academically Forgotten 
Field 
The subject of intelligence and especially of intelligence reform has been 
generally overlooked by both political scientists and organization theorists. This is 
because the study of intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is difficult 
because much of the evidence and data is secret. More will be said on this point in 
section 1.2. In addition, there is at present no widely accepted definition of intelligence 
and this lack of conceptual clarity also makes the study of intelligence difficult. 
Notwithstanding, the problems associated with secrecy surrounding intelligence work it 
is essential from the outset to develop an explicit working definition of what is meant by 
the term “intelligence”, what can be understood as intelligence, and also its relationship 
to national security and foreign policy making. These issues will be dealt with in the 
first section of this chapter. 
In the second section different academic approaches to the study of intelligence 
will be introduced. These contrasting approaches may be interpreted as different facets 
of the study of intelligence. They include topics such as relationship of intelligence to 
policy making, to democratic principles and the ethics of intelligence or the study of 
intelligence failure in general. However, the question of intelligence community reform 
has not been discussed in great depth so far within the political science or organizational 
literatures.  
For this reason, there is at present no “ready-made” theory, which could be used 
and applied to U.S. intelligence community reform post 9/11. Thus, in order to explain 
the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community to both the pre- and post-9/11 efforts a 
combined approach of organization and bureaucracy theory with aspects from political 
science and decision making must be developed. Lastly, this chapter will present the 
research method used in this thesis. 
 
1.1. What Is Intelligence and Why Is It Important for National Security? 
According to Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading expert in intelligence studies, there 
are several ways to think about intelligence:5 
                                                 
5
 There has been a rich ongoing discussion about what intelligence is, which due to space constraints 
cannot be delved into here, and thus Mark Lowenthal’s approach was chosen. For more information on 
definitions of intelligence, see e.g. Davis, Jack. 1992. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949”. Studies in 
Intelligence 36 (5): 91-104. 
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• Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which 
certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, 
and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are 
conceived and conducted. 
• Intelligence as a product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of 
these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operation 
themselves. 
• Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that 
carry out its various functions.6 
 
Throughout this thesis, the third type of intelligence perception will be mostly used 
because it addresses the key aspect of intelligence analyzed in this thesis – intelligence 
community as an institutional body and its parts. 
Another way of thinking about intelligence is to see it in terms of the craft of 
intelligence, which has two basic components. The first is collection – that is gathering 
of particular information about intelligence targets. Collection is done through different 
methods, such as human intelligence – spies and informants; signals intelligence – 
intercepted communications; imagery intelligence – maps, pictures, etc.; and open 
source intelligence – information derived from publicly available sources. The second 
component is analysis – that is studying collected information and deriving conclusions, 
judgments, or predictions.  
According to one intelligence scholar, “in general, analysis should drive 
collection so that collection focuses on obtaining the information that analysts need in 
order to render their conclusions, judgments, or predictions. ‘All-source analysis’ refers 
to analysis of an intelligence topic using information collected by all relevant 
methods.”7 This process of tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating 
intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. Special functions outside of the intelligence 
cycle are covert actions and counterintelligence, which is focused on protecting the 
country, as well as intelligence agencies, from the activities of other foreign intelligence 
services8. 
                                                 
6
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 8. 
7
 Lederman, Gordon N. 2005. “Restructuring the Intelligence Community”. p. 89 in Peter Berkowitz 
(ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution. 
8
 Turner, Michael A. 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield., p. 41. 
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Intelligence, in the meaning of a finalized product, is an essential part of national 
security policy making. It can provide crucial information about the potential enemy or 
support (or provide evidence against) a certain national security policy action. As 
Robert Jervis contends, “the purpose of intelligence is to provide an understanding of 
the world on which foreign policy can be based and to support instruments to influence 
and possibly deceive others.”9 Policymakers generally accept the intelligence as an 
important part of their decision and policymaking. However, the role and importance of 
intelligence varies in each administration. Again using in words of Robert Jervis, 
“policy makers say they need and want very good intelligence. They do indeed need it, 
but often do not want it.”10 This means that sometimes the view of intelligence analysts 
is not the same as that of the decision makers. This is because it is not always the case 
that intelligence submitted to decision makers is supportive of a government’s preferred 
policy goals. Thus, the relationship between decision makers and intelligence is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
1.2. Academic Approaches to the Study of Intelligence 
The essence of intelligence, both in the meaning of the information provided as 
well as the process, is secrecy. According to Michael Warner, “even the accidental 
disclosure of some analytical, informational, or operational advantage over a rival or an 
enemy is presumed to be tantamount to the loss of that advantage while it is still 
potentially useful.”11 The fact that intelligence is conducted with some level of secrecy 
makes it very hard for the scholars of intelligence to undertake comprehensive analyses. 
As Warner concludes, “intelligence studies have been conducted one way on the 
‘outside’ with no official access to original records, and another way on the ‘inside’, 
where a few scholars have intermittently enjoy sanctioned (if not always complete) 
access to the extant documentation.”12 Thus, an imbalance is created where studying 
intelligence from the outside is extremely difficult and in a sense incomplete, and on the 
other hand the internal sources and studies are difficult to verify. 
                                                 
9
 Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception, and Deception”. p. 70 in Jennifer E. 
Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
10
 Jervis, Robert. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform”. The 
Forum 4 (1): 1. 
11
 Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence”. p. 17 in Loch K. Johnson 
(ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Due to the element of secrecy and also due to the various meanings of 
intelligence, there is little published material on how to study intelligence. Thomas 
Bruneau and Steven Boraz point to the striking fact that “whereas intelligence officers 
and the organizations within which they function in the intelligence community are 
extremely rigorous methodologically in concluding their work, when we turn to the 
study of intelligence structures and processes by outsiders and retired intelligence 
professionals, there is little rigor and virtually no consensus on how to research and 
analyze the intelligence community.”13  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the failure of intelligence community to 
prevent them, attention of scholars as well as former intelligence officials to study 
intelligence heightened, however there is only little available analysis on the 
organization of intelligence and its reform. Even the aforementioned Bruneau and Boraz 
focus in their volume Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness, on the question of relationship between democracy and intelligence. Thus 
they analyze topics such as democratic control of intelligence, the legislative and 
judicial oversight, the problem of civil rights protection with connection to intelligence, 
and the transformation of intelligence from a tool of state oppression in transitional 
countries.14 Many other authors have also focused on the question of ethics and 
intelligence, such as Michael Herman15, or on intelligence oversight in the United 
States, for example L. Britt Snider16 or Jennifer Kibbe.17 
Other authors envisage the U.S. intelligence community reform after 9/11 
through the lenses of changes in intelligence analysis, technology, and intelligence 
collection methods and practices. Here the volume Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, 
Obstacles, and Innovations edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce18 stands out 
                                                 
13
 Bruneau, Thomas C., Boraz, Steven C. 2007. “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness”. P.1 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to 
Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”. Intelligence and National 
Security 19 (2): 342-358. 
16
 Snider, L Britt. 2005. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 11”. Pp. 239-258 in 
Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
17
 Kibbe, Jennifer. 2010. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: In the Solution Part of the Problem?” 
Intelligence and National Security 25(1): 24-49. 
18
 George, Roger Z., Bruce James B. (eds.). 2008. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and 
Innovations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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for its comprehensive treatment of this subject matter. Among other scholars focusing 
on these topics are Stephen Marrin19 and Deborah G. Barger20. 
Third group of authors, who touch upon the problem of intelligence reform, 
focuses on the question of intelligence failure and its prevention. Their approach 
explains that intelligence failures are inevitable and impossible to prevent. Therefore, 
there is no need for substantial reform intelligence community because it in general 
works well. Moreover, reforms of the whole intelligence community would negatively 
affect those parts of the system that produce good results. Main proponents of this 
approach are mostly former intelligence professionals, for example Richard K. Betts21, 
Richard Posner22, and Paul R. Pillar.23 
All of these approaches to the study of intelligence address a certain type of 
change or reform of intelligence, in all three of its meanings. However, none of them 
analyze the organization of intelligence and its importance. Neither do they present a 
suitable theoretical framework for evaluating the reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community after 9/11 in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. Only three authors 
tackle the question of intelligence community reform from an organizational point of 
view. The first is Amy Zegart, who in her book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11,24 creates a combined theoretical approach to study adaptation failure of 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on both organization theory and political 
science theory of rational choice decision making. Even though this scholar applies her 
framework to an explanation of U.S. intelligence community failure before 9/11, her 
combined framework proves useful even for evaluating the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community reform. The second is a couple of authors, Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas 
Skelley, who in their chapter Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory25 provide an insight of organization theory on the organizational 
structure, culture and management of the intelligence community. The next part of this 
                                                 
19
 Marrin, Stephen. 2007. “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic 
Responsibilities”. Intelligence and National Security 22 (6): 821-846. 
20
 Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation. Available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf> 
[accessed 20.3. 2010]. 
21
 Betts, Richard K. 2007. 
22
 Posner, Richard A. 2005 and 2006. 
23
 Pillar, Paul R. 2006. 
24
 Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
25
 Hastedt Glenn P., Skelley, Douglas B. 2009. “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory”. Pp. 112-130 in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.). Intelligence 
Theory: Key Questions and Debate. New York: Routledge. 
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chapter will present the main arguments for an organizational approach to the topic of 
U.S. intelligence community reform.  
 
1.3. Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform 
In order to build a model of the U.S. intelligence community reform, which 
would allow its proper evaluation and explanation, both organization theory as well as 
the theory of new institutionalism and rational choice decision making will be used. 
Even though, the main focus is on the organizational side of the intelligence 
community, its internal structures, cultures and management, attention also has to be 
paid to processes outside of the U.S. intelligence community. These explain the 
influence of leadership decision-making as well as the institutional design of the 
American democratic principles on the final outcome of the intelligence reform. 
Organization theory consists of a system of competing ideas some of which are 
useful for explaining the failure of the intelligence reform to create a more efficient 
intelligence community. Classical organization theory is focused mostly on private 
corporations and businesses, thus it is necessary to adopt a bureaucratic perspective 
from organization theory. Here the logic may be summarized as follows. First, internal 
change is difficult for private companies26 and even more for governmental 
organizations.27 Second, internal resistance to change is powerful because it is based on 
both the organizational structure and also on an entrenched culture of values, norms, 
ideas and identities.28 Three reasons why organizations resist change can be 
characterized in the following manner.  
First, there is the bounded rationality of organizational leaders, who settle for 
options to internal change that seem to them to be good, but which in fact might not be. 
However, because the leaders have usually incomplete information, cannot predict the 
future and are bound by cognitive constraints, it can lead them to adopt changes which 
might be poorly identified, while the real problems are not addressed and deficiencies 
prevail.29 
                                                 
26
 Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. The Limits of Organizational Change. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Egeberg, Morton. 2003. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective”. Pp. 
116-126 in B. Guy Peters, John Pierre (eds.). Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage 
Publications. 
29
 Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press. 
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The second reason is structural secrecy. In order to be efficient, organizations 
specialize and divide to proficient subunits focusing on specific tasks. However, this 
kind of specialization prevents the efficient movement of knowledge and information 
within an organization. The resulting outcome is that “people in one part of the 
organization often lack the expertise to understand the work of people in other parts of 
the organization.”30 Structural secrecy makes it hard for managers to understand what 
exactly are the subunits doing and what needs to be changed. “The very structures, 
rules, and technologies designed to improve efficiency sabotage the organizations 
ability to learn and change.”31 
Finally, the liability of time or institutional inertia is the third factor limiting the 
organizational change. All organizations become more resistant to change as routines, 
norms, and relationships get established over time. Here, the problem is multifaceted. 
Organizational management supports standardization in operating procedures, 
motivation of employees, etc. But the very measures that create stability and reliability 
reduce the probability of change.32 In addition, the growing homogeneity of 
organizational culture – i.e. norms, relationships, and behaviors – leads employees to be 
naturally resistant to change of the way things have been done because they have 
become comfortable and used to the old procedures.33 
These three obstacles to change apply to all organizations. However, change is 
even harder for government agencies. This is because governmental institutions are 
generally designed to be both stable and durable and hence resistant to change. 
Government institutions place a high value on reliability, predictability and consistency 
in performing their tasks.34 Moreover, it is much easier for government agencies to 
resist change because they are not operating in a competitive market environment, 
which motivates private companies to adapt in order to survive.  
Also, the political environment in which government institutions work makes it 
difficult for them to change. The political backing for the creation or reform of a 
governmental agency relies on compromising political coalitions. Political opposition in 
                                                 
30
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 52 
31
 Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 110. 
32
 Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John. 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”. American 
Sociological Review 49: 149-164. 
33
 Kaufman, Herbert. 1976. Are Governmental Organizations Immortal? Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press or Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown. 
34
 Meyer, Marshall W., Zucker, Lynne G. 1989. Permanently Failing Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
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the American democratic political system has various means to limit or hamper the 
reform or creation of a new agency.35  
Another obstacle to governmental agency change in comparison with the private 
sector is that managers of governmental organizations are restricted by many more 
rules, conflicting goals and bureaucratic red tape. The process of managerial decisions 
such as hiring and firing employees, or acquiring more funds is required to move 
through a complicated system of bureaucratic layers, which ultimately makes it difficult 
for the governmental agencies to change. 
Another way of changing agencies that do not manage internally is an imposed 
change from the outside, through executive or legislative action. These processes are not 
at the core of the argument of this thesis, but have a certain effect on the final outcome 
of the U.S. intelligence community reform and therefore need to be mentioned. 
Especially important is the fact that even here obstacles to organizational change 
emerge. These consist of the rational self-interest decision making of both the president 
as well as the legislators.  
For presidents the incentives to improve organizational effectiveness exist and 
presidents are expected to promote it. However, presidents must prioritize among issues 
on their packed agendas. With limited election terms, presidents focus mostly on issues 
that directly concern voters, rather then on changing the complicated organizational 
design of governmental agencies. As Zegart concludes, “presidents are especially 
reluctant to push for agency reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of 
anticipated resistance.”36 Also for legislators the topic of agency reform is mostly not 
attractive enough to delve into. Especially the intelligence reform has weak connection 
to voters in their electoral districts.  
A second external barrier to intelligence reform stems from some key principles 
of American democracy, its decentralized system of federal government and stress on 
civil liberties. The federal system of government, as was already mentioned, enables 
political opposition to mitigate the final outcomes of proposed reforms. Also, the 
emphasis on civil liberties usually complicates any attempts to reform and centralize the 
intelligence community out of the fear of civil rights violations if more power was 
vested in the intelligence community. 
                                                 
35
 Moe, Terry. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure”.  Pp. 267-322 in John E. Chubb, Paul E. 
Peterson (eds.). Can the Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
36
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 57. 
- 22 - 
 
This overview of the intelligence and organizational literatures highlights a 
number of key themes relevant to reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
All organizations by their very nature are resistant to substantial change and are 
constrained by rational self-interest of key decision makers. In addition, public 
institutions must take into account their political environment. In the case, of 
intelligence organizations strong popular support for liberal democratic principles is a 
central consideration. Each of these three themes provides the building blocks for the 
research methodology used in this thesis. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
Given the complex theoretical framework applied to the study of the U.S. 
intelligence community reform, the research methodology requires a comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the actual research method used in this thesis may be summarized as an 
analytical and evaluative organizational narrative. The research methodology used in 
this thesis is based on an Eastonian37 input/output perspective on intelligence reform. 
The basic features of this methodological approach are presented schematically in 
Figure 1.1. 
Within this Figure 1.1 the development of the U.S. intelligence community 
before 9/11 as well as actions undertaken in order to promote intelligence reform post 
9/11 are considered to be inputs into the original institutional design of the intelligence 
community. Thereafter, the impact of the pre-9/11 situation and post-9/11 reform 
proposals will be evaluated using an organizational and rational-decision making 
framework. Lastly, the output or actual implementation of the legislation reforming the 
U.S. intelligence community will be evaluated based on the criteria of effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
The intelligence institutions depicted by the box in the centre of Figure 1.1 
consists of the internal organizational processes present within the U.S. intelligence 
community. These internal processes include the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within the intelligence agencies culture. 
The internal organizational processes are influenced by external processes entrenched in 
                                                 
37
 David Easton, a renowned political scientist, created a model of political system based on input and 
output factors which are influenced by external environment. For more on Easton’s application of systems 
theory of political science, see e.g. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
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the political and societal environment. The external environment processes consist of 
executive and legislative decisions made by the self-interest rationale of political 
leaders, as well as of the democratic societal values of citizens on the basis of deeply 
held beliefs regarding civil liberties. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the research methodology 
 
Note: This systems theory approach to intelligence provision, based on the work of Easton,38 views the 
work of intelligence institutions as being a product of the inputs into these institutions and the 
environment within which intelligence institutions operate. This model does not deal directly with the 
internal operations of intelligence institutions but suggests that institutional factors play an important 
role in mediating policy inputs and outputs. 
 
The pre-9/11 socio-political context will be discussed in chapter 2. This context is 
viewed in Figure 1.1 as providing a key input to the development of the U.S. 
intelligence community before 9/11. Within the approaches to the study of intelligence 
presented in section 2.2 of chapter 2, all of the previously mentioned themes such as 
limits of intelligence oversight, methods and practice of intelligence agencies 
influencing institutions decisions and actions, and the advocacy of the status quo by 
former intelligence professionals add to the pre-9/11 input will be discussed. Each of 
these themes has influenced the internal organizational design and culture of the U.S. 
intelligence community. 
Later in chapter 3 the focus will shift to an examination of the input provided by 
reactions to the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on governmental and legislative initiatives to 
reform the U.S. intelligence community. These actions have also had an impact on the 
internal institutional processes within the intelligence community. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
                                                 
38
 Ibid., p. 32. 
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thereafter evaluate all the interconnected input processes influencing the final output of 
the post-reform intelligence community in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. 
The evidence for the analysis and evaluation of the U.S. intelligence community 
reform presented in following chapters is drawn from a wide range of unclassified and 
declassified policy documents. This type of evidence is composed of various 
commission recommendations, official reports and working papers analyzing the pre-
9/11 and post-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence community, internal agency evaluation 
documents of the progress of implementing the intelligence reform propositions, various 
official strategies, and miscellaneous pieces of legislation related to the intelligence 
community reform. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical and methodological framework for this research 
thesis has been presented. The theoretical approach adopted draws inspiration from 
insights derived from the literatures on intelligence and organizations. These insights 
have been used in conjunction with an Eastonian systems model to construct a 
methodological approach exploring the two main influences, or inputs, on intelligence 
institutional reform and the enhanced security provision provided by intelligence 
organizations collectively. This policy output will be evaluated in terms of two central 
criteria: effectiveness and efficiency. Given the relative underdevelopment of the 
scholarly study of intelligence community reform such a methodological approach 
seems a reasonable approach to adopt when dealing a large volume of detailed evidence. 
In the next chapter, the process of applying the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives developed in the foregoing pages will be “put to the test” and used to 
marshal the evidence to address the two key questions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. 
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2. U.S. Intelligence Community before 9/11: Searching for Direction 
For about forty years the United States intelligence community focused on one 
overriding target: the Soviet Union, and its satellites. Attention and resources were 
mostly directed against Soviet nuclear forces and its conventional forces threatening 
Western Europe.39 However, with the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community, 
as well as the whole direction of the U.S. foreign policy, faced a dilemma of finding its 
purpose in a new unipolar world.40 The old adversary had disappeared and a new one 
was coming in many different forms and shapes. The intelligence community was 
expected to adapt to these new threats and to focus on a changed set of targets. The 
ability (or inability) to adapt to these changes forms part of the pre-9/11 input to the 
intelligence community reform agenda outlined earlier in the systems theory model 
presented in Figure 1.1. 
This chapter will first focus on the change of the intelligence environment after 
the end of the Cold War and the challenges posed by transnational threats. Although 
these threats were not new to the U.S. intelligence community, they were never in the 
forefront of its attention. In the second section, various attempts to reform the 
intelligence community before 9/11, based on the changing threats and targets, will be 
presented. These were set forth in recommendations of a number of bipartisan blue-
ribbon commissions, nonpartisan think tank reports and governmental initiatives 
undertaken during the 1990s. The final part of this chapter will examine the main 
obstacles to implementing these proposals and recommendations for a reform. 
 
2.1. Post-Cold War Environment: Adapting to New Threats 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
communist threat had diminished and there was no apparent threat from any foreign 
military power or any hostile ideology of comparable reach to that of the Soviet 
                                                 
39
 Maddrell, Paul. 2009. “Failing Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats”. International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22 (2): 199.  
40
 The concept of the United States as the world’s only leading superpower and the future of America’s 
grand strategy was vastly  analyzed by many outstanding scholars of international relations, e.g.: 
Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. “The Unipolar Moment”. Foreign Affairs 70 (1): 23–33; Layne, 
Christopher. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise”.  International Security 
17 (4): 5–51; Layne, Christopher. 1997.  “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future 
Grand Strategy”. International Security 22 (1): 86–124; or Nye, Joseph S. 2002. “Limits of American 
Power”. Political Science Quarterly 117 (4): 545-559. 
- 26 - 
 
Union.41 However, different types of threats to U.S. national security emerged. These 
threats were known to U.S. policy makers and intelligence analysts during the Cold 
War, but they were mostly understood as being peripheral to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its communist counterparts.  
The main characteristic of these threats is their asymmetric and transnational 
nature. The asymmetry is postulated by the non-state character of their actors, which 
can be mostly described as armed groups. According to Richard H. Schultz, a leading 
expert on the topic of asymmetric threats and armed groups, there are four categories of 
armed groups: terrorists, insurgents, militias, and organized crime. “All armed groups, 
to varying degrees, challenge the state’s authority, power, and legitimacy. Some do so 
by seeking to overthrow the government and replace it, while others attempt to weaken, 
manipulate, or co-opt the state.”42 This is achieved through the use violence and force in 
unconventional and asymmetric ways. The transnational aspect of these threats can be 
characterized by their disrespect for national boundaries and cross border operational 
mode. These threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.43 
Transnational threats and the actors responsible for them were not new for U.S. 
intelligence; the intelligence community had been active against organized crime and 
drug traffickers even during the Cold War. Similarly, terrorism was a re-occurring issue 
with recognized threats of Middle East terrorism since the 1970s and state-sponsored 
terrorism of the 1980s. But as Gregory Treverton points out, the novelty was: (1) in the 
growing importance of transnational threats, especially of terrorism, and (2) in the range 
of concern for transnational threats, which (again most notably terrorism) became the 
primary activity for intelligence.44 
Also, the spectrum of present and potential transnational threats has been 
broadening, thus creating the need for the intelligence community to adapt in order to be 
able to follow this growing number of targets. Whereas during the Cold War the 
problem was a general lack of information, the post-Cold War environment presented 
the opposite challenge for the intelligence community – too much information 
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 May, Ernest R. 1996. “Intelligence: Backing into the Future”. p. 37 in Roy Godson, Ernest R. May and 
Gary Schmitt (eds.). U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads. Washington: Brassey’s. 
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 Schultz, Robert H. 2005. “The Era of Armed Groups”. p. 10 in Peter Berkowitz (ed.). The Future of 
American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution.  
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 Definition in: Best, Richard A. 2001. Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational 
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stemming from the vast range of transnational threats. Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading 
scholar of intelligence studies, contends that “deciding what to focus on in the absence 
of the overwhelming Soviet threat and in the midst of nearly a decade of severe budget 
cuts was a daunting managerial challenge”.45 
The terrorist threats did, indeed, stand out among the many other transnational 
threats identified after the end of the Cold War. Some intelligence officials argued that 
intelligence agencies did recognize the importance of the terrorist threats and allocated 
its resources and launched new programs to combat terrorism well before 9/11. As 
former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates stated in 1994, the U.S. 
intelligence community started to readjust its priorities and shifted its resources away 
from the Soviet and other communist-related targets and missions soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, 58 percent of the whole intelligence 
community’s budget were devoted to following the Soviet-related threats, while by 
1993 this figure had dropped to just 13 percent.46 Even though specific budget figures 
for the intelligence community are classified, it appears resources were reallocated to 
fight terrorism. As the conclusions of the Joint Inquiry suggest, despite the time of tight 
budgets during the 1990s, direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.47 
Moreover, both within the CIA and the FBI incentives to transform and to 
address the terrorist threats evolved. According to the testimony of former Director of 
the FBI (1993-2001) Louis J. Freeh before the 9/11 Commission, the FBI had more than 
tripled its counterterrorism budget by 1999; it had also doubled the number of agents 
working on counterterrorism cases and expanded the number of its Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF) to improve coordination with local law enforcement.48 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2003, stated in 
his testimony before the Joint Inquiry that both the CIA as well as the intelligence 
                                                 
45
 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2008. “Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq”. p. 227 in 
Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.). Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
46
 Robert Gates quoted in Hedley, John. 1996. “The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix 
it?” Studies in Intelligence 39 (5): 14. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol39no5/pdf/v39i5a02p.pdf> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
47
 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. 2002. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001. Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Joint Inquiry Final Report), p. 257. Available at: 
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
48
 Freeh, Louis J. 2004. “On War and Terrorism”. Testimony before the National Commission on 
Terrorist attack upon the United States. April 13, 2004. Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/freeh_statement.pdf> [accessed 15.4. 2010]. 
- 28 - 
 
community as a whole had focused on the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other 
Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or Egyptian Islamist Jihad. An 
interagency approach was adopted through the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), under 
the auspices of the DCI. Among other CIA initiatives were: a new comprehensive 
strategy against al Qaeda called “The Plan”, a nationwide program for hiring qualified 
personnel for counterterrorism tasks, a counterterrorism educational programs, and 
measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI such as exchange of senior 
officials.49 
However, as Gregory Treverton, a renowned intelligence expert, points out, the 
U.S. intelligence community faced a number of Cold War legacies, which were 
mismatched to the changed threats. First, it was the boundaries between intelligence and 
law enforcement, foreign and domestic, and between public and private, which were 
created out of concern for civil liberties. These boundaries were then reinforced by the 
institutional legacy, which organized intelligence by source based on “stovepipes”50 on 
the collection side, and by agency not by issue or problem on the analysis side. During 
the Cold War, this division enhanced competition between analysts and provided 
different perspectives on the same issue, while the agencies could tailor their analysis to 
the needs of their consumers. The final Cold War legacy was a product of the 
boundaries. Domestic intelligence performed by the FBI was twice circumscribed. The 
FBI was first and foremost law enforcement organization, thus focused on reaction and 
prosecution, rather than on prevention. Moreover, “the domestic-intelligence function 
was limited by the boundary between intelligence and law enforcement, a ‘wall’ that 
extended inside the FBI and inhibited cooperation among intelligence and law 
enforcement officials working on similar issues.”51 
The intelligence community pre-9/11 attempted to transform itself amid the new 
terrorist threats by reallocating resources and creating new initiatives. However, the 
pace of the transformation was not efficient enough given the limited resources as well 
as the obstacles within the organizations stemming from the Cold War legacy of the 
institutional design of the intelligence community. As a result, the events of 9/11 
highlighted the unpreparedness and ineffectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community 
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to prevent a terrorist attack. Most of the deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community 
and the importance of adaptation of the intelligence community organization to the 
transnational threats were identified by various commissions and initiatives throughout 
the 1990’s. Their main ideas and recommendations will be examined in the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
2.2. Pre-9/11 Attempts to Reform the U.S. Intelligence Community52 
The end of the Cold War brought on a debate not only about the role of the 
United States in the international system, it has also stirred up a discussion about the 
importance of intelligence for the U.S. national security and foreign policies53 as well as 
about the best way the intelligence community should be organized in order to face the 
changed threats. Amy Zegart, a leading expert on U.S. intelligence reform and national 
security, created an intelligence reform catalogue consisting of twelve major bipartisan 
commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces. This catalogue 
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts between 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
this respect, Zegart contends that “All of their reports urged reform within intelligence 
agencies, across the Intelligence Community and other parts of the U.S. government.”54 
Using Zegart’s approach to analyzing the pre-9/11 state of the U.S. intelligence 
community has the advantage of eliminating the problem of hindsight, instead it allows 
us to focus on what the intelligence officials and policymakers really knew before 9/11. 
Table 2.1 presents the twelve initiatives, out of which six were high profile 
bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions chaired by Congressional leaders and top 
governmental officials such as former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, former 
Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and Harold Brown, William Webster former director of 
both the CIA and FBI and Ambassador Paul Bremer. Three studies were developed by 
leading nonpartisan think tanks: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Institute 
for Public Policy, and the 20th Century Fund. The remaining three reports stemmed from 
                                                 
52
 For detailed structure of the U.S. Intelligence Community before 9/11 see Appendix 1. 
53
 One of the main critiques of U.S. intelligence was Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who even 
proposed abolishment of the CIA (Moynihan, Daniel P. 1998. Secrecy: The American Experience. New 
Haven: Yale University Press). On the other hand, John Lewis Gaddis stressed that the importance of 
intelligence for U.S. national security because “the absence of no imminent threat is no guarantee that 
threats do not exist” (Gaddis, John Lewis. 1991. “Toward the Post-Cold War World”. Foreign Affairs 70 
(Spring): 102.). 
54
 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 27. 
- 30 - 
 
governmental initiatives: President Clinton’s interagency National Performance Review, 
the FBI’s 1998 Strategic Plan, and a House Intelligence Committee staff study.55  
 
Table 2.1. Intelligence Reform Catalogue of Unclassified U.S. Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism Studies, 1991-2001 
 
Year 
Issued 
Study Name Number of 
Recommendations 
1993, 
1995 
National Performance Review (Phases I and II) 35 
1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) 
39 
1996 Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force 29 
1996 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study 
(IC21) 
75 
1996 20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence 18 
1997 National Institute on Public Policy Report on Modernizing 
Intelligence (Odom Report) 
34 
1998 FBI Strategic Plan 1998–2003  60 
1999 Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Deutch Commission) 
57 
1999, 
2000 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore 
Commission), Reports 1 and 2 
60 
 
2000 Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement 
(Webster Commission) 
21 
 
2000 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) 36 
2001 U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-
Rudman Commission), Phase III Report 
50 
 Total 514 
Source: Adapted from Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 29. 
 
Together the studies proposed 514 recommendations on wide range of issues. Only six 
of the studies focused specifically on intelligence issues; the other six dealt with topics 
ranging from counterterrorism (The Gilmore and Bremer Commissions), proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (The Deutch Commission), federal law enforcement (The 
Webster Commission), to emerging 21st century threats to the U.S. national security in 
general (The Hart-Rudman Commission). Out of the 514 recommendations, 
approximately two-thirds of them, or 340, focused exclusively on improving and fixing 
the U.S. intelligence community. It should be noted that even the law enforcement and 
counterterrorism studies paid a great amount of attention to the problems of the 
                                                 
55
 Zegart Amy. 2005. “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies”. 
International Security 29 (4): 86. 
- 31 - 
 
Intelligence Community. “Tellingly, every study during the period included discussion 
of major intelligence deficiencies and every study issued recommendations to fix them. 
Together, the counterterrorism and law enforcement studies contributed one-third of all 
intelligence reform recommendations.”56 
Zegart has identified four categories of major organizational problems on which 
the studies mostly agreed: (1) the intelligence community’s lack of coherence or 
“corporateness”; (2) insufficient human intelligence; (3) personnel systems that failed to 
align intelligence needs with personnel skills or encourage information sharing; and (4) 
weaknesses in setting intelligence priorities.57 It is important to note that each of these 
four categories were later identified by both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 
9/11 Commission as the ultimate blunders leading to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. 
The lack of “corporateness” can be best understood through the structural 
shortages in organization and lack of leadership in the U.S. intelligence community. As 
the Council on Foreign Relations report pointed out, “the intelligence community was 
less a community than a collection of more than a dozen largely autonomous 
components spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the world” with no one in 
charge of them.58 Despite the official role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
as the main leader of the intelligence community being responsible for proposing 
strategies and coordinating efforts across the intelligence agencies, the DCI was in 
reality overpowered by the Secretary of Defense which controlled over 80 percent of the 
intelligence budget. In this sense, the 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study 
criticized what it saw as “the glaring gap” between the DCI’s responsibilities and its 
authorities.59 
Inadequate human intelligence capabilities were criticized by a majority of the 
reports. In this respect, it was recommended that the recruitment process requiring prior 
approval from the CIA before individuals suspected of civil rights violations could be 
recruited60 be re-evaluated or abolished. The Bremer Commission recommended the 
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DCI to issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines would no longer apply to recruiting 
terrorist informants and identified aggressive recruitment of human intelligence sources 
on terrorism as one of the intelligence community’s highest priorities.61 A similar 
suggestion was made by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which also warned against the 
steep decline of intelligence budgets and its impact on human intelligence.62 
The problems of personnel systems and information sharing were addressed by 
nearly one-third of the recommendations. The House Intelligence Committee staff study 
concluded that the intelligence community “continues to face major personnel crises 
that it has, thus far not addressed in any coherent way”.63 Hand in hand with the 
personnel issues, the importance of information sharing was stressed. The Aspin-Brown 
Commission as well as the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Council on Foreign 
Relations Task Force recommended improvements in information sharing between the 
intelligence agencies and better cooperation with law enforcement agencies on domestic 
intelligence issues.64 
Many of the recommendations proposed during the 1990s also focused on the 
lack of attention of both the intelligence officials as well as policymakers to setting 
intelligence priorities. The emergence of transnational threats at the end of the Cold War 
resulted with more issues to be covered by the intelligence agencies with less sources 
and little guidance about how to prioritize among them. The 1996 House Intelligence 
Committee called the requirements process “one of the most vexing aspects of 
intelligence management” and called for creation of “an overarching concept for 
coordinating intelligence requirements, especially when faced with declining resources, 
a growing customer base, and increasingly diverse requirements”.65 The lack of 
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effective prioritizing process was criticized even five years later by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission, which was concerned with the “dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of 
important countries, regions, and functional challenges”.66 
As Zegart contends, of the 340 recommendations for changes of the U.S. 
intelligence community, only 35 were successfully implemented, and 268 – or 79 
percent of the total – resulted in no action at all.67 There was only one legislative 
initiative that attempted to implement the various commissions’ recommendations and 
one initiative that served as a starting point for all of the studies included in the 
Intelligence Reform Catalogue. This first attempt to reflect the changed situation of the 
post-Cold War world was made by Senator David Boren and Representative Dave 
McCurdy in 1992.68 Both of these legislators introduced two nearly identical proposals 
to reshape the structure of U.S. intelligence community including the replacement of the 
Director of Central Intelligence with a Director of National Intelligence, who was 
supposed to preside over four separate agencies – one for each category of intelligence 
collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) and the fourth for newly created agency 
responsible for analysis.69 Moreover, the DNI was supposed to have budget authority 
over all kinds of intelligence, including military. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was 
not adopted, and as Richard A. Best notes, “observers credited strong opposition from 
the Defense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with 
inhibiting passage of the legislation”.70 
The other main legislative initiative was the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
the 1997 Fiscal Year (FY1997), which attempted to act upon the recommendations of 
the Aspin-Brown Commission and the IC21 Study. Two deputy DCI positions were 
established, one for Deputy DCI and the other for a Deputy DCI for Community 
Management, both Senate-confirmed positions. Moreover, the act gave the DCI 
authority to develop and present to the President an annual budget for the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program and to participate in the development of a military 
intelligence budget. Despite the effort that went into the FY1997 legislation, attempts 
intended to enhance the DCI’s community-wide role were not fully implemented. The 
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FY1997 Act established four new Senate-confirmed positions having responsibilities 
that extended across all intelligence agencies. From its enactment until it was 
superseded by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Senate 
confirmed only two individuals to these positions, who both left office in 2003 and were 
never replaced. In addition, the DCI’s authorities in the preparation of budgets for all 
intelligence agencies had not been fully exercised.71 
Analysis of the intelligence reform catalogue data on various attempts to reform 
the U.S. intelligence community amid the growing threats of transnational terrorism 
indicates that intelligence officials as well as policymakers recognized the importance 
of these threats and the necessity to adapt to them. However, both legislators and 
intelligence specialists failed to achieve the necessary reforms to eliminate the 
deficiencies identified. Even after legislation implementing the recommendations was 
adopted, proponents of reform failed to oversee its full realization. The FY1997 Act is 
one example of such failures. There are a number of reasons why these attempts were 
thwarted. These reasons will be examined in the final section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Obstacles to Reform pre-9/11 
Answering the question why were the pre-9/11 recommendations largely 
ignored by intelligence officials as well as the policymakers requires a multifaceted 
perspective. The first and largest obstacle was the general aversion of organizations 
toward reform. Such resistance opposed both internal initiatives espousing change and 
external attempts imposed through legislation or executive action. The second obstacle 
is embedded in the very principles of American democracy, which are based on 
protection of civil liberties, as well as on the fragmentation and decentralization of the 
U.S. system of government. The third obstacle is based on the rational interests of the 
U.S. leaders, i.e. the tradeoffs between incentives for change and the actual capabilities 
to make the change, which largely effect the decision making of the U.S. leaders. This 
three level approach facilitates creating an explanatory model of resistance to reform of 
the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 despite the widespread recognition of the 
threat posed by terrorism during the 1990s. 
 
2.3.1. Organizational Obstacles 
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As noted in chapter 2, organizations in general do not change easily72, for 
government agencies change is even harder73, and for the intelligence community it is 
particularly so.74 All organizations have to overcome three types of problems when 
attempting to change: (1) bounded rationality75 – cognitive limits of individuals 
affecting the decision-making and management of organizations; (2) structural secrecy 
or information asymmetry76 – specialization of subunits preventing knowledge sharing; 
and (3) liability of time or institutional inertia77– growing resistance to change as 
routines, norms and relationships become established. As Amy Zegart contends, for 
government agencies these problems are heightened, because they lack three key 
advantages that the business organizations enjoy.78 
The first is the lack of market competition, which in private sector creates the 
incentives for reform to promote better efficiency and effectiveness if they want to 
survive. Government agencies do not face this immediate threat of diminishing or 
replacement due to poor performance. The Congress does have oversight capabilities. 
However, its powers to dissolve an intelligence agency are limited. 
The second advantage that government agencies lack is that the owners and 
employees of private companies generally want them to succeed and therefore create 
and support the incentives for change. On the contrary, government agencies’ reform is 
often thwarted by political opponents who obstruct the legislative process and thus limit 
the likelihood for success of reform. In the case of the U.S. intelligence community, the 
role of the Department of Defense lobby proved crucial as it effectively blocked many 
of the initiatives attempting to reorganize the community that would reduced its 
authority in any way.79 
The third disadvantage when comparing the government agencies to the private 
sector are the limits imposed on the actual managerial work of public sector officials, 
who are bound with bureaucratic red tape and have much less freedom in their decision-
making as opposed to managers of private companies. Intelligence officials serve many 
different consumers from the president, his advisors and members of the Congress, who 
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all have different and often conflicting preferences. This makes it very difficult to make 
internal adjustments.80 
 
2.3.2. Democratic Principles 
American democratic principles limited external intelligence reform in two 
ways. First, as was already mentioned above, there is the fragmented and decentralized 
political system based on separation of powers, congressional committee system, and 
majority rule. Within this system it is possible for political opponents to hinder the 
enactment of new legislation and thus curb or thwart any reform process altogether.81 
Another way in which the democratic process negatively influenced the 
intelligence reform attempts was its emphasis on civil liberties. Any change of the U.S. 
intelligence community, which would led to heightened domestic intelligence or 
cooperation of CIA on domestic affairs was immediately criticized. Such opposition 
was based on fears of limiting civil liberties and creating a “big brother” kind of 
institution – something highly unpopular with the American public.82 
 
2.3.3. Rational Decision-making 
The last obstacle is a result of the differing capabilities and incentives of 
decision-makers. Both the president and legislators are well-aware of the difficulty of 
enforcing a major intelligence reform. The general unpopularity of the topic among 
voters as well as the community itself lowers the decision-makers incentives even more. 
Moreover, national security bureaucrats promote their own interests. These are mostly 
adhering to the status quo as no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to any 
other ‘rival’ organization.83 
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2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. More 
specifically, this chapter has explored the resistance of the U.S. intelligence community 
to various reform initiatives during the 1990s. A variety of explanations have been used 
to account for such institutional resistance to comprehensive reform. One influential 
approach based on historical experience, suggests that real reform or change is only 
possible amid a catastrophe or crisis. Pearl Harbor and entrance into WWII were the 
impetus leading to the creation of the CIA and a subsequent restructuring of the whole 
system of the U.S. national security.  
Since the immediate post-war era, no major attempt to reorganize and reform the 
U.S. intelligence community had been successful until the enactment of the Intelligence 
and Prevention Terrorism Act. It seems that the post-Cold War change of threat 
environment did not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s 
intelligence services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence 
community was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was 
unprepared to prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Only after the events of 9/11 and from the perspective of hindsight did the 
deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community become widely visible and hence 
impossible to ignore. The question of whether the worst terrorist attack in the history of 
the United States was a catalyst strong enough to promote effective and efficient 
intelligence reform will be examined in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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3. 9/11 and its Aftermath: Searching for Answers and Solutions 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in American 
history. Their extent and brutality combined with the fact that they were carried out on 
the American soil provided unique opportunity not only for the reform of the U.S. 
intelligence community, but also for the biggest transformation of the U.S. government 
since 1947. Suddenly, the shocked American public was willing to sacrifice some of its 
civil liberties in exchange for protection. Also, the rational self-interests of the President 
as well as the legislators shifted towards support for the intelligence reform.  
After the first shock from 9/11 passed over, a wide-ranging debate was 
prompted over the role of intelligence in failing to recognize the threat and prevent the 
terrorist attacks. Two commissions were established to investigate the failure. First was 
the Joint Inquiry conducted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees and second was the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). The conclusions and 
recommendations of these committees pointed out some of the essential weaknesses 
within the intelligence community and became an important starting point for 
subsequent intelligence community reform.  
Moreover, in the immediate reaction to 9/11, President Bush and the U.S. 
Congress promoted other initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. These initiatives affected also the U.S. intelligence 
community. The first one, enactment of the USA Patriot Act had a positive impact as it 
removed the barriers of information sharing between the law enforcement and 
intelligence. The second initiative, the homeland security agenda, turned out to have a 
more ambiguous impact. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
responsible among other functions for domestic intelligence gathering and analysis 
created another level in the already fragmented intelligence community. Also, the 
creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) produced more confusion 
about the roles of intelligence community and the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. 
This chapter will present the main findings and recommendations of the Joint 
Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission. Thereafter, there will be an examination of the 
initiatives that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, such as the USA 
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Patriot Act, the development of homeland security agenda, and the creation of the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center and their implications for intelligence reform.   
As was the case with the pre-9/11 context of the U.S. intelligence community, 
these initiatives also serve as an input factor to the evaluation of the final outcome of the 
U.S. intelligence community reform, its efficiency and effectiveness (see Figure 1.1). 
 
3.1. Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations 
Shortly after 9/11, questions concerning the failure of intelligence to avert the 
terrorist attacks were raised. There was pressure to find out what had led to the attacks 
and who was responsible. Was the U.S. intelligence community properly organized for 
the transnational, non-state actor threats? Had policymakers known about the threat and 
failed to act? These were the types of questions that were asked both by the U.S. public 
as well as by the legislators themselves. It is apparent from the previous chapter that the 
threats were known and that there were many hints pointing to the insufficient 
organization of the intelligence community, however, only after 9/11, for the first time 
since the end of the Cold War, people actually seemed to pay attention. 
First, the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Intelligence Committees established a Joint Inquiry with three principal goals: (1) to 
conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have 
known prior to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the 
United States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist 
attacks against the United States and its interests; (2) identify and examine any systemic 
problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or 
preventing these attacks in advance; and (3) to make recommendations to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist 
attacks.84 
Among the main findings of the Joint Inquiry was that “prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was neither well-organized, nor well-equipped, and did not 
adequately adapt to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets 
within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage 
provided by U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities.”85 Put simply, as the 
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Joint Inquiry recognized, the intelligence community was not properly organized for a 
transnational threat such as al Qaeda. 
Other findings included: (1) the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy both on governmental as well as intelligence level; (2) inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources and problematic intelligence community budgeting practices and 
procedures; (3) inefficient use of new technology and reliance on outdated technologies, 
thus having a negative impact on collaboration between the intelligence community 
agencies as well as their adaption to the nature of the terrorist threats; (4)  lack of 
incentives for analytical positions, which were seen as dead-end jobs in the community 
and which led to analytic deficiencies, thus seriously undercutting the ability of U.S. 
policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat; (5) lack of information sharing 
not only between intelligence community agencies, but also within individual agencies, 
and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, and also between 
intelligence community and relevant non-intelligence community agencies, such as law 
enforcement and border protection; (6) lack of reliable and knowledgeable human 
sources; (7) lengthy and perilous application process for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance leading to a diminished level of FBI coverage of 
suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States; (8) lack of strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.86 
 In its final report, the Joint Inquiry proposed nineteen recommendations, which 
included establishing a powerful new director of national intelligence, revamping the 
intelligence priority process, and considering whether new domestic intelligence agency 
should replace the FBI. However, as M. Kent Bolton contends, the Joint Inquiry’s 
thorough work – it studied some one million documents and interviewed some 500 
persons – “raised more questions than it answered; it thereby provided an impetus for 
subsequent postmortems.”87 This succeeding task was undergone by the 9/11 
Commission, the mother of all postmortems. 
 The 9/11 Commission built on the findings of the Joint Inquiry and added some 
more insights stemming from 1200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of various 
documents. The 9/11 Commission took the reshaping of the U.S. intelligence into a new 
level. Gregory Treverton points out that “its report was dramatic and made several 
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recommendations – primarily to reshape the organization of U.S. intelligence but also to 
begin to change the way it does business.”88 
 Regarding intelligence, the 9/11 Commission identified six problems, which 
created the need to restructure intelligence: (1) structural barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work – the problem of organizing national intelligence around collection 
disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission; (2) lack of common standards 
and practices across the foreign-domestic divide that created the inability to pool 
information gathered abroad with information gathered in the United States; (3) divided 
management of national intelligence capabilities, which limited influence of the DCI 
over the three intelligence agencies housed within the Department of Defense (the NSA, 
the NGA, and the NRO); (4) weak capacity of the DCI to set priorities and move 
resources; (5) too many tasks carried out by the DCI – the fact that DCI had three jobs 
as head of the community, principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters, and 
head of the CIA combined with his weak authorities even limited his managerial 
abilities; (6) too complex and secret nature of intelligence community, which made 
public comprehension of the intelligence agencies and the rules surrounding them 
impossible.89 
 Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission recognized the fact that even though the 
DCI was responsible for community performance, it lacked three authorities critical for 
any agency head or chief executive officer: control over purse strings, the ability to hire 
or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure 
and personnel.90 In order to address these problems the 9/11 Commission made six 
broad proposals, which underscored the need not only to create the technical 
infrastructure to better share intelligence but also to rethink the perspective of “need-to-
know” and other security requirements that frustrated sharing. The 9/11 principal 
recommendations were to91: 
 
• Create the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), located in 
the White House and possessing real authority over the budgets of the fifteen 
U.S. intelligence agencies 
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• Institute a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reporting to the DNI, 
responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence 
• Establish national intelligence centers, organized around discrete issues on 
the model of the NCTC, under the authority of the DNI 
• Make the CIA director a position separate from the DNI and charge him 
primarily with building better espionage capacity for the nation 
• Rethink the web of “need-to know” and other security procedures that 
frustrate not just sharing but also intelligence work as whole 
• Not to create a separate domestic-intelligence service, instead to encourage 
the FBI to move forward with changing its mission from pure law 
enforcement to terrorism prevention  
 
The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations fit to each of the 
four categories (lack of “corporateness”, personnel/information sharing, strategic 
mission and priorities, and human intelligence) of the twelve pre-9/11 commissions and 
task forces’ proposals for reform. Therefore, it is possible to see some consistency in the 
pre- and post-9/11 attempts to reform the U.S. intelligence community. As chapter 2 
showed, the pre-9/11 attempts were generally ignored by the decision-makers and 
resisted by the intelligence agencies themselves. The general idea behind the 9/11 
Commission reform proposal was that after 9/11 the incentives for adoption of the 
reform have changed and it was therefore possible to usher in a sweeping reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community. The next chapter will address this assumption.  
But before we move to an interpretation of the implementation of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, it is important to pay attention to other developments, 
which happened simultaneously with the work of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 
Commission.  
 
3.2. Immediate Reaction and its Implications for Intelligence Reform 
The surprise of the 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in sweeping response of the 
Bush administration and the U.S. Congress in order to boost domestic counterterrorist 
policies. This immediate reaction included enactment of the USA Patriot Act, 
development of a homeland security agenda and subsequently the establishment of the 
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Department of Homeland Security. Both of the initiatives had implications for the 
intelligence community reform. 
 
3.2.1. USA Patriot Act 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration presented Congress 
with proposals to expand police and prosecutorial powers to enhance the fight against 
terrorism”.92 Six weeks later, these proposals culminated in the adoption of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA Patriot Act93. It passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by wide margins – 375 to 66 and 98 to 1 respectively.94 
As a result of the speedy manner in which Congress presented (Oct. 23), debated, and 
implemented this policy (voting in the House was held on Oct. 24 and in the Senate on 
Oct. 25) there was little controversy surrounding its inception.95 
The main aim of the USA Patriot Act was to strengthen the abilities of the U.S. 
government agencies to collect and share information regarding ongoing investigations 
of terror plots. And also to enable the U.S. government to be better equipped to identify, 
investigate, follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists. Among the most 
important provisions included in the act were:96 
 
• It allowed for federal warrants to be effective nationwide and no longer 
limited to special districts; 
• It enabled law enforcement to obtain subpoena power for alleged terrorists’ 
communications, including fixed and wireless telephones, e-mail, web 
surfing, as well as unopened voice mail and e-mail; 
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• It attached roving wiretaps to alleged terrorists and thereby eliminated the 
need for the government to request wiretaps for specific telephone numbers 
as previously required; 
• It improved coordination and cooperation, such as information gathering 
between US intelligence and law enforcement investigators, with respect to 
terrorist organizations; 
• It allowed law enforcement to use new subpoena power to obtain payment 
information such as credit card or bank account numbers, of suspected 
terrorists who are utilizing the Internet; 
• It created rules to counter terrorists’ access to, and use of illicit funds as well 
as to prevent or impede other improper terrorist activities; 
• To punish those who aid or harbor terrorists. 
 
The importance of the USA Patriot Act with regards to the U.S. intelligence was 
embedded in the provisions which enhanced domestic surveillance as an amendment of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Also, the Act provided for possible 
sharing of information on criminal probes between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government. Thus, eliminating one of the main 
deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence criticized even before 9/11. 
However, from the point of promoting substantial intelligence reform, the USA 
Patriot Act was only a quick fix, which did not (and was not intended to) address the 
structural deficiencies of the intelligence community. 
 
3.2.2. Homeland Security 
The U.S. government also moved in another direction, as President Bush started 
to focus more on creating a broad concept of a unified approach to protecting the 
homeland against future terrorist threats. This strategy also had an intelligence element, 
however there were many problems connected with the homeland security agenda. 
The first steps taken in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken already less than one month after the attacks. On October 8, 
2001 Tom Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and the Director of the newly established Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS). The Office’s mission was to “develop and coordinate the 
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implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks. The Office’s objective was to coordinate the executive branch’s 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”97 
At the end of October 2002, the Homeland Security Council was created by the 
President. Again, Tom Ridge was put in charge of this council. Among the members of 
the HSC were: the President and the Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
and Health Care, the Attorney General, the Director of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Director of FBI, and the Director of CIA. The HSC’s role was to 
ensure the coordination of all homeland security related activities across the whole 
spectrum of federal, state and local offices and agencies. 
However, this model of so called “presidential advisor” proved insufficient. “In 
particular, critical voices in Congress pointed to inherent weaknesses in Ridge’s post. 
Without any budget authority, they argued, the Homeland Security czar lacked 
sufficient human and financial resources, had no way to enforce decisions, and relied 
primarily on the power of persuasion, albeit as a trusted advisor with unfettered access 
to President Bush.”98 On the other hand, there also existed fears of Ridge’s excessive 
influence that went beyond congressional accountability. These fears led Democratic 
senator Joe Lieberman to propose in May 2002 a full-scale reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy and a creation of a new department dealing with the questions of homeland 
security. Even though President Bush had previously rejected proposals for such full-
scale government reorganization, the need for this change became imminent. Therefore, 
in June 2002, President Bush introduced his own proposal that “sought to maximize 
presidential influence over any new cabinet-level department”.99  
In his speech to the nation on June 6, 2002,100 President Bush emphasized the 
need for essential reorganization of government by creating the Department of 
Homeland Security that would help the government to deal more effectively with the 
new threats of the 21st century. The new National Strategy for Homeland Security 
prepared by Ridge’s OHS team was also introduced by the President in this speech. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued on July 16 2002, 
introduced three main strategic objectives of combating terrorism on the domestic level: 
“(1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur.”101 The homeland security strategy was divided into six key mission areas 
within which the strategy was supposed to operate. The first three areas were focused on 
the first objective of prevention, other two focused on the second aim of reducing 
vulnerability and the last focused on damage minimization and recovery. The 
framework of six critical mission areas was established as follows: 
 
• Intelligence and Warning area, which included creation of an integrated 
federal approach to gathering, analysis, production, and sharing of 
information from both classified and open sources; 
• Border and Transportation Security area, which was aimed at preventing 
terrorists and terrorist materiel in entering the country by creating an 
interconnected system of border and transport infrastructure control that 
simultaneously secures the legitimate flow of people and goods; 
• Domestic Counterterrorism area, which was focused on support for old and 
evolution of new intelligence and law enforcement efforts to identify 
terrorists and their supporters, prevents them from carrying attacks, and to 
arrest and prosecute them; 
• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets area, which involved 
precise and complete identification and prioritization of the U.S. 
infrastructure, including virtual networks, and assessment of consequences 
and connections among the infrastructures; 
• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats area, which was primarily focused 
on detection, deterrence, prevention, and management of the consequences 
of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response area, which was aimed at 
minimizing the damage and rapid recovering from terrorist attacks which 
may occur. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security also identified the Department’s key role 
“as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions involved in homeland 
security”102 and its main challenge in developing “complementary systems that avoid 
duplication and ensure essential requirements are met”103. Moreover, it stressed that in 
order to meet the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination must be increased 
“in law enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy 
development and implementation so that public and private resources are better aligned 
to secure the homeland”.104  
According to Chris Hornbarger, “prior to 9/11, eleven of fourteen cabinet 
departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Veterans Affairs), plus a host of 
independent and subordinate agencies (for example, the CIA, and FEMA) bore 
substantial responsibility for key aspects of homeland security”.105 This situation has 
changed with the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the 
Homeland Security Act enactment on November 25, 2002.106 The new department 
combined twenty two agencies with approximately 180,000 employees including “such 
disparate organizations as: the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
(Transportation), the Secret Service (Treasury), FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FBI), and the Critical Infrastructures Assurance Office 
(Commerce)”.107 It became the fifteenth department in the history of U.S. government 
and a third biggest department of the Bush administration. 
One of the DHS’s four directorates, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate (IAIP) was intended to fulfill one of the most critical homeland 
security functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of 
information. It was tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information 
about terrorist threats to the United States, assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. 
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infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant 
federal, state, and local officials. It was to “fuse and analyze intelligence and other 
information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources – including the 
CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT and data gleaned from other 
organizations.”108 However, it had neither the power to collect intelligence nor any 
tasking authority over other agencies. Rather than integrating the CIA, FBI and other 
agencies, the IAIP had to beg to obtain information from them.109 Both the CIA and the 
FBI strongly resisted handing over significant power to the DHS. And both agencies 
increased, rather than decreased their homeland security functions. According to Seth 
Jones, “White House and congressional support for DHS faded quickly. Most 
policymakers believed either that DHS was unable to perform terrorist threat analysis 
adequately, or that other departments within the federal government could do it 
better.”110 
 
3.2.3. Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
In a rather surprising move, President Bush circumvented the newly established 
DHS’s intelligence directorate and proposed an establishment of a new Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in January 2003.111 The TTIC was created under the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the 
president and federal agencies on terrorist threats – the very task originally envisioned 
for the DHS. 
The TTIC was designed to integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information 
collected domestically and abroad and to design a database of known and suspected 
terrorists that could be accessed by federal, state, and local officials across the United 
States. It was also focused on examining regional threats, such as Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It 
was staffed by representatives from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the 
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Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, NGA, and Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Even though, it was legally not part of the CIA (officially it reported to the 
DCI), in practice the distinction was much less clear as the CIA effectively controlled 
its functions – it was placed under the CIA’s budget and was located at CIA 
headquarters.112 As with the case of the IAIP, its mandate was very vague, concentrating 
on analysis not on driving collection with no attempt to shift the intelligence community 
organizational paradigm. Thus, it had only added another fragment to the already 
disjointed intelligence community structure. 
Although created to improve coordination and sharing, the TTIC has caused 
confusion within the federal government about the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. Its creation duplicated functions of the IAIP and greatly undermined its mandate. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
President Bush and the U.S. Congress reacted to the shock of 9/11 events in a 
number of distinct ways that have had far reaching consequences for the intelligence 
community. First, Congress decided to study the intelligence failure through its Joint 
Inquiry, while simultaneously adopting legislation on improving enhancing domestic 
surveillance and removing limits on domestic and foreign information sharing 
embedded in the USA Patriot Act. In contrast, President Bush focused on promoting a 
new homeland security agenda, which originally contained an intelligence aspect but 
was weakened by the creation of the TTIC.  
One fundamental implication of all of these new security policies was that none 
of these initiatives presented a comprehensive plan of how to integrate the wide ranging 
activities of the intelligence community, change agencies’ incentives and cultures to 
enhance information sharing, match intelligence resources against priorities, reform the 
FBI or improve human intelligence. By the time the Joint Inquiry’s findings and 
recommendations which were published in 2002, the immediate momentum for 
substantial reform of the U.S. intelligence community was already gone. The 9/11 
Commission, backed by enormous media coverage and pressure from the 9/11 victims 
families, was more successful in pushing for implementation of its recommendations. 
However, as will be argued in the next chapter, its proposals for “sweeping” reforms 
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were mitigated during the congressional debate over the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act. 
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4. Implementation of the post-9/11 Recommendations: Bringing about 
the Reform? 
The debate over intelligence reform following the release of the 9/11 
Commission report presented an opportunity to make far-reaching changes to create a 
more effective and efficient U.S. intelligence community. However, due to pertaining 
rational self-interest decision making processes and inability to overrule heightened 
opposition in Congress, the potential for substantial reform was not materialized. 
Moreover, because the newly created position of the Director of National Intelligence 
was not given such authorities as was suggested in the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, it became difficult for him to promote policies, which would have 
effectively enabled him to overcome the internal resistance to reform within the 
intelligence organizations. 
This chapter will first focus on the process of adopting the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The legislative debate that 
accompanied its enactment and its major provisions will be introduced. Then, the actual 
impact of the IRTPA on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community 
will be evaluated, both in terms of the newly created institutions – the DNI and the 
NCTC, as well as from the point of view of the old institutions – the FBI and the CIA. 
The analysis and evaluation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations’ 
implementation and the consequent character of the intelligence community after the 
enactment of the IRTPA presented in this chapter can be interpreted as the output 
perspective of the input-output methodological model (see Figure 1.1) examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11. 
 
4.1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
The 9/11 Commission final report was issued in July 2004 and was followed by 
an immediate congressional response. Throughout the course of its work, the 9/11 
Commission received extensive media coverage, which gave rise to public pressure on 
the Congress to act on the recommendations. Also, a significant lobby was set up 
around the 9/11 victim families pushing for the implementations of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. These forces speeded up the legislative process and 
both the Senate and the House began to draft implementing legislation. 
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4.1.1. Intelligence Reform Legislative Process Background 
Both versions of bill focused mainly on the two central recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission: the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The original DNI proposal 
suggested authorities for the individual to oversee all-source national intelligence 
centers, serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, manage the national 
intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence 
community. Included in his powers were supposed to be the responsibility for 
submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating fund to the intelligence agencies, 
and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community.113  
The NCTC recommendation was designed to address the intelligence 
community’s structural problems, particularly the lack of an appropriate entity for 
performing executive branch–wide counterterrorism operational planning. It was 
supposed to be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies. Its focus was envisaged to be on counterterrorism 
and it was supposed to have responsibility for integrating the intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities against terrorism. Its aim was to be the preeminent body for analyzing 
terrorism and assessing the terrorist threat.114 
The Senate bill followed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations more closely, 
while the House bill provided for a far less powerful director. The House bill covered a 
wide range of counterterrorism issues, including immigration and criminal penalties. 
Glenn Hastedt summed up the differences between the bills: “Under the Senate bill, the 
CIA director ‘shall’ be under the authority, direction, and control’ of the national 
intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only ‘report’ to the 
National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence 
Director the power to develop budgets and give ‘guidance’ to intelligence community 
members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would ‘determine’ the budget. The 
Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the 
Director’s high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil 
liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.”115 
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The main opposition against the bill came from the House Republicans led by 
the chair of House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Essentially, Hunter was 
a protégé of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in Congress. Similar to 
previous attempts to reform the intelligence community, Department of Defense 
officials, now led by Rumsfeld, strongly opposed any proposals changing the structure 
and streamlining the intelligence community. These changes were traditionally 
perceived by Pentagon as a threat to its control over defense intelligence agencies and 
over the vast share of the intelligence budget. Thus, the Defense Department leadership 
tried to discredit the reform by all means, both privately during classified hearings, and 
publicly when General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered 
a bombshell letter to the House Armed Services Committee. “In the letter, Meyers 
opposed giving the proposed director of national intelligence strong budgetary 
authorities over intelligence agencies housed in the Pentagon arguing that only a 
Pentagon-controlled budget would ensure sufficient ‘support to the warfighters’.”116 
Moreover, the presidential support to the Senate version of the bill remained 
lukewarm.117 At a time of ongoing War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the President did nothing to stop the Defense Department lobby. He simply avoided 
fighting his own Department of Defense over intelligence reform at war time. 
According to Michael Turner, “President Bush had to look like he was pushing the bill 
but would in fact prefer to see the proposal die”.118 And that is why he, at the end, 
recommended the passage of a bill that conformed to the House version, establishing a 
weak DNI and keeping the Defense Department in charge of its intelligence agencies. 
The final bill was adopted 89-2 in the Senate and 336-75 in the House.119 The president 
then signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 on 
December 17, 2004. 
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4.1.2. Major Provisions of the IRTPA 
The IRTPA was divided into eight titles:120 (I) Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; (II) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (III) Security Clearances; (IV) 
Transportation Security (V) Border Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters; (VI) 
Terrorism Prevention; (VII) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations; (VIII) Other Matters.  
Under Article I, the IRTPA created a Senate confirmed DNI separate from the 
CIA director, responsible for leading the intelligence community and for serving as 
principal adviser to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland 
Security Council. The DNI was given several important authorities and 
responsibilities.121 
Determining the Intelligence Budget122. The DNI has been tasked to determine 
the intelligence budget proposal submitted to the President for consideration and 
submission to Congress. With regards to the military portions of the budget, the 
legislation has stated that the DNI shall participate in the development by the Secretary 
of Defense of the annual budgets of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. However, the scope of the participation was 
not specified by the legislation. 
Managing the Execution of the Intelligence Appropriation. Contrary to the 9/11 
Commission recommendation, the IRTPA has kept the intelligence appropriation 
classified, thus keeping the intelligence funding hidden in other departments’ 
appropriations and being received straight through the departments’ budgets. However, 
the legislation has given the DNI control over the funds flowing through the 
departments to the intelligence agencies through exclusive direction to the Office of 
Management and Budget with respect to the apportionment of funds drawn on the U.S. 
Treasury. The legislation has also permitted the DNI to audit and monitor how 
departments are expending the funds.  
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Transferring Funds and Personnel. The DNI has not been given a full authority 
over the agencies funds and personnel. The DNI has only been allowed to move up to 
$150 million from agencies per fiscal year to meet emerging threats, provided that the 
funds moved are less than 5 percent of an agency’s intelligence funding and that the 
fund movement does not terminate an acquisition program. The DNI has been given 
authority to move personnel during the DNI’s start-up phase. The DNI might make 
additional personnel transfers pursuant to joint procedures agreed upon with department 
secretaries. The legislation thus deleted the provisions of prior law that a department 
secretary may veto the DCI’s transfer of intelligence funds and personnel and that FBI 
funds and personnel are exempt from any transfer.  
Hiring Senior Officials. The DNI has received strengthened authority to select 
senior officials. As under prior law, the Secretary of Defense must seek the DNI’s 
concurrence before submitting a recommendation to the president for the Directors of 
the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National 
Reconnaissance Office. However, the Secretary of Defense may not forward a 
recommendation to the president if the DNI objects. The same arrangement has been 
maintained for the selection of the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and 
research, the assistant secretary of homeland security for information analysis, and other 
senior officials across the intelligence community with the respective department heads. 
But importantly, the DNI has not received the authority to remove anyone from their 
position. 
Another important provision, which aimed to change the intelligence 
community’s strategic operational planning, was establishment of the statute of National 
Intelligence Centers (created based on geographic and transnational topics according to 
the DNI’s and NSC’s priorities). Under the IRTPA, the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) and the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) were formed.123  
The centers and other entities that the DNI might have wanted to create were to 
be housed in an administrative body called the Office of the DNI (ODNI). The ODNI is 
technically an independent agency because it is not located within any other executive 
branch department or entity. The DNI’s staff has also been located in the Office of the 
DNI.  
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The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been made responsible for 
integrating the intelligence agencies’ capabilities, designing preeminent 
counterterrorism analysis and proposing collection requirements to the DNI to guide the 
agencies’ collection activities. The NCTC’s other function established under the IRTPA 
was to engage in planning for counterterrorism operations across the executive branch. 
However, the actual description of the planning work has remained fairly vague in the 
IRTPA, because “it existed in a gray area between high-level strategy and detailed, 
tactical planning”.124 
Other provisions of the IRTPA focused on the problem of improving the 
domestic intelligence capabilities of the FBI (Title II). The IRTPA directed specific 
instructions for the FBI to change fundamentally the FBI’s orientation and culture. The 
Director of the FBI was ordered “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated 
national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance 
specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the 
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with 
substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.”125 
Moreover, the IRTPA paid vast attention to provisions concerning homeland 
security and improving the counterterrorism prevention as well as response. The 
provisions under Title VI (Terrorism Prevention) were aimed at enhancing the ability of 
the DHS to stop terrorists before they reach the U. S. borders, and to stop money-
laundering practices that support terrorism. Other sections and titles were also devoted 
to transportation security and border protection, thus stretching the overall reach of the 
IRTPA. 
 
In summary, the 9/11 Commission was one of the very few commissions to ever 
see its recommendations successfully codified into law. However, the IRTPA’s actual 
impact was mitigated by the ambiguity of its language. The vagueness of the legislation 
was a product of the congressional compromise and strong Defense Department lobby 
protecting its “turf”. Even thought the adoption of the IRTPA improved the situation of 
central management of the U.S. intelligence community, it did not vest enough 
authorities to the DNI to be able to overcome the obstructions to the intelligence 
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community reform from both the agencies themselves, as well as from the DOD 
leadership. Moreover, the fact that the IRTPA focused in most part on other fixes in 
homeland security also contributed to its ambiguous impact on the intelligence 
community reform. The actual development of the establishment and functions of the 
new agencies with the intelligence community, the DNI and the NCTC, as well as the 
impact of the IRTPA on the old agencies, the FBI and the CIA, will be examined and 
evaluated in the following subchapters. 
 
4.2. Intelligence Community after the Reform Act126 
This subchapter will focus on evaluation of the newly established institutions in 
the IRTPA, the DNI and the NCTC. The key question is whether their creation 
essentially led to better efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism mission. 
 
4.2.1. Director of National Intelligence 
According to Gordon Lederman, “the Executive Branch’s implementation of the 
2004 act began without the necessary vigor.”127 The first DNI, Ambassador John 
Negroponte, was an accomplished diplomat and policymaker, but he lacked working 
knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and substantial experience in leading and 
transforming large organizations. Negroponte decided to take on his role in the same 
fashion as his DCI predecessors and quickly absorbed two key intelligence functions – 
providing the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and overseeing the production of the 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Thus, 
Negroponte became, as was required by the law, the president’s chief intelligence 
briefer as well as chief analyst. However, giving a good substantive briefing takes time 
– according to some up to 60 percent.128 And as Arthur Hulnick points out, “if the DNI 
had nothing else to do, then serving as the government’s chief intelligence analyst might 
make sense. But he is supposed to be managing the intelligence system, including 
overseeing the budget process, arranging long-range planning, and other matters of 
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interagency concern.”129 It is possible to say that while Ambassador Negroponte 
solidified his position as the chief intelligence officer, he certainly failed to fulfill his 
position as the chief executive officer of the intelligence community. 
One of the major problems of implementing the IRTPA is that the legislation 
was giving the DNI considerable responsibility but not enough power and authority 
especially when faced with Defense Department resistance. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld successfully pushed for establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, “which was widely viewed as an attempt to block the DNI’s effort to gain 
effective authority over DOD intelligence functions.”130 All Defense Department 
intelligence agencies were made subordinate to this new Director of Military 
intelligence-like position. Thus, the DNI’s actual power over the DOD agencies has 
remained quite limited. 
Also the creation of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) proved problematic. Patrick 
Neary contends that the problem began with Negroponte’s inability to clearly articulate 
the ODNI’s mission. “Rather than the engine of change, the ODNI became the fulcrum 
of competing notions of reform.”131 On top of its unclear mission, the ODNI expanded 
into aggrandizing 1500 staff positions, even though originally it was supposed to be 
limited to about 500 people.132 Such growth of bureaucratic layering certainly was not 
something envisaged in the attempts for efficient reform. 
In 2006, Ambassador Negroponte resigned from the position of the DNI and was 
replaced by seemingly much better fit for the position, retired Admiral Mike 
McConnell. Former NSA director with decades of experience in U.S. intelligence was 
confirmed in January 2007. DNI McConnell began his tenure by issuing a 100-day plan, 
followed by a 500-day plan for the intelligence community. They were based on a 
number of initiatives such as: (1) Create a Culture of Collaboration; (2) Foster 
Collection and Analytic Transformation; (3) Build Acquisition Excellence and 
Technology Leadership; (4) Modernize Business Practices; (5) Accelerate Information 
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Sharing; (6) Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities.133 Both of the plans focused on better 
management and provided “an intellectual structure for considering intelligence reform 
more methodically.”134 Even though the change on the working level remained 
limited,135 the rhetoric and McConnell’s approach to the DNI’s position certainly led to 
a better sense of corporateness and leadership within the intelligence community. 
 In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was succeeded by Robert 
Gates, a former DCI in December 2006, which subsequently led to easing of tension and 
improved relationship between the DNI and the Defense Department during the final 
months of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, some other serious problems 
remained, especially on the level of coordination and oversight of the old agencies and 
within the newly created NCTC such as deficiencies regarding security clearances and 
personnel management. 
 
4.2.2. National Counterterrorism Center 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to give boost to 
information sharing and analysis. It has taken over and expanded the TTIC’s mission 
and became a hub for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence across the community. 
The NCTC was presented as the most successful improvement of the intelligence 
community – the grand jewel of intelligence reform. Different agency officials were 
supposed to sit in one room and draft collective analysis on terrorist threats. The IRTPA 
“in order to promote and facilitate rotations to the new center, required rotational 
assignments for promotion within the intelligence community, and created specific 
incentives for service in national intelligence centers.”136  
However, even if the rules allow it, organizational barriers still block 
information sharing. According to Amy Zegart, “because NCTC’s analysts have varying 
levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they still see different 
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pieces of information.”137 Arthur Hulnick also points out that “CIA security officials did 
not accept the clearances of officers from other agencies without doing their own 
security checks, and that even a CIA officer had to get a new clearance because he 
would be using a different computer system than the one for which he already had 
access.”138 This kind of bureaucratic pathology is very baffling given the amount of 
criticism and pressure for improvement was imposed on information sharing after 9/11. 
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project issued a report card 
assessing implementation of its recommendations. Information sharing efforts received 
a grade D.139 Two years later, one intelligence officer offered a similarly discouraging 
progress report and underscored that “most of the sharing issues we face are cultural and 
process rather than technology.”140 However, the technological problems should not be 
overlooked as the agencies’ intelligence databases use different software mostly 
incompatible with each other. 
Moreover, according to Zegart, “most U.S. intelligence agencies have no 
experience conducting all-source analysis, so the personnel they assign to the NCTC is 
learning on the job.”141 However, with inexperienced analyst and obstructions to their 
actual work, the quality of analysis is hampered. Also, within the respected agencies, 
rotational assignments are not promoted as they should be. They are still seen more as a 
necessary evil than as a prestigious mission to which the brightest analysts should be 
nominated. And once part of the NCTC the analysts continue their loyalty to their 
parent agencies rather than to the NCTC mission itself.142 
The idea of rotational assignments was one of the key initiatives in transforming 
the intelligence community into – in President Bush’s words – a single, unified 
enterprise.143 In order to accomplish this task creation of a notion of jointness was 
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required.144 However, the process of joint duty has been largely circumvented by 
intelligence professionals. But as Patrick Neary concludes, “joint duty is a means to an 
end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission 
accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur 
without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional 
workforce.”145 
 
To sum up, evaluating performance of the newly created agencies clearly shows 
that deficiencies pertain. The key problem is the inability of the DNI to overcome the 
cultural patterns embedded in the U.S. intelligence community’s institutional 
environment. These obstacles than make it difficult for the DNI, already weakened by 
some of the provisions of the IRTPA not granting him enough authority, to fully 
coordinate the intelligence community into a unified enterprise efficient and effective in 
countering the terrorist threats. While for the new institutions the problem lays in the 
inability to coordinate, for the old institutions, such as the FBI and the CIA, as will be 
shown in the last part of this chapter, the problem is to adapt. Nevertheless, the main 
obstacles to the reform for both are deeply rooted in the organizational structure, culture 
and practices. 
 
4.3. FBI’s and CIA’s Internal  Attempts to Implement Reform 
Due to the severe criticism for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11, the 
FBI has set forth ambitious changes in order to redefine itself from an agency that 
investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence 
before attacks occur. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its 
counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence. It is important to 
note that these actions were motivated in part by FBI’s desire to remain the lead 
counterterrorism agency for homeland threats as voices calling for creation of 
completely new domestic intelligence agency and or creating a domestic intelligence 
element within the DHS sprung during the post-9/11 discussions. 
According to Seth Jones, “FBI Director Robert Mueller tried to change the FBI’s 
traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the 
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hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and 
policymakers at headquarters. He implemented a major reorganization and increased 
resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were 
permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism.”146  
Moreover, an Operations Center was established to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information sharing and collaboration. Also 66 new Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 
the country were created, which included state and local law enforcement officers, and 
FBI agents. The FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive 
Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office was 
responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI 
investigations and overall strategies. It was the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating 
intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the 
U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state 
and local law enforcement, and the private sector. Each FBI field office was also put 
under a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s 
intelligence functions in that field office.147  
Despite these major changes, the law enforcement organizational culture largely 
prevails. Most problematic is the position of analysts within the FBI structure. 
According to Arthur Hulnick, “analysts were recruited or borrowed, primarily from 
other intelligence analytic units, but soon found that they were second-class citizens in a 
system that valued the Special Agents more than the analysts.”148 The FBI’s own 
guidelines divide its employees to only two groups Special Agents and “other support 
professionals”, thus putting analysts into a same group with cleaning people or truck 
drivers.149 Amy Zegart also refers to this problem contending that “the bureau rules still 
mandate that senior positions in the field, including the top spot in every U.S. field 
office, be staffed by FBI special agents.”150 These provisions essentially preclude any 
career moves for the FBI analysts. 
 Efforts to improve the FBI’s obsolete technology systems have also been 
unsuccessful and very costly. After two attempts to acquire a technology modernization 
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program, the FBI still does not have a modern and effective case management record 
system.151 
 Even though that the FBI has attempted the most ambitious changes, the results 
are disappointing and greatly inefficient given the amount of attention and resources 
allocated to consolidate its domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. It seems 
that most of the proposed changes have been unable to break the law enforcement way 
of thinking within the agency, despite the fact that its official mission has been restated 
to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats 
first, and to uphold and enforce the criminal laws second. 
The CIA has not adapted well to the post-9/11 changes either. For most of the 
time, it has been an agency in turmoil. Due to numerous scandals both of its foreign 
operations (the black sites scandal152) as well as its leadership (Porter J. Goss 
scandal153), the morale has been on a low. The IRTPA ordered the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency to rebuild CIA’s analytical capabilities, transform the clandestine 
services by building its human intelligence capabilities, develop a stronger language 
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives, emphasize recruiting 
diversity among operation officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities, and to 
ensure a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection 
at the operational level. It has also “instructed the CIA and the Department of Defense 
to work better together in coordinating their respective intelligence domains.”154  
The CIA has attempted to increase its domestic intelligence powers first through 
its Counterterrorist Center and then through the TTIC, which was placed under the 
CIA’s budget and headquarters. Even when the independent NCTC was created, the 
CIA provided its analysts but focused more on protecting its own turf by not sharing all 
of its information, which was explained by differences in clearances.  
With regards to improving HUMINT capabilities, obstacles also prevail. The 
recruitment process of new HUMINT agents is bounded by the old rules of secrecy and 
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fear of moles. According to Arthur Hulnick, the old “paranoia remains, but is now 
focused on the possibility that a jihadi will get on the inside. Thus, applicants who have 
the right languages and ethnic background are being kept out by the fear of penetration. 
Most damaging is the reluctance on the part of security officials to clear people who 
come from backgrounds abroad that they find questionable.”155 Moreover, completing 
security forms and waiting for the background checks and the polygraph exams that 
many agencies demand still takes months, and this selection process is discouraging 
potential recruits.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 clearly shows that even 
though attempts to substantially reform the U.S. intelligence community into a single 
united enterprise with the aim and strategy of fighting transnational terrorist threats 
were made, real change has not to date reached the standard that was originally 
envisaged. Such an outcome is surprising given the strong public reaction to the events 
of 9/11 and the enthusiasm the legislative and executive branches of government 
exhibited for improving intelligence gathering and coordination. The evidence presented 
in this chapter points to a number of reasons for the failure of reform of the intelligence 
community to match expectations.  
The legislative negotiations surrounding the IRTPA bill were strongly 
influenced by a robust Defense Department lobby and combined with only lukewarm 
attention from President Bush resulted in adoption of a very vague and ambiguous piece 
of legislation. On paper, the newly created DNI has many responsibilities as well as 
authorities. However, the actual powers are much less significant and have not enabled 
the DNI to overpower the Department of Defense or overcome resistance to reform 
within the old intelligence agencies. Thus, the DNI’s ability to coordinate the U.S. 
intelligence community has been impaired. Moreover, the burgeoning size of the Office 
of the DNI has raised questions about unnecessary levels of bureaucratic layering, 
which is not helping attempts to building a more efficient intelligence community.  
Another important factor in explaining the limited success of the reform agenda 
is the organizational culture of the old intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Their 
debilitating sense of agency parochialism, a belief in the overriding importance of 
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security, and the “need-to-know” principle of secrecy makes them extremely resistant to 
change even amid a crisis on the scale of 9/11.  
However, it can be argued that although the intelligence community is not 
working efficiently even after the reform, it is nonetheless effective in preventing 
terrorist attacks from happening. This is largely due to the fact that in the past nine 
years, U.S. intelligence spending has roughly doubled. The DNI publicly released the 
figure of $47.5 billion for the FY2008 National Intelligence program. An earlier release 
by the then DCI Tenet for FY1998 was a $26.7 billion aggregate budget for NFIP,156 
JMIP and TIARA.157 This growth in funds has undoubtedly helped to improve U.S. 
intelligence community functioning, i.e. its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of a 
9/11 type attack. However, it remains an open question as to whether these funds have 
been used as efficiently as they might have been given the aims of the intelligence 
reform agenda. At present, the answer to this ‘efficiency’ question appears to be 
negative. Because of the organizational obstacles, money was not efficiently spent on 
technological improvements, on the HUMINT recruitment, nor on information sharing 
or unifying security clearances.  
The result of the U.S. intelligence reform then is a system that is effective, that is 
able to prevent terrorist attacks, but is not efficient in doing so. The idea behind the 9/11 
Commission recommendations was to create a unified intelligence community, which 
would work both effectively and efficiently on its mission to counter terrorist threats. 
However, only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence 
community is still a work in progress. 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations were a building stone of U.S. 
intelligence reform. But given the relatively poor results of this reform agenda, voices 
criticizing the form and scope of this reform program have come from both academics 
and intelligence professionals. These questions have inquired about the right kind of 
intelligence reform, and what more could have been done to improve the intelligence 
community. The final chapter will initially examine alternative approaches proposed by 
critics of the intelligence reform program to date. Thereafter, possible solutions to the 
current intelligence reform dilemma will be presented. 
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5. The Right Kind of Reform for the Intelligence Community? 
The 9/11 Commission recommendations set forth a path for the U.S. intelligence 
community reform based on its centralization and enhanced information sharing. 
However, soon after the publication of the 9/11 Commission report, criticism from both 
academics as well as intelligence professionals began to scrutinize the report’s 
conclusions and recommendations as overlooking a number of important realities 
connected to both the U.S. intelligence community and its abilities to avoid intelligence 
failure (i.e. prevent surprise attacks). This chapter will analyze these alternative 
approaches to the U.S. intelligence reform. Then, proposals of possible future steps in 
order to improve the current state of U.S. intelligence community will be made. 
Also this chapter provides the evaluation and analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 from the output perspective 
of the methodological model (figure 1.1). 
 
5.1. Preventing Surprise Attacks 
Soon after the 9/11 Commission report was published, a number of scholars and 
former intelligence professionals criticized the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations as 
well as the 9/11 Commission’s overall approach to the U.S. intelligence community. 
The main objection against the report and the subsequent legislation was based on an 
argumentation that it is impossible to prevent surprise attacks. The very nature of 
surprise attacks is uncertainty caused by asymmetry of attacker and victim. As Richard 
Posner, one of the main proponents of this theory points out, “the attacker picks the 
time, place, and means of attack. Since without a great deal of luck his plan cannot be 
discovered in advance by the victim, the attacker has, by virtue of his having the 
initiative and of the victim’s being unable to be strong everywhere all the time, a built-
in advantage that assures a reasonable probability of a local successes.”158 Therefore, 
the character of the attacks makes it extremely difficult to prevent them. As Posner 
continues, “even the best intelligence service is bound to be surprised from time to time 
because the only way to ensure against ever being surprised is to ignore the cost of false 
alarm and as a result bombard action-level officials with dire warnings.”159 
Furthermore, preventing surprise attacks is virtually impossible either due to lack of 
information or an excess of data. Richard K. Betts warns that “in attack warning, there 
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is the problem of ‘noise’ and deception.”160 He points to an overload of high volume of 
analysis, reports, statistics, which are exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb them 
or scrutinize them.  
Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents: Living with the High Risk 
Technologies argues that some type of failure is simply inherent in the system.161 Even 
though Perrow’s work was focused mostly on early warning systems of nuclear attack 
during the Cold War, his conclusions are, according to the critics of post-9/11 
intelligence reform, valid also for the U.S. intelligence community. As Joshua Rovner 
and Austin Long conclude, “both tactical warning intelligence and nuclear power plants 
are best described as complex, tightly coupled systems. The amount of time available 
for analysts or operators to make correct decisions is often quite small, with almost no 
margin for error. Interactions in both a nuclear power plant and an enemy organization 
(be it a nation-state’s military or a terrorist group) are often unobservable. Certainly, 
enemy intentions, as opposed to dispositions, are nearly always unobservable.”162  
The 9/11 Commission was also criticized for its perspective of hindsight and 
assumptions that anything what was uncovered retrospectively should have been 
uncovered in real time by the intelligence community. Paul R. Pillar, a long term 
veteran of the CIA, condemns the 9/11 Commission’s references to the failure of 
‘connecting the dots’. As he puts it, “the dots the counterterrorist analyst faces, unlike 
those in children’s puzzles, have neither numbers nor a white background, and they can 
be connected in many different ways.”163 Richard Posner also disapproves of the 9/11 
Commission’s approach. He contends that “with the aid of hindsight it is easy to 
identify missed opportunities to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from 
that observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result not of 
bad luck, the enemy’s skill and ingenuity, the inevitability that some surprise attacks 
will succeed, the personal failures of individuals, or the difficulty of defending against 
suicide attacks or protecting a well-nigh infinite range of potential targets, but rather of 
systemic failures in the nations intelligence and security apparatus; failures that can be 
rectified, making us safe, by changing the apparatus.”164 
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All of these authors have come to a conclusion that the U.S. intelligence 
community had worked well before 9/11. Despite the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks, 
the overall counterterrorism performance of the U.S. intelligence community during the 
1990s was strong. Therefore, the proposals for major organizational reform of the 
intelligence community were not substantiated.   
Richard K. Betts argues that no intelligence reform could ever be permanent or 
complete for the simple reason that fixing specific problems often creates new ones and 
that no initiative occurs without opportunity costs. Reforms intended to increase flow of 
analysts, for example, can cause overload, leaving analysts without the time or tools 
needed to separate critical signals from noise. Reforms intended to help analysts 
connect the dots might cause them to be too creative, prompting them to issue 
unnecessary alarms. In a sense, intelligence reform is a zero-sum game: removing some 
weaknesses creates new ones, and these new weaknesses are a likely source of 
intelligence failure.165 Elsewhere, he also points out that “no one ever stays satisfied 
with reorganization because it never seems to do the trick – if the trick is to prevent 
intelligence failure.”166 Thus, the 9/11 Commission could not find a fix to the problem 
of the U.S. intelligence community because the problem is essentially unfixable. 
This criticism, however, overlooks a number of important realities. As chapter 3 
of this thesis has shown, the U.S. intelligence community did not perform well before 
9/11. The intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the threats of transnational terrorism 
even though there were voices both from within and from outside of the intelligence 
community. Moreover, it can be argued that not all of intelligence failures and surprise 
attacks can be prevented, but in the case of 9/11 there were many opportunities that 
could have grasped the danger of terrorist attacks if the system was better organized and 
better adapted to the threat. Better allocation of personnel, better incentives for analysts 
and removing obstacles to information sharing could have led to at least higher chance 
of thwarting the attacks in preparation if not to preventing them at all. 
Moreover, it is true that the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission did examine 
the events preceding the 9/11 attacks from hindsight, however, as was also discussed in 
chapter 3, there were twelve commission, think tank and presidential initiative reports, 
which had made the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission already throughout the 
1990s. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission cannot be accused of picking the most obvious 
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problems of the intelligence community after the attacks happened, because all of the 
problems addressed by the 9/11 Commission were already recognized before 9/11.  
Thus, it is possible to argue that if there had been a substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on the discussed pre-9/11 
recommendations, the intelligence community’s efficiency and effectiveness would 
have been enhanced and the chance to prevent the terrorist attacks would have been 
much larger. 
 
5.2. Is There a Need for the DNI? 
Questions also arose whether a centralized structure of the intelligence 
community is the right one. Again, Rovner and Long are against. They argue that 
“decentralized intelligence offers several potential benefits. Greater autonomy for field 
operators would allow them to recruit unsavory informants – even terrorists – without 
fear of reprimand from the home office. Loosening centralized standards would also 
favor entrepreneurial analysts who prefer to freely communicate with their peers and 
policy counterparts instead of having to follow strict guidelines on communication.”167 
They also point out that increased centralization through the DNI would hamper 
informal interaction between analysts. 
Richard Posner also calls for more decentralization. In his 2006 book Uncertain 
Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in the Throes of Reform, he praises the value 
of complementarity and competition in intelligence, prevention of groupthink and 
motivation of employees by their belonging to only a part of the intelligence community 
and not the whole system as such.168 
However, it is important to clarify that centralization and decentralization of the 
U.S. intelligence community are not mutually exclusive organizing principles. There are 
many companies and organizations where organization is based on both strong central 
authority and decentralized management. Nevertheless, the right balance between 
centralization and decentralization is crucial. Too much centralization can slow down 
innovation, hamper swift and nimble action and have negative influence on employees’ 
morale. On the other hand, too much decentralization can impede coordination and 
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information sharing, evokes distrust, and creates centers of power which refuse reform. 
Thus, the key question is not whether to centralize, but how much and what. 
Therefore, to answer the question asked in the subheading, the U.S. intelligence 
community needs the DNI, however, with much stronger authority than it currently 
posses in order to be able to coordinate the U.S. intelligence community as a unified 
entity but also in order to have enough power to oversee and promote enough 
decentralization which would allow for healthy amount of competition and innovation. 
Suggestions of how to achieve this equilibrium in the U.S. intelligence community 
organization will be made in the last subchapter. 
 
5.3. What to Do Next: Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyzed some of the main obstacles and problematic 
aspects of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform. Two main problems were 
characterized: first, the inability of the newly established institutions such as the DNI 
and the NCTC to properly coordinate and incorporate the intelligence community and 
its agencies, and second the inability and also unwillingness of the old agencies such as 
the CIA and the FBI to adapt to the changed environment and to implement the 
provisions of the intelligence reform legislation. Reasons for these problems were 
identified as being mostly of organizational character based on bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry and institutional inertia. They include poor management, lack of 
incentives for personnel and recruits, inefficient clearance system hampering 
information sharing, and technical deficiencies. 
Therefore, it is important to identify possible solutions to improve the efficiency 
of the U.S. intelligence community. That is to promote such measures, which would 
overcome the organizational obstacles to the intelligence reform and enhanced the 
ability of the U.S. intelligence community to prevent terrorist attacks, i.e. to support its 
effectiveness. It is possible to recognize four main steps leading to more efficient U.S. 
intelligence community. 
First, powers and authorities vested in the newly created position of the Director 
of National Intelligence must be strengthened. However, rather than issuing new 
legislation, the DNI should fully exploit the authorities he currently has under the 
IRTPA and insist on his budgetary authorities in order to promote greater efficiency 
within the U.S. intelligence community. Even though the DNI’s powers are limited, he 
should use them in full scope. If he fails to exercise them, it will create a precedent for 
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weak or only virtual authorities of the DNI and discredit the position of the DNI as 
such. As Gordon Lederman suggests, “the DNI should thoroughly review the budget of 
each intelligence entity and refuse to include any programs in the next year’s budget 
proposal that fail to correspond to the DNI’s vision for integration. The DNI should also 
use his apportionment authority to hold entities’ feet to the fire, authorizing the release 
of selected appropriated funds only once the DNI is satisfied with the pace of 
integration.”169 This would allow the DNI to establish himself as the chief executive 
officer and to build up the unified intelligence enterprise, as was envisioned by the 9/11 
Commission. 
Second, in order to act efficiently as a chief coordinator, the DNI should leave 
some of the responsibilities connected with the preparation for the Presidential Daily 
Briefs to designated mission managers. This would allow the DNI to focus more on the 
organizational transition and management of the intelligence community. Moreover, 
orienting the U.S. intelligence community towards specified missions such as 
counterterrorism (here the mission manager is the Director of the NCTC), counter 
proliferation or by region, i.e. Iran, North Korea would help to break the stovepipes and 
enhance interagency cooperation.170 Also, the mission of the Office of the DNI must be 
clarified in order to prevent creating just another bureaucratic layer to the intelligence 
community organization and to support the DNI’s chief managerial role in a proper 
manner. Thus the ODNI’s roles, responsibilities and lines of authority have to be clearly 
declared.  
Third, culture of a single, unified enterprise needs to be created to promote 
better organizational incentives and to motivate intelligence personnel. The Joint Duty 
Program has to be endorsed by creating incentives for both managers to send their 
qualified personnel and also for the intelligence personnel themselves to produce quality 
outcomes while on their duty. In order to evaluate performance, as well as the post-
rotational career moves a rating system of a kind should be developed. Common 
organizational culture could be also enhanced by integrated training. Arthur S. Hulnick 
argues that “a centralized basic course would not only save money, but also build the 
kinds of relationships that would enhance information sharing and cross-agency 
assignments.”171 After the basic course a specialized courses within the respected 
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agencies would follow but the first training under the auspices of the intelligence 
community “brand” would help in establishing an integrated institutional culture. This 
common institutional culture, if promoted with the right incentives, would help prevent 
turf wars among agencies and improve cooperation. On the other hand, incentives for 
healthy competition in analysis should be supported and a certain amount of 
decentralization should be encouraged in order to avoid the problem of groupthink. 
Fourth, removing the overly complicated system of security clearances is 
essential for improving efficiency of the intelligence community. So far, each agency 
has its own system of providing security clearances and background checks and the 
agencies mostly do not recognize each others clearances, which seriously hampers 
information sharing. A unified system created under the supervision of the DNI would 
remove this obstacle. 
If done right, these proposals would help lessen the identified organizational 
obstacles to the intelligence community change. Improving managerial capabilities can 
help to, at least partially, overcome bounded rationality; establishment of integrated 
institutional culture can mitigate institutional inertia within the individual agencies; and 
incentives for information sharing can moderate structural secrecy. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that for all these suggestions to be 
successfully implemented a support of senior officials, beginning with the president, as 
well as of the legislators is crucial. Thus, the trade-off between decision makers’ 
incentives and capabilities has to create enough interest, as well as actual capabilities to 
seriously invest into substantial intelligence reform in order to improve intelligence 
community’s abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Much of the evidence presented in this chapter and previous one highlight that 
reform of the U.S. intelligence community post-9/11 is still a work in progress. 
However, adopting the suggested proposals would not only improve the efficiency of 
the intelligence community but would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. The 
interconnectedness of the effectiveness and efficiency criteria illustrated earlier in 
Figure 1.1 is clearly evident. Continuous organizational problems hampering the 
efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community have had a negative impact on 
effectiveness; that is on its abilities to prevent terrorist attacks. A case in point is the 
failed attempt to detonate a bomb on an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. 
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This incident was preceded by a number of systemic mistakes caused by the lack of 
efficiency within the intelligence community.172 Such recent evidence demonstrates that 
current initiatives to overcome organizational obstacles within the U.S. intelligence 
community have had limited success. If such security lapses are to be avoided in the 
future the United States government must address the question of what policies will 
ensure the most effective and efficient means of countering terrorist threats. 
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Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored the vulnerability and 
unpreparedness of the United States for such an attack. Most importantly, 9/11 
highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and operational capabilities to 
counter terrorism. First, the U.S. intelligence community could not operate in an 
integrated manner because its structure was a Cold War relic with no single actor with 
ultimate authority. Second, the executive branch lacked an effective coordinated 
planning mechanism for counterterrorism operations. 
Soon after 9/11 critical voices sprung up calling for substantial reform of the 
U.S. intelligence community in order to improve its abilities to counter terrorist threats. 
The purpose of this diploma thesis has been to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 
intelligence community reform on the basis on its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Throughout this research, the criteria of ‘effectiveness’ has been conceptualized as the 
ability of the intelligence community to prevent surprise attacks, whereas ‘efficiency’ 
has been operationalised as measures undertaken at the organizational level within the 
intelligence community in order to prevent terrorist attacks.  
At the beginning of this thesis, two key questions were raised. The first of these 
questions inquired into whether the U.S. intelligence community became more effective 
and efficient following the attacks of September 11, 2001? The evidence presented in 
the chapters 2 through 5 suggests that the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 is 
mostly effective (i.e. there has not been any successful terrorist attack). However, it is 
not efficient due to organizational problems, which include lack of leadership, inability 
or unwillingness to cooperate and share information, and to provide the right incentives 
for current personnel and potential recruits to the intelligence community. These 
institutional deficiencies cause inefficiency of the intelligence community, which 
consequently endanger the intelligence community’s effectiveness in countering 
terrorist threats.  
The second question asked in the introduction of this thesis delved into why in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 intelligence failure, has a thorough 
reform of the intelligence community not materialized? The hypothesis that the 
adoption of substantial intelligence reform (which would be both effective and efficient) 
was obstructed by a number of factors proves to be correct. First, the nature of U.S. 
intelligence organizations hindered extensive reform. Second, the rational choices of the 
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U.S. leadership (i.e. the executive and legislative branches of government) did not 
facilitate a process of significant change. Third, the American public’s democratic 
principles were sometimes in conflict with proposals that were seen to undermine civil 
liberties. Out of these three obstacles to substantial reform of U.S. intelligence, the 
organizational obstacles have been identified as the most significant factor in the 
resistance to reform. Therefore, most attention has been paid to the analysis of the 
organizational processes within the intelligence community’s institutions. 
The main argument presented throughout this diploma thesis has been that the 
original aim of reform was to transform the U.S. intelligence community into a single, 
unified enterprise that would be both effective in preventing the terrorist attacks and 
efficient in doing so. This goal has not been realized. Instead, although the post-9/11 
intelligence community has managed to prevent the terrorist attacks, its organizational 
problems still remain. 
In order to analyze and evaluate reform of the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence 
community and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence system 
an organizational model has been adopted. In this model, it has been argued that 
institutional reform is very difficult due to the bounded rationality of intelligence 
management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within U.S. intelligence 
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within intelligence agencies’ culture. 
Moreover, the intelligence institutions operate in a political and societal 
environment that creates additional constraints on their ability to adapt and reform. 
These external processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by 
American political leaders who often act in a manner that might be reasonably described 
as being motivated by rational self-interest. In addition, American public opinion and its 
adherence to democratic values based on protection of civil liberties has also been an 
important contextual variable. In general, intelligence community reform is a very 
difficult and long term process and this situation is not helped by public fears about any 
measures that might undermine civil liberties. As a result, the lack of popular support 
for strengthening of the U.S. intelligence community’s powers have often provided 
insufficient incentives for decision makers to embark on root-and-branch reform of the 
intelligence services. 
Chapter 2 has revealed this was the situation that permeated repeated attempts to 
reform the US intelligence community before 9/11. Throughout the 1990s a number of 
attempts were made to adapt the U.S. intelligence community to the changing nature of 
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threats that arose after the end of the Cold War. The transnational and asymmetric 
threats (especially terrorism) superseded the single danger posed by the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. The spectrum of present and potential targets was broadening and the 
intelligence community had to deal with an overwhelming amount of information 
stemming from these threats.  
Twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task 
forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
during the 1990s; and together these bodies made 340 recommendations to reform the 
intelligence community. Many of these proposals suggested improvement in the 
intelligence community’s sense of corporate identity; enhancing human intelligence; 
encouraging information sharing and improving personnel issues; and creating a better 
system of setting intelligence priorities. All of these suggestions were proposed by the 
Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission after the 9/11 as well. It is important to note that 
before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, there were not enough incentives 
for policy makers or intelligence community leaders to embark on a substantial reform 
agenda.  
The assumption introduced in this thesis has been that the shock of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks would create such incentives; however, chapter 3 presented evidence 
that tends to contradict this hypothesis. The immediate reaction of the Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress to events of 9/11 was focused on (a) quick fixes 
such as the enactment of the USA Patriot Act removing many barriers for domestic 
surveillance, or (b) wide governmental changes promoted through a new homeland 
security agenda. None of these initiatives represented what might be reasonably called a 
comprehensive approach towards reforming and integrating the intelligence community. 
Thus, the momentum for change generated by the tragic events of 9/11 vanished.  
Another opportunity to enforce far-reaching changes to create a more effective 
and efficient U.S. intelligence community occurred with publication of the 9/11 
Commission Report. Chapter 4 examined the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations embedded in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) enacted in 2004. A number of problems have been identified regarding the 
IRTPA. First, the impact of this law was diluted during the legislative debate in the U.S. 
Congress where the Defense Department lobby successfully obstructed many changes 
that would have endangered its exclusive position within the intelligence community. 
The DOD’s dominant position is evident from the fact that it secures 80 percent of the 
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intelligence community’s overall budget. Second, the IRTPA created new intelligence 
institutions such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National 
Counterterrorist Center (NCTC). However, the act does not vest enough power in them 
to allow them to attain a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. This limitation 
appears to be especially true in the case of the DNI where its position has been impaired 
and its coordination and managerial powers have been hampered. Therefore, the DNI is 
unable to overcome the organizational obstacles embedded in the intelligence 
community’s organizational culture. Third, the organizational obstacles outlined in this 
study refer primarily to the old intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, and 
their resistance to adapt to the new security environment and to implement properly the 
IRTPA provisions.  
The argument presented in this study of the organizational features of U.S. 
intelligence has been pointing to its lack of efficiency. Such inefficiency is particularly 
evident in the inability of the newly created institutions to properly manage and 
coordinate their activities and the unwillingness of the older established agencies to 
adapt and to embrace the new provisions. 
In order to improve efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community, a number of 
proposals have been suggested. These were outlined and discussed in chapter 5. A 
central feature of these proposals is the agency charged with the management of reform 
– the DNI. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a central and 
persistent failing of the U.S. intelligence community in the post Cold War period has 
been the inability to develop more effective and efficient channels of coordination. Here 
the institutional focus of this research has demonstrated why the logic of organizations 
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. With regard to the DNI, four concrete proposals for 
reform are pertinent.  
First, enhancing the power of the DNI through uncompromising exploitation of 
all authorities vested in it under the IRTPA. Second, the DNI’s focus should be on 
organizational transition rather than the time consuming task of preparing the daily 
presidential briefings. Third, this change would facilitate creating an organizational 
culture that pursues a single mission providing the motivation and incentives for 
enhanced cooperation. Fourth, such reform would reduce the extremely complicated 
system of security clearances which debilitates information sharing. If these steps for 
increasing the efficiency of the intelligence community are implemented, then the 
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effectiveness of the intelligence community in preventing surprise attacks is also likely 
to improve. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this study highlights an important 
general point: reform of the U.S. intelligence community is essentially a work in 
progress. This has important consequences not only for stakeholders’ (i.e. citizens, 
policy makers, intelligence providers and scholars) understanding of how the U.S. 
intelligence community operates, but also the most appropriate means of evaluating its 
strengths and weaknesses. In this diploma thesis, U.S. intelligence has been modeled 
using an input-output approach developed within systems theory where intelligence 
outputs have been evaluated on the basis of two criteria, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Such an approach has the merits of reducing a very complex set of organizational 
relationships to a small number of core features that facilitate generalization. However, 
this approach is limited as it adopts a static structural perspective and cannot deal 
effectively with the essentially strategic nature of institutional change. 
For this reason future research on reform of the U.S. intelligence community 
should focus on the operations of the DNI. Such research would deal not only with 
institutional structures but also with the strategic interactions that are a defining feature 
of the DNIs work. In this respect, the New Institutionalism literature and insights 
derived from formal modeling such as Game Theory would provide the foundations for 
a more detailed account of why the U.S. intelligence community has experienced such 
difficulty in improving coordination.  
Such a theoretical approach would facilitate identifying and constructing 
empirical indicators, or benchmarks, that would allow both scholars and practitioners to 
evaluate the success of different reform plans. Such a theoretical approach and 
methodology has the important advantage of reflecting the evolutionary nature of 
intelligence community change. The research presented in this diploma thesis represents 
an important and necessary first step in such a research agenda by mapping out the 
context and key players and providing a concise evaluation of the main institutional 
problem – coordination.  
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Summary 
The argument presented in this thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research question addressed in this thesis and the 
research model based on effectiveness and efficiency is introduced. 
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological background for this 
research thesis. This work commences with a definition of intelligence and a brief 
discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of intelligence and their relevance to the intelligence 
community reform are introduced. The organization theory approach to study 
intelligence community is recognized as the most appropriate. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11. It examines 
the changed intelligence environment after the end of the Cold War and the repeated 
attempts to reform the intelligence community amid the growth of transnational threats. 
This is followed by an analysis of the obstacles to these reform attempts. The evidence 
presented in chapter 2 suggests that the post-Cold War change of threat environment did 
not produce enough incentives for a substantial reform of America’s intelligence 
services. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the U.S. intelligence community 
was both inefficient and ineffective in its counterterrorism efforts and was unprepared to 
prevent the terrorist attacks due to institutional lethargy. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the search for answers as to 
why 9/11 happened, and what needed to be done in order to prevent it from happening 
again. First, the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations are 
examined. Then, the actions of the Congress and President Bush, undertaken 
simultaneously with the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission hearings, and their impact 
on the intelligence community reform are discussed. These new security policies 
include enactment of the USA Patriot Act, promoting the homeland security agenda and 
establishing the Terrorist Threat Information Center. The analysis presented in this 
chapter leads to a conclusion that none of these initiatives presented a comprehensive 
plan of reform of the U.S. intelligence community. 
Chapter 4 delves into the implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA provisions is 
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evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their role in the 
intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their attempts for 
internal change. The idea behind the 9/11 Commission recommendations was to create a 
unified intelligence community, which would work both effectively and efficiently on 
its mission to counter terrorist threats. The evidence presented in chapter suggests that 
only the first aim has been achieved. The efficiency of the U.S. intelligence community 
is still a work in progress. 
Chapter 5 provides some alternative approaches and perceptions of the U.S. 
intelligence reform and suggestions for future actions in order to make the intelligence 
community more efficient are proposed. It is argued that adopting the suggested 
proposals would not only improve the efficiency of the intelligence community but 
would also lead to enhanced effectiveness. 
In the concluding chapter the two research questions are answered and the main 
arguments of this diploma thesis summarized. Suggestion on future research on reform 
of the U.S. intelligence community focusing on the operations of the DNI using the 
New Institutionalism theory and Game Theory approaches are made.  
 
- 81 - 
 
Sources 
 
1. Primary Sources 
a. Acts 
USA Patriot Act. Public Law 107-56, October 26, 2001. Available at: 
<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Homeland Security Act. Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002. Available at: 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Public Law 108-458, 
December 17, 2004. Available at: <http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
 
b. Reports, Strategies 
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence 
Community. 1996. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. 
Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of 
the United States Intelligence Community.  Available at: 
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/index.html> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force. 1996.  Making 
Intelligence Smarter Task Force Report. Washington, D.C.: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press. Available at: 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/127/making_intelligence_smarter.html> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 1996. IC21: The 
Intelligence Community in the 21st Century Staff Study. I. Overview and 
Summary. Available at: 
<http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21_toc.html> [accessed 
18.5. 2010]. 
National Commission on Terrorism. 2002. Countering the Changing Threat of 
International Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on 
Terrorism. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010].  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2007. 100-Day Plan: Integration 
and Collaboration. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Available at: <http://www.dni.gov/100-day-
plan/100_FOLLOW_UP_REPORT.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2007. 500-Day Plan: Integration 
and Collaboration. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Available at: <http://www.dni.gov/500-day-plan.pdf> [accessed 
18.5. 2010]. 
- 82 - 
 
Office of the Homeland Security. 2002. National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. Washington, D.C.: White House, Office of Homeland Security 
Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf> [accessed 
18.5. 2010]. 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. 2001. Road Map for 
National Security: Imperative for Change. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Commission on National Security/21st Century. Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nssg.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. 2002. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Joint Inquiry Final Report).  
Available at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
 
c. Official Speeches 
Bush, George W. 2002. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation. 
Transcript available at: <http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html> [accessed 
18.5. 2010]. 
Bush George W. 2003. The 2003 State of the Union Address. Complete 
transcript available at: <http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.htm> [accessed 
18.5. 2010]. 
 
d. Testimonies 
Freeh, Louis J. 2004. “On War and Terrorism”. Testimony before the National 
Commission on Terrorist attack upon the United States. April 13, 2004. 
Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/freeh_statement.pdf> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Tenet, George. 2002. Written Statement for the Record of the Director of 
Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee. October 17, 2002. 
Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/101702tenet.html> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
 
2. Secondary Literature 
a. Monographs 
Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in 
American National Security. New York: Colombia University Press. 
Bolton, M. Kent. 2008. U.S. National Security and Foreign Policymaking after 
9/11: Present at the Re-creation. Plymouth: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc. 
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown. 
Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
- 83 - 
 
Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kaufman, Herbert. 1976. Are Governmental Organizations Immortal? 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. The Limits of Organizational Change. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press. 
Meyer, Marshall W., Zucker, Lynne G. 1989. Permanently Failing 
Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Moynihan, Daniel P. 1998. Secrecy: The American Experience. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Nacos, Brigitte L. 2005. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding 
Threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World. New York: Penguin 
Academics. 
Noftsinger, John B., Newbold, Kenneth F., Wheeler, Jack K. 2007. 
Understanding Homeland Security: Politics, Perspectives and Paradoxes. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Odom, William E. 2003. Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Perrow, Charles. 1984. Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the 
Wake of 9/11. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Posner, Richard A. 2006. Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in 
the Throes of Reform. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Turner, Michael A. 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
b. Chapters in Edited Volumes 
Alexander, Yonah. 2006. “United States”. Pp. 9-43 in Alexander, Yonah (ed.). 
Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. 
Bruneau, Thomas C., Boraz, Steven C. 2007. “Intelligence Reform: Balancing 
Democracy and Effectiveness”. Pp. 1-24 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. 
Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
Doyle, Charles. 2005. “Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA 
Patriot Act”. Pp. 1-82 in Alphonse B. Ewing (ed.). The USA Patriot Act 
Reader. New York: Nova Publishers. 
- 84 - 
 
Egeberg, Morton. 2003. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An 
Organizational Perspective”. Pp. 116-126 in B. Guy Peters, John Pierre (eds.). 
Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage Publications. 
Hastedt, Glenn P. 2007. “Washington Politics, Intelligence, and the Struggle 
against Global Terrorism”. Pp. 99-125 in Loch K. Johnson (ed.). Strategic 
Intelligence Vol. 4: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism: Defending the 
Nation against Hostile Forces. Westport: Praeger Security International. 
Hastedt Glenn P., Skelley, Douglas B. 2009. “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: 
Insights from Organization Theory”. Pp. 112-130 in Peter Gill, Stephen 
Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.). Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debate. 
New York: Routledge. 
Hornbarger, Chris. 2006. “National Strategy: Building Capability for the Long 
Haul”. Pp. 272-322 in Russell D. Howard, James J.F. Forest, Joanne C. Moore 
(eds.). Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Jervis, Robert. 2009. “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception, and 
Deception”. Pp. 69-79 in Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Vaults, 
Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Jones, Seth G. 2006. “Terrorism and the Battle for Homeland Security”. Pp. 
266-271 in Russell D. Howard, James J.F. Forest, Joanne C. Moore (eds.). 
Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Lahneman, William J. 2007. “U.S. Intelligence prior to 9/11 and Obstacles to 
Reform”. Pp. 73-95 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming 
Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: 
University of Texas Press.   
Lederman, Gordon N. 2005. “Restructuring the Intelligence Community”. Pp. 
65-102 in Peter Berkowitz (ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: The Hoover Institution. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. 2008. “Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 
11 and Iraq”. Pp. 226-237 in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.). 
Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
May, Ernest R. 1996. “Intelligence: Backing into the Future”. Pp. 36-45 in Roy 
Godson, Ernest R. May and Gary Schmitt (eds.). U.S. Intelligence at the 
Crossroads. Washington: Brassey’s. 
Moe, Terry. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure”.  Pp. 267-322 in  
John E. Chubb, Paul E. Peterson (eds.). Can the Government Govern? 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Schultz, Robert, H. 2005. “The Era of Armed Groups”. Pp. 1-39 in Peter 
Berkowitz (ed.). The Future of American Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: The 
Hoover Institution. 
Snider, L Britt. 2005. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 
11”. Pp. 239-258 in Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber (eds.). Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
- 85 - 
 
Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of  Intelligence”. 
Pp. 17-27 in Loch K. Johnson (ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
c. Articles in Scholarly Journals 
Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence 
Failures Are Inevitable”. World Politics 31 (1): 61-89. 
Betts, Richard K. 2002. “Fixing Intelligence”. Foreign Affairs 81 (1): 43-59. 
Conley, Richard S. 2006. “Reform, Reorganization, and the Renaissance of the 
Managerial Presidency: The Impact of 9/11 on the Executive Establishment”. 
Politics & Policy 34 (2): 304-342. 
Davis, Jack. 1992. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949”. Studies in Intelligence 
36 (5): 91-104. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1991. “Toward the Post-Cold War World”. Foreign Affairs 
70 (Spring): 102-122. 
Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John. 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational 
Change”. American Sociological Review 49: 149-164. 
Haynes, Wendy. 2004. “Seeing around Corners: Crafting the New Department 
of Homeland Security”. Review of Policy Research (21): 369-395. 
Hedley, John. 1996. “The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix 
it?” Studies in Intelligence 39 (5): 11-19.   
Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”. 
Intelligence and National Security 19 (2): 342-358. 
Hulnick, Arthur R. 2007. “Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20 (4): 567-582. 
Hulnick, Arthur S. 2008. “Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21 (4): 621-634. 
Jervis, Robert. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and 
Intelligence Reform”. The Forum 4 (1): 1-14. 
Kibbe, Jennifer. 2010. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: In the Solution 
Part of the Problem?” Intelligence and National Security 25(1): 24-49. 
Krauthammer, Charles. 1990.  “The Unipolar Moment”.  Foreign Affairs 70 (1): 
23–33. 
Layne, Christopher. 1993.  “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will 
Arise”.  International Security 17 (4): 5–51. 
Layne, Christopher. 1997.  “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: 
America’s Future Grand Strategy”. International Security 22 (1): 86–124. 
Lederman, Gordon N. 2009. “Making Intelligence Reform Work”. The 
American Interest 2009 (Spring/Summer): 25. 
Maddrell, Paul. 2009. “Failing Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats”. 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22 (2): 195-220. 
Marrin, Stephen. 2007. “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and 
Predicting Analytic Responsibilities”. Intelligence and National Security 22 
(6): 821-846. 
Nye, Joseph S. 2002. “Limits of American Power”. Political Science Quarterly 
117 (4): 545-559. 
- 86 - 
 
Neary, Patrick C. 2010. “The State of Intelligence Reform, 2009”. Studies in 
Intelligence 54 (1): 1-16. 
Perrow, Charles. 2006. “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland 
Security and the Intelligence Reorganization”. Homeland Security Affairs 2 
(1): 1-32. 
Pillar, Paul R. 2006. “Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11 Commission’s 
Tale of Strategic Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 21 (6): 
1022-1044. 
Rovner Joshua, Long Austin. 2005. “The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence 
Reform and the 9/11 Commission”. International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 18 (4): 609-637. 
Rovner, Joshua, Long, Austin, Zegart, Amy. 2007. “Correspondence: 
Intelligence Reform?” International Security 30 (4): 196-208. 
Turner, Michael A. 2005. “Intelligence Reform and the Politics of 
Entrenchment”.  International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
18 (3): 383-397. 
Vickers, Robert. 2006. “The Intelligence Reform Quandary”.  International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19 (2): 
Zegart Amy. 2005. “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of the U.S. 
Intelligence Agencies”. International Security 29 (4): 78-111. 
 
d. Working Papers, Congressional Reports 
Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation. Available at 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Best, Richard A. Jr. 2001. Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering 
Transnational Threats to the U.S. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service. Available at: <http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 
2010]. 
Best, Richard A. Jr. 2004. Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949–
2004. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Best, Richard A. Jr. 2010. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – 
Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service. Available at: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41022.pdf> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
Cumming, Alfred, Masse, Todd. 2004. FBI Intelligence Reform since September 
11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32336.pdf> 
[accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
 
e. Newspaper Articles 
Jehl, Douglas. 2005. “Bush Picks Longtime Diplomat for New Top Intelligence 
Job”. New York Times February 18, 2005. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/politics/18director.html?pagewanted=pr
int&position=> [accessed 18.5. 2010]. 
- 87 - 
 
Miller, Greg. 2010. “Spy Agencies Faulted for Missing Christmas Day Bomb 
Attempt, Senate Panel Finds”. Washington Post May 15, 2010. Available at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/18/AR2010051805073.html> [accessed 18.5. 
2010]. 
Wolf, Jim. 2008. “U.S. says 2008 intelligence budget was $47.5 billion”. 
Reuters October 28, 2008. Available at: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49R8DQ20081028> [accessed 18.5. 
2010]. 
- 88 - 
 
List of Appendices  
 
Appendix 1. U.S. Intelligence Community before the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act 
 
Appendix 2.  U.S. Intelligence Community after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act Reorganization 
 
Appendix 3.  List of Abbreviations 
89 
 
Appendix 1. U.S. Intelligence Community before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
 
Source: Odom, W. 2003. Fixing Intelligence for a more secure America, p. 197. 
- 90 - 
 
Appendix 2. U.S. Intelligence Community after the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act Reorganization  
 
 
  Source: Lowenthal, Mark M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, p. 32. 
- 91 - 
 
Appendix 3. List of Abbreviations 
 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CTC  Counterterrorism Center 
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence 
DEA  Drug Enforcement Administration 
DNI  Director of National Intelligence 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DOE  Department of Energy 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FISA  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FY  Fiscal Year 
HSC  Homeland Security Council 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
IAIP  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
IC21  Intelligence Community in the 21st Century Committee 
IMINT  Imagery Intelligence 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
NCPC  National Counter Proliferation Center 
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center 
NFIP  National Foreign Intelligence Program 
NGA  National Geospatial Agency 
NIC  National Intelligence Council 
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate 
NIP  National Intelligence Program 
NRO  National Reconnaissance Office  
NSA  National Security Agency 
IRTPA  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
JMIP  Joint Military Intelligence Program 
JTTF  Joint Terrorism Task Force 
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OHS  Office of Homeland Security 
PDB  Presidential Daily Brief 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence  
TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
TSA  Transport Security Administration 
TTIC  Terrorism Threat Information Center 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
- 92 - 
 
PROJEKT DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE 
 
 
Jméno:  
Alžběta Bernardyová 
 
E-mail:  
bernardyova@seznam.cz 
 
Semestr: 
Letní 
 
Akademický rok: 
2008/2009 
 
Název diplomové práce: 
Vnitřní bezpečnost: realita či mýtus? Domácí boj s terorismem a reforma 
zpravodajských složek Spojených států amerických po 11. září 2001 
(Homeland Security: Reality or Myth? Domestic counterterrorism and U.S. Intelligence 
Community Reform post 9/11) 
 
Předpokládaný termín ukončení:  
LS 2009/2010 
 
Vedoucí práce:  
PhDr. Vít Střítecký 
 
Vymezení tématu: 
Diplomová práce se bude zabývat analýzou změn v protiteroristické politice 
Spojených států po teroristických útocích z 11. září 2001. Cílem těchto změn bylo 
dosažení sjednocení protiteroristických politik a vytvoření jednotného systému 
schopného zajistit vnitřní bezpečnost Spojených států před teroristickými hrozbami. 
Jednalo se za prvé o vytvoření nového Ministerstva pro vnitřní bezpečnost (DHS) a o 
reformu zpravodajských složek.  
Časově tedy bude práce vymezena útoky z 11. září 2001 až po konec druhého 
prezidentského období George W. Bushe. 
 
Zdůvodnění výběru tématu a jeho významu 
V Národní strategii pro vnitřní bezpečnost z roku 2002 byla představena 
koncepce DHS, které mělo sloužit jako sjednocující jádro rozsáhlé národní sítě 
organizací a institucí zapojených do vnitřní bezpečnosti. Jedním z hlavních úkolů DHS 
pak mělo být také vyvinutí propojených a doplňujících se systémů, které se navzájem 
posilují namísto toho, aby se duplikovaly. Zde však vyvstává hlavní problém této 
strategie. DHS spojilo pod svou působnost 22 vládních agentur a úřadů s cca 170 tisíci 
zaměstnanci.  
Již od počátku začalo docházet k bojům o moc, udržení pravomocí a 
samozřejmě co nejvyššího rozpočtu mezi těmito jednotlivými institucemi, které 
odmítaly spolupráci a podřízení se novému ministerstvu. Také CIA a FBI, které měly 
poskytnout DHS své zpravodajské informace týkající se teroristických hrozeb vnitřní 
bezpečnosti k centrálnímu shromáždění, analýze a dalšímu šíření, se postavily proti a 
- 93 - 
 
raději začaly samy vytvářet své protiteroristické aktivity zabývající se zajišťováním 
vnitřní bezpečnosti. 
 
 
Cíle diplomové práce: 
Cílem mé práce bude analýza událostí, které vedly k vytvoření DHS a dále 
provázely tento složitý proces. Analyzována bude také navazující reforma 
zpravodajských složek. Hlavní pozornost bude věnována problematickým aspektům 
těchto reforem z hlediska sjednocování protiteroristických politik administrativou 
presidenta G.W. Bushe.  
 
Výzkumná otázka: 
 Základní otázkou práce bude proč i přes snahy administrativy presidenta G.W. 
Bushe nedošlo za celou dobu jeho prezidentského období k vytvoření plánovaného 
jednotného systému vnitřní bezpečnosti. Jako navazující otázka se pak nabízí, zda je 
takovýto systém možné v současném americkém politickém systému vytvořit a zda je 
sjednocení zpravodajských služeb z hlediska protiteroristické strategie USA opravdu 
žádoucí. 
 
Předběžná hypotéza: 
Fakt, že k vytvoření jednotného systému zcela nedošlo, dosud neznamenal 
fatální ohrožení vnitřní bezpečnosti Spojených států amerických. Je proto možné 
předpokládat, že centralizování zpravodajských služeb a ostatních agentur vnitřní 
bezpečnosti není pro zajištění bezpečnosti USA nezbytně nutné. 
 
Předpokládná metoda zpracování tématu: 
Hlavní metodou práce bude aplikace neoliberální institucionální teorie motivů a 
procesů vytváření politických institucí na proces založení DHS a dále na institucionální 
reformu amerických zpravodajských složek.  
Na jedné straně se zaměřím na analýzu oficiálních dokumentů (zákonů, vládních 
vyhlášek, prohlášení a analýz) a na straně druhé budu čerpat z novinových komentářů a 
analýz věnujících se dané problematice, a také z odborných prací na dané téma 
(publikace, články v odborných časopisech, atd.). 
 
Předpokládaná osnova práce 
1. Úvod 
2. Vnitřní bezpečnost a zpravodajské složky před 11. zářím 2001 
3. 11. září 2001 a selhání zpravodajských služeb 
4. Reorganizace vnitřní bezpečnosti po 11. září – Ministerstvo pro vnitřní 
bezpečnost 
5. Reforma zpravodajských složek 
6. Hlavní problematické aspekty 
7. Závěr 
Seznam literatury: 
1. Prameny 
a. Zákony 
- 94 - 
 
Homeland Security Act. Public Law 107/296, 25.11. 2002. Dostupný z: 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf>. 
Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act. Public Law 108-458, 17.12. 
2004. Dostupný z: <http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf>. 
b. Zprávy, strategie 
National Commission on Terrorism. Countering the Changing Threat of 
International Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on 
Terrorism, 2000. 57 s. Dostupné z: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004. 567 s. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Law 
Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United 
States Prior to 9/11: Staff Statement no. 9. Washington, D.C.: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004. 12 s. 
National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington, D.C.: White House, 
Office of Homeland Security, 2002. 71 s. Dostupné z: 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf>. 
Terrorism in the United States 2000/2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice. 49 s. Dostupné z: 
<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.pdf>. 
House of Permanent Select Committee on Inteligence and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence. Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 
Community Activity before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 2002. 127s. 
Částečně odtajněný dokument dostupný z: 
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/part1.pdf>. 
 
c. Projevy 
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation předneseného 6.6. 2002. 
Dostupný z: 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html> [cit. 
11.5.]. 
 
2. Sekundární literatura 
a. Monografie 
BOLTON, M. Kent. U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Making: 
Present at Re-creation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2008. 433 s. 
BULLOCK, Jane A., HADDOW, George D., COPPOLA, Damon P. 
Introduction to Homeland Security. Boston: Elsevier Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2006. 588 s. 
- 95 - 
 
CLARKE, Richard A. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on 
Terror. New York: Free Press, 2004. 305 s. 
NACOS, Brigitte L. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding 
Threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World. New York: Longman 
Publishers, 2006. 325 s. 
NAFTALI, Timothy. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American 
Counterterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 2005. 399 s. 
POSNER, Richard A. Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the 
Throes of Reform. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006. 
228 s. 
PURPURA, Philip B.. Terrorism and Homeland Security: An Introduction 
with Applications. Boston: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. 465 s. 
RICHELSON, Jeffrey T. The U.S. Intelligence Community. Philadelphia, 
PA: Westview Press, 2008. 
SIMS, Jennifer E., GERBER, Burton (eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 
 
b. Kapitoly ve sbornících 
9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 8. Counterterrorism before 9/11: 
National Policy Coordination. In Understanding the War on Terror: A 
Foreign Affairs Book. New York: Foreign Affairs, s. 166-181. 
ALEXANDER, Yonah. United States. In ALEXANDER, Yonah: 
Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, s. 9-43. 
GOURÉ, Daniel. Homeland Security. In KURTH CRONIN, Audrey, 
LUDES, James M. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, s. 261-284. 
HORNBARGER, Chris. National Strategy: Building Capability for the 
Long Haul. In HOWARD, Russell D., FOREST, James J.F., MOORE, 
Joanne C. Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, s. 272-322. 
JONES, Seth G. Terrorism and the Battle for Homeland Security. In 
HOWARD, Russell D., FOREST, James J.F., MOORE, Joanne C. 
Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, s. 266-272. 
 
c. Články v odborných časopisech 
BERKOWITZ, Bruce. Intelligence for the Homeland. SAIS Review. 2004, 
vol. 24, no. 1, s. 1-6. 
- 96 - 
 
CONLEY, Richard S. Reform, Reorganization, and the Renaissance of the 
Managerial Presidency : The Impact of 9/11 on the Executive 
Establishment. Politics & Policy. 2006, vol. 34, no. 2, s. 304-342. 
HAYNES, Wendy. Seeing around Corners: Crafting the New Department of 
Homeland Security. Review of Policy Research. 2004, vol. 21, no. 3, s. 369-
395. 
MURRAY, Jennifer. Is There Room in the Intelligence Community for 
HSINT? SAIS Review, 2008, vol. 28, no. 1, s. 141-143. 
 
d. Podkladové studie, analýzy 
CARAFANO, James J., HEYMAN, David: DHS 2.0 : Rethinking the 
Department of Homeland Security. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 2004. 35 s. Dokument dostupný z: 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/72759_1.pdf
>. 
CHALK, Peter, ROSENAU, William. Intelligence, Police, and 
Counterterrorism: Assessing Post-9/11 Initiatives. Arlington, Va.: Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2003. 29 s. 
RELYEA, Harold C., HOGUE, Henry B. Department of Homeland 
Security: The 2SR Initiative. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 2005. 29 s. Zpráva pro Kongres Spojených států amerických 
dostupná z: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33042.pdf>. 
 
e. Elektronické dokumenty 
Department Six-point Agenda. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland 
Security, 21.2. 2008, dostupné z: 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0646.shtm>. 
 
Podpis studenta a datum: 
 
15.6. 2009  
 
 
Vedoucí práce: PhDr. Vít Střítecký 
 
Schváleno: 
 
